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1. Introduction 
 
At Europol’s home-page, the visitor is welcomed with the words: 
 
“Europol is the European Law Enforcement Organisation which aims at improving the 
effectiveness and co-operation of the competent authorities in the Member States in 
preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of 
international organised crime.” 
 
The establishment of Europol was agreed upon in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union 
of 7 February 1992. It started limited operations on 3 January 1994 in the form of the Europol 
Drugs Unit (EDU) fighting against drugs. Progressively, other important areas of criminality 
were added. On 1 January 2002, the mandate of Europol was extended to deal with all serious 
forms of international crime1
 
. The Europol Convention was ratified by all Member States and 
came into force on 1 October 1998. Following a number of legal acts related to the 
Convention, Europol commenced its full activities on 1 July 1999. In 2009 the agency 
officially celebrated its 10th anniversary. On the 18 of April 2008, the EU interior ministers 
reached a political consensus on the “Council Decision establishing Europol” in Luxembourg. 
This Council Decision will replace the Europol Convention, and Europol will thus become 
one of the EU agencies and will be funded from the Community budget instead of 
contributions from the Member States. 
Based on the provisions of the Europol Convention, the objectives of Europol are to improve 
the effectiveness of and cooperation among police authorities of EU Member States in order 
to prevent and combat serious international organized crime. Europol’s specific areas of 
criminal investigation include the illicit trafficking in drugs, vehicles, and human beings, 
including child pornography; forgery of money; money-laundering; and terrorism. Priority is 
given to crimes against persons, financial crimes, and cyber crimes; when an organized 
criminal structure is involved and when the criminal activity involves two or more Member 
States of the EU.  
 
                                                 
1 such as organized robbery, swindling and fraud, computer crime, corruption, environmental crime, and other 
crimes specified in the Europol Convention’s Annex (Europol Convention, 1995 
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Similar to the structure of other international police organizations (e.g. Interpol), Europol is 
not an executive police force with autonomous investigative powers. Instead, Europol’s 
activities are oriented at facilitating communications among and supporting selected activities 
of the police organizations in the participating states. 
 
Europol cannot be analysed without taking the changing nature of the European Union and its 
cooperation in Police and Judicial Cooperation into account. Police work belongs to the core 
issues of state sovereignty. Until today, law enforcement authorities tend to prefer the security 
of established bilateral working relationships to the often cumbersome and rather new 
cooperation structures involving all Member States.2
 
 So how can cooperation in such a 
sensitive area evolve?  
This Doctoral thesis aims at understanding why Europol evolved during the past decade; how 
its mandate is defined; how it interacts with the relevant authorities in the Member States and 
other international bodies; and finally to whom Europol is accountable – both from a legal and 
democratic perspective. During this introduction, I will give an overview of the underlying 
theories as well as of my working methods and assumptions. 
 
 
1.1. Weber’s bureaucratization theory 
 
The best way to explain current European police cooperation and Europol is to apply Max 
Weber’s theory. Mathieu Deflem reflected on Weber’s (1922) bureaucratization theories and 
concepts to understand the above mentioned developments. He defends that the theoretical 
viewpoint that the cooperation between law enforcement agencies are shaped by a historical 
process of bureaucratization.  
 
Three conditions are central to this development3
1. the structural condition of formal bureaucratic autonomy of police institutions; 
: 
2. the operational motive among police of a shared conception of crime and crime 
control to create transnational “expert systems”; and 
                                                 
2 see also Malcolm Anderson, Counterterrorism as an Objective of European Police Cooperation, in European 
Democracies Against Terrorism, edited by Fernando Reinares, Onati International Series in Law and Society, 
Dartmouth, 2000, p. 240 
3 lbid, pp. 12–34 
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3. a remarkable persistence of nationality can be observed in international police work, 
does not clash with a police institution’s relative autonomy from governmental 
control, because both the governments and the bureaucracies of states are legitimated 
in the context of national states 
 
 
1.1.1. “Relative independence” 
 
First, in order to accomplish cooperation across national borders, police institutions must have 
gained a position of relative independence from the dictates of the governments of their 
respective national states. Such a condition of institutional independence or formal 
bureaucratic autonomy allows public police institutions, though formally sanctioned by states, 
to autonomously plan and execute relevant strategies of crime control and order maintenance. 
Early efforts to organize international police cooperation in Europe in the nineteenth century, 
for instance, were limited in scope and operations because they were politically motivated and 
planned by autocratic governments.4
 
  
My Chapter on the “Historical evolution of Police and Judicial Cooperation” (chapter 2.) will 
argue that the first manifestations of police cooperation (TREVI group) were very informal. 
Later the political behaviour of Member States changed towards an institutionalisation of 
cooperation. This happened especially after the mid 1990s5
 
. This is mainly due to single 
markets externalities on immigration, asylum and policing policies which were not to be 
solved by intergovernmental regulation. On the 1 May 1999, the Amsterdam Treaty 
committed the Council to remove “controls on persons, be they citizens of the Union or 
nationals of third countries, crossing internal borders” within five years of the entry into force. 
The Treaty also incorporated the 3000 pages of the Schengen acquis into the legal framework 
of the EU. As a result the institutions for collective decision-making such as the Trevi 
framework, the Schengen Accord and Justice and Home Affairs provisions of the Maastricht 
Treaty were established.  
                                                 
4 lbid. pp. 45–65 
5 Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union, Second Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2005., 
pp 365 
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The removal of internal borders and the setting-up of surveillance of external borders (the so-
called “Schengen borders”) increased leads to the phenomenon Jörg Monar identified as 
“distinction between outside and inside. It is the main implication of an emphasis put on 
internal security provided through effective law enforcement and access to justice: “It implies 
a fundamental distinction between a ‘safe(r) inside’ and an ‘unsafe(r) outside’ with the EU’s 
frontiers as the dividing line and law enforcement as the key instrument to maintain and 
further enhance this distinction. (…)The dynamic of exclusion which such an approach and its 
claim to supreme legitimacy can generate is quite obvious: People from the ‘outside’ which 
actually or potentially endanger the ‘safe inside’ must be kept outside or brought under 
appropriate control and enforcement action.”6
 
 
Simon Hix argues, that one of the central aims of the modern state is to grand and protect 
citizens’ rights and freedoms and that the Amsterdam Treaty commits in a similar way the EU 
to „maintain and develop an area of freedom, security and justice.“7 The “area of freedom, 
security and justice”8
 
 was defined as equal access to justice for all EU citizens, cooperation 
between the member states’ authorities on civil matters, and the establishment of minimum 
common rules covering criminal acts, procedures and penalties. One of the major – perceived 
– threats to the security of citizens is terrorism. The establishment of the Trevi (Terrorism, 
Radicalism, Extremism and Violence) Group was agreed upon in 1975, after the 1972 
massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games,  
A number of scholars claim that the fight against terrorism was a pivot element which 
triggered the deepening of cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs. Jörg Monar thinks that 
the EU had to respond9
                                                 
6 Jörg Monar, Justice and Home Affairs in a Wider Europe: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion in ESRC 
‘One Europe or Several?’ Programme Working Paper 07/00, pp. 6 
 to the challenge of a terrorist attack through adequate internal security 
measures, participate effectively in the international front against the terrorist networks and 
provide credible solidarity with the United States. Already one of these tasks would have put 
a considerable strain on the Union’s capacity to act, but together they formed quite a 
formidable test for the potential and limits for the Union as an actor in fight against 
international terrorism. It is important to keep in mind that – even if the role of the European 
Union is a growing one – the Member States do not intend to give up their sovereignty in law 
enforcement. Police forces, judicial authorities, security and intelligence agencies and border 
7 Simon Hix, op.cit., p. 344 
8 TEU, Title IV, Article 61 
9 Jörg Monar, op.cit., p. 387 
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authorities all remain under national control; and most operational work in the field of 
counter-terrorism will remain the preserve of national authorities.  
 
Malcom Anderson10
 
 questions anti-terrorist action as basis for institutionalized transnational 
police cooperation for various reasons: As it is usually direct towards influencing state policy 
it is par excellence an issue of state security. As political causes and interests are involved, 
government usually have widely differing perspectives on the implications and importance of 
particular terrorist incidents. Within the state it is already difficult enough to coordinate police 
and intelligence services and they often also have different interests in international 
cooperation. Political violence is normally linked to broadly base political movements and 
cannot be repressed by police action alone but requires coordinated government policies 
aimed at removing the underlying root causes. And finally acts of terror have a dramatic 
impact on public opinion but they are relatively rare compared with ordinary criminality and 
long periods without countries experiencing any incident weaken the day-to-day commitment 
of police agencies to international cooperation.  
Or as Monica den Boer puts it “European security identity is still hugely fragmented, its 
scattered nature is reinforced even further by the weakness of supranational government and 
the lack of public and social legitimacy.”11
 
 
However, the events following 9/11 support the importance of the fight against terrorism not 
only for police cooperation at UN level, but also for the role of Europol on a European level. 
On the 20 September 2001, the Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted several measures to 
combat terrorism on the basis of proposals by Europol and the Council General-Secretariat. 
On the 15 November 2001 a specialized counter-terrorism unit, the Counter-Terrorism Task 
Force became fully operational at the Europol headquarters. This specialized unit consists of 
terrorism and liaison officers and seconded experts from police and intelligence services of 
the Member States. A year later the Task Force was incorporated into the Serious Crime 
Department, but became a separate entity again after the Madrid bombing in March 2004. 
 
                                                 
10 Malcolm Anderson, op.cit., p. 230 
11 Monika den Boer, The fight against Terrorism in the Second and Third Pillars of the Maastricht 
Treaty: Complement of Overlap?, in Fernando Reinare, European Democracies Against Terrorism, Onati 
International Series in Law and Society, Dartmouth, 2000 
  op.cit, p. 221 
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The evolution of European treaties and the agreement of the diverse Justice and Home Affairs 
programmes must be understood as documents which reflect a harmonisation of the concept 
of western democracies among the Member States. They were given birth under the 
impression of the two world wars, agreed upon by states which committed themselves to 
human rights and civil liberties. Only then could police authorities gain their position of 
“relative independence” and freedom of being instrumentalized or abused by their respective 
regimes. My analysis of the treaties and their impact on Justice and Home affairs, as well as 
the Justice and Home Affairs programmes will show how an evolving, common 
understanding of a modern society paved the way for Europol. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty as a legal document will not directly influence Europol. The “spirit” of the 
Treaty on the other hand, already found its echo in the Council Decision establishing Europol; 
which is why I did not discuss it in detail. 
 
 
1.1.2. “Expert Systems” 
 
As a consequence to the “relative independence”, police agencies develop expert systems of 
knowledge that can be shared among fellow professionals across national boundaries
 
. In the 
case of international cooperation, such knowledge systems particularly concern expertise 
about the course of international crime, as well as criminal developments that affect several 
countries at once, such as the influence of economic modernization on criminal conditions 
across the world.  
The chapter on “Europol’s objective” (chapter 3.2.1.) explains the agencies scope with 
regards to crime, and also shows how it got enlarged with the Council Decision establishing 
Europol. From 1 of January 2010, it “shall cover organised crime, terrorism and other forms 
of serious crime (…) affecting two or more Member States in such a way as to require a 
common approach by the Member States owing to the scale, significance and consequences of 
the offences.”12
 
  
                                                 
12 Article 4, Council Decision establishing the European Police Office, op.cit. 
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My chapter on “Europol’s IT Databases” (chapter 3.5.) shows how sophisticated the means of 
communication actually are. They enable national police authorities to exchange data within 
the highest security perimeters. Additionally Europol is granted access to European databases 
like the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Visa Information System (VIS) and it is 
currently discussed to allow access to Eurodac. Based on the available information, Europol 
officers are able to identify pan-European trends, as well as cooperate with national police 
officers in fighting transnational crime-groups. Consequently it improves the “effectiveness 
and co-operation of the competent authorities in the Member States in preventing and 
combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of international 
organised crime.”13
 
 
 
1.1.3. “Persistence of nationality” 
 
Third, considering the form in which international cooperation will take place, international 
police work will primarily remain oriented at enforcement tasks that have a distinctly local or 
national significance. The national persistence of international police work does not clash 
with a police institution’s relative autonomy from governmental control, because both the 
governments and the bureaucracies of states are legitimated in the context of national states. A 
remarkable persistence of nationality can be observed in international police work
 
. This 
assumption is one of the underlying hypotheses of my work.  
Especially my chapter on “Europol and the Member States” (chapter 4.6.) shows the validity 
of this argument. Europol does not exist in a void but actually in a rather “crowded space” 
dominated by national law enforcement agencies, and complemented by diverse International 
Police Organisations like Interpol and finally a number of European bodies. As the setup of 
Europol very much reflects this European reality in police cooperation I will analyse their 
structure in the chapter on “the institutional framework and cooperation” (chapter 4). Eurojust 
and Frontex are the European agencies which are most relevant for Europol. The Police 
Chiefs Task Force and the Joint Situation Centre are – even though they not European 
agencies – important as well. They all contribute to the work of Europol, and share to a 
                                                 
13 Europol home-page 
www.europol.eu 
Retrieved 04. September 2009 
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certain extend the same problems: the quality of their work depends very much on the 
willingness of the national law enforcement agencies to cooperate with them.  
 
There already exists vast legislation on the obligation to communicate criminal intelligence 
and information with Europol and the agency draws a picture which shows how much the 
situation improved since its installation. Reality – however - is less rosy. Some Member 
States still deprive Europol of the information it needs to produce an added value for the 
national police agencies. It is more or less a vicious circle. Without offering added value to 
those – let’s call them “reluctant” – Member States, it is hard for Europol to build up 
reputation. Without a good reputation it is nearly impossible to receive national criminal 
intelligence which is necessary to identify pan-European trends. 
 
I will argue that the reluctance of national law enforcement agencies to transmit information 
is linked to a number of reasons. Member States prefer to cooperate bilaterally in sensitive 
issues. Most of them have had cooperated this way for decades, which enabled them to build 
up mutual trust. Feeding information into the Europol system would mean to share sensitive 
information with not only the European agency, but also with the rest of the European 
Member States. This reluctance to “broadcast” information is even easier to understand, if one 
remembers how unwilling police agencies are already on a national level to cooperate. 
Conveying this situation again to the European level, different cultures and languages even 
impede these circumstances.  
 
The persistence of nationality will also be shown explicitly, when Europol’s mandate and 
structure are analysed in chapter 3.2.  “Europol’s mandate” and chapter 3.3. “The crux of two 
separate entities at Europol”. European Member States have defined crimes differently, 
criminals have been treated differently, courts have been structured differently and the 
different law enforcement agencies have been developed very differently along historical 
patterns, and therefore hold differing powers and mandates. Criminals – on the other hand - 
have never been bound by similar constraints, but are actually rather quick to exploit them. So 
one could perceive Europol as a pragmatic way to respond to imbalance between 
internationally working crime syndicates and police forces which are pretty much bound to 
the soil of the state they are meant to protect.  
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The European answer to this situation was the setup of an expert system (as described above). 
But this expert system is actually not as “European” as it seems at the first glance. Everyone 
not specifically concerned with Europol might think that Europol is one entity, with its entire 
staff following the same procedures to achieve the same goal and fight international crime in 
Europe. There is – however - an arbitrary distinction between Europol staff on the one hand, 
and Liaison staff and National Units on the other hand. This basically creates two different 
entities, and establishes an artificial division between police officers who basically follow the 
same goals. By separating those two entities organisationally, Member States are able to use 
their National Units for the simple bilateral exchange of information, while excluding 
“European core” of Europol (namely the international staff in the serious crime units) from 
highly interesting and valid information at the same time. Member States can choose if they 
prefer to work in an intergovernmental manner, or if they include the (more or less) 
supranational part as well. My numbers clearly show that the supranational part is bypassed in 
the larger part of cases! As a consequence, Europol’s supranational core-business, e.g. like the 
publication of annual threat assessments, suffers from the lack of information. Consequently it 
is not able to create added value for the respective national agencies.  
 
In 2006 the Austrian EU Presidency asked the question if “the role of Europol is to be 
expanded towards that of a European investigative authority with police powers”14 which 
would then have to face differences in law and criminal procedure law.15 The High Level 
Conference on the Future of Europol agreed generally that no full law enforcement 
competencies for Europol were desired and a clear description of the competences was wished 
for.16
 
  Its recommendations paved the way for Europol’s further development. 
The opportunity for a re-design would have been provided by the advancement from the 
Europol Convention to the Council Decision establishing Europol. The Europol Convention 
was perceived to be a rather “heavy tool”17
                                                 
14 Press Release Karin Gastinger : Europol and the role of justice, Austrian Federal Ministry of Justice, 
 to organise Europol. Europol is based upon a 
Convention because at the time of its establishment the tool of a Council Decision in the 
14 January 2006 
15 Interview with Yves Joannesse, op.cit. 
16 Presidency to Article 36 Committee, Chairman’s Summary of the High Level Conference on the Future of 
Europol (23 and 24 February 2006), Council of the European Union, Doc. No. 7868/06, Brussels, 29 March 
2006,p . 5 
17 Interview with Yves Joannesse, DG Justice Liberté et Sécurité, European Commission, Brussels, 22. March 
2006 
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Third Pillar simply did not exist.18 Every Protocol needs to be ratified by every single national 
parliament. This serves on one hand as a scrutiny tool for the national parliaments, but also 
slows down the process significantly on the other hand. Therefore, on 5th of January 2007 the 
Commission tabled a Proposal for a Council Decision establishing the European Police 
Office.19 Negotiations on the proposal lasted a year and a political agreement was reached on 
18 April 2008. On the 18 of June 2008 the Council decided on the “Council Decision 
establishing the European Police Office (Europol)”20
 
 which will apply from 1 January 2010. 
Europol however is still a relatively young institution. And it was equipped with a tool which 
should enable its officers to get closer to their core business and hunt down criminals: the 
Joint Investigation Teams (JIT). Europol officials may participate in a support capacity in 
Joint Investigation Teams and may - within the limits provided for by the law of the Member 
State where the joint investigation team operates - assist in all activities and exchange 
information with all members of the Joint Investigation Team. They shall however not take 
part in any coercive measures. Being considered as cumbersome and expensive, perception of 
them seems to have changed during the years. Eurojust National Members also being enabled 
to participate in JITs provides another asset for the multinational investigation teams. If 
cognition of the teams continues to improve, they could prove to be the door opener for 
intensified cooperation on all levels. 
 
The Council Decision brought a significant change with regards to the funding of the budget. 
Europol will no longer be financed by Member States contributions, but by Community 
funds. The Council and the European Parliament will be the “budgetary authorities” which 
will grant especially the latter more influence. Another novelty facilitates the election of the 
Director. The appointment, done by the Council of Ministers, currently requires unanimity, 
but from 1 January 2010 new rules will allow a decision with a two-thirds majority. This 
makes it unlikely that the struggle for a new Director for Europol will stay as fierce it was so 
far. From 2005 to 2006 Europol was for several months without a Director, as the Justice and 
Home Affairs Council was not able agree on this topic. Almost the same happened again in 
spring 2009, until it was agreed upon Rob Wainwright, the British candidate. 
 
                                                 
18 OFFICIAL of the Council Secretariat, Brugge, 18 March 2003 
19 Proposal for a Council Decision establishing the European Police Office (EUROPOL) - consolidated text, 
Doc. No. 6427/08, Brussels, 14 March 2008 
20 Council Decision establishing the European Police Office (Europol), Doc. No. 8706/08, Brussels, 24 June 
2008 
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1.2. European Integration Theory 
 
As Europol also needs to be understood as a phenomenon of European integration, I briefly 
illustrate the two major theoretical concepts of European integration theory. They are suited to 
explain European Integration, the evolvement of the Justice and Home Affairs policy area in 
general, and the creation of Europol in special: Neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism. 
Both of them seem valid to understand the process Europol went through; especially as the 
agency did not develop in a linear, stringent manner, but was subject to various “ups and 
downs”. In the following you will find a rough overview of the two theories.  
 
But let me start by defining the term of European integration. For Ernst Haas integration is 
not a condition, but a process“21 in which “political actors in several distinct national settings 
are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, 
whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states”22 This 
definition includes a social process – the shifting of loyalties – as well as a political process 
which includes negotiation and decision-making about the construction of new political 
institutions above the participating Member States with a direct say in at least a part of the 
member states' affairs.23
 
 
Diez and Wiener distinguish between “integration theory” which means the field of theorizing 
the process and outcome of European integration and the term “theoretical approaches” when 
referring to the individual abstract reflections on European integration. 
 
                                                 
21 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, Political, social, and economic forces, 1958 - 1968, University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2004, p. 11 
22 lbid. 
23 Thomas Diez and Antje Wiener, European integration theory, The mosaic of integration theory, Oxford Press, 
2nd Edition, 2009, p. 2 
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1.3. Neofunctionalism 
 
Neofunctionalism seeks to explain the move away from the anarchic state system and towards 
supranational institution-building by identifying particular societal and market patterns as 
pushing for elite behaviour towards common market building: 
 
“States, instead of struggling for power, are expected to defend their preferences and to 
cooperate when cooperation is deemed necessary for their realization. State preferences are 
seen as resulting from changing domestic competitions for influence; there is no fixed and 
knowable national interest. Preferences of political actors are formulated on the basis of the 
values held; they, in turn, determine an actor's sense of interest. In short, Neofunctionalism 
carried the assumptions of democratic pluralism over into policy formulations relating to 
international matters by disaggregating the state into its actor-components:”24
 
 
So-called “low-politics” areas were seen to be functionally interconnected with other policy 
areas, and have the potential for “spilling over” into them. First this would happen to areas 
closely related to market policy, but ultimately it would also touch upon other areas 
(functional spill over): 
 
“Originally, Neofunctionalism assumed that integration would proceed quasi-automatically as 
demands for additional central services intensified because the central institutions proved 
unable to satisfy the demands of their new clients. Thus, activities associated with sector 
integrated initially would “spill over” into neighbouring sectors not yet integrated, but now 
becoming the focus of demands for more integration.”25
                                                 
24 Ernst B. Haas, op.cit, p. xiv 
 Neofunctionalism also introduced a 
stronger emphasis on actors with an interest in further integration, especially the “secretariat” 
of the regional organization (as the Commission). Even though Member States remain 
important actors in the process, they do not exclusively determine the direction and extent of 
subsequent change. Schmitter rather thinks that regional bureaucrats in league with a shifting 
set of self-organized interests and passions seek to exploit the above mentioned “spill-overs” 
and “unintended consequences” that occur when states agree to assign some degree of supra-
25 lbid., p. xv 
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national responsibility for accomplishing a limited task an then discover that satisfying that 
function has external effects upon other of their interdependent activities.26
 
 
Spillover can be broken down into more specific subcategories27
 
, as 
• Functional spillover, which implies that if states integrate one sector of their 
economies, the impossibility of isolating one economic sector from another will lead 
to the integration of other sectors 
 
• Technical spillover implies that disparities in standards will lead different states to rise 
(or sink) to the level of the state with the strictest (or most lax) regulations.  
 
• Political spillover is based on the argument that once different functional sectors 
become integrated, different interest groups – such as corporate lobbies and trade 
unions – will increasingly switch their attention from trying to influence national 
governments to trying to influence the new regional executive will which encourage 
their attention to win more influence for itself.  
 
But as the process of integrating Europe seemed to stop around the mid 1970s, the validity of 
the functional approach was put into question. Moravscik criticised neofunctionalism for the 
“optimistic notion” that integration was automatically self-reinforcing and would evolve 
smoothly to a federal union without triggering fundamental distributive or ideological 
conflicts. He thought that integration was still heavily dependent on unanimous consensus 
among governments, and governments did not always privilege regional over global 
multilateral cooperation, and that neofunctionalism could say little about basic causes of 
national demands for integration or interstate agreements to achieve it.28
 
 
Schmitter29
                                                 
26 Philippe C. Schmitter, Neo-Neofunctionalism, in Thomas Diez and Antje Wiener, op.cit, p. 46 
 introduced  new variations on the theme of spillover, like spillaround (an increase 
in the scope of the functions carried out by an IO), build-up (an increase in the authority or 
power of an IO without a corresponding increase in the number of areas in which it is 
27 Stephen George, Politics and Policy in the European Community, 3rd edition, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1998, p. 23 
28 Andrew Moravscik, The choice for Europe, Cornell Studies in Political Economy, 1998, p 14 - 17 
29 Philippe C. Schmitter, A Revised Theory of Regional Integration, in Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. 
Scheingold, Regional Integration: Theory and Research, Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press, 1971 
 14 
involved), retrenchment (an increase in the level of joint arbitration between or among 
Member States at the expense of the power of the IO), and finally the spillback (a reduction in 
both the breadth and depth of the authority of an IO) 
 
1.3.1. Intergovernmentalism 
 
For one of the most prominent theorists of liberal intergovernmentalism (LI), Andrew 
Moravscik, the set-up of the EC – and consequently the EU – was shaped by more than the 
convergence of national preferences in the face of economic change. There were important 
distributional conflicts which were resolved through hard interstate bargaining, in which 
credible threats to veto proposals, to withhold financial side-payments, and to form alternative 
alliances excluding recalcitrant governments carried the day. The outcomes reflected the 
relative power of states or patterns of asymmetrical interdependence. To secure these 
bargains, governments eventually delegated and pooled sovereignty in international 
institutions for the express purpose of committing one another to cooperate. This transfer of 
sovereignty takes place, where potential joint gains are large but efforts to secure compliance 
by foreign governments through decentralized or domestic means are likely to be 
ineffective.30
 
 
According to Moravscik, governments simply cooperate when induced or constrained to do so 
by economic self-interest, relative power, and strategically imposed commitments. It is 
normal for them to do so. 
 
This leads to an important conclusion for the research field of Justice and Home Affairs. 
Moravscik does not think that the EU suffers no more than any existing nation state 
government from a democratic deficit. Checks and balances between the EU institutions, 
“indirect democratic control via national governments and the increasing powers of the 
European Parliament are sufficient to ensure that EU policy-making is – in nearly all cases, 
clean, transparent, effective and politically responsive to the demands of European 
citizens.”31
                                                 
30 Andrew Moravscik, The choice for Europe, op.cit, p 3-8 
One chapter of my thesis is devoted to the question of democratic legitimacy and 
accountability of Europol.  
31 Andrew Moravscik, In Defence of the Democratic Deficit: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(4), 603-24 
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1.4. Accountability of Europol 
 
One of the key questions concerning police forces as well as European institutions concerns 
accountability and legitimacy. The concept of legitimacy refers to the acceptability of a social 
or political order. For an institution to be legitimate, it has to rest on the passive support (at a 
minimum) of the people whom its policies affect. This acceptance has both a normative and a 
sociological meaning. To be normatively legitimate, the right of an institution to make 
publicly binding decisions has to be justified by some objective means (e.g., its practices can 
meet a set of standards that has been agreed upon). In a sociological sense, an institution is 
legitimate when it is accepted as appropriate and worthy of being obeyed by those affected by 
its policies. Since Fritz Scharpf’s contribution, it has become frequent practice among 
students of legitimacy to further differentiate between input and output legitimacy.32 
According to a common – although not universally adopted – definition, input legitimacy is 
concerned with the participatory quality of the decision-making process leading to rules and 
laws, whereas output legitimacy refers to the perceived efficiency of these rules and laws.33
 
 
It is impossible to analyse the situation Europol finds itself in, without deconstructing the 
developments in the third pillar. This policy area works on an intergovernmental basis, with 
decisions met in unanimity, and limited influence of the European institutions like the 
Commission, the European Parliament or the European Court of Justice. I will argue that from 
input legitimacy point of view, the situation is far from perfect. One on hand National 
Parliaments lack possibilities to influence or control developments in the third pillar; the 
European Parliament on the other hand is yet to be vested to compensate this lack of 
democratic control.  
 
This larger picture is reflected by the specific situation of Europol. Europol is currently 
accountable to the Council of Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs. The Council is 
responsible for the guidance and control of Europol. It appoints the Director and the Deputy 
Directors and approves the budget. The Council of Ministers contains representatives from all 
Member States, and the requirement for unanimous decisions helps ensure a democratic 
                                                 
32 Fritz W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999 
33 Thomas Risse, Transnational Governance and Legitimacy, in Benz, A. and Papadopoulos, Y. (eds.) 
Governance and Democracy. London: Routledge, 2006, p. 185 
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control of Europol. The Europol Management Board comprises of one representative from 
each Member State and of the Commission and has the main role in steering the day-to-day 
work of (Article 28), The Member States’ authorities are therefore informed in great detail 
about Europol’s functioning through their representatives in the Management Board where 
decisions are taken by unanimity. 
 
With regards to the operational accountability of Europol and its officers, the specific 
mandate of the agency has to be kept in mind. My argument is that so far Europol has only a 
relatively limited function compared with the wide range of functions entrusted to “normal” 
police forces in the Member States as it yields no executive powers. 
 
 
 
 
I developed the idea for this dissertation while I was writing my Master Thesis on “Europol 
and Counter-Terrorism” and realized that the situation Europol finds itself in is by far more 
complex and multi-layered than one would believe at a first glance. Some of the chapters 
therefore draw on my Master Thesis.  
 
My thesis will mainly make use of documents published by the European institutions, and 
secondary literature like scientific books or articles concerned with the topic. Expert 
interviews will provide a valuable insight on the agencies work, while news coverage will 
provide supplementing information. Existing (scarce) literature on Europol either approaches 
the topic from a criminological perspective or examines the legal basis. As a political scientist 
I found it highly interesting to go beyond these questions and examine which process lead to 
this legal basis, and find out how well it is actually implemented. Especially my work for the 
Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the unit of Justice and Home Affairs helped me 
understanding European police cooperation. Frankly spoken I was rather surprised to realise 
during my studies, that my understanding of the comprehensive and sophisticated European 
reply to organised crime turned out to be not quite as ambitious as I expected.  
 
I still remember very vividly one interview with a high-ranking Europol official who I dared 
to ask the naive question for the role of Europol in the European architecture for inner 
security. He immediately started to grumble at me that such a concept would only exist on 
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paper, while national police authorities prefer not to show any indication of actually following 
this idea. It was one of these moments, in which I had to realise how distant written law and 
its application could actually be. And at the same time this small anecdote shows the area of 
tension and ambiguity that makes European Justice and Home Affairs such an interesting field 
of research. I would like to thank all of the people who ready to share their time and 
experience with me, and who gave me valuable insights into this topic. I would ask the reader 
to accept their wish to keep their names private for obvious reasons. 
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2. Historical evolution of Police and Judicial Cooperation 
2.1. The emergence of Trevi 
 
Already at a Council of Ministers meeting in Rome in December 197534, the installation of a 
special working group to combat terrorism in the EC was agreed upon.35 This was mainly 
triggered by the failure of the German authorities to imprison effectively those responsible for 
the 1972 massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games.36
 
  In 1976, the EC 
Interior Ministers agreed that in future the Interior Ministers should be accompanied by senior 
police and security service officials at EC meetings.  
In 1976 the Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and Violence (Trevi)37
 
 group was set up by the 
European Council as a forum for cooperation between interior ministries and police agencies. 
Its work was based on intergovernmental cooperation between the 12 participating states, 
excluded the main EC institutions like the Commission or the European Parliament and was 
not made formally part of the EU institutions. 
 
2.1.1. The five working groups 
 
Five working groups were set up within the Trevi framework: Trevi 1 was composed by 
agents of national intelligence agencies and responsible for measures to combat terrorism. 
Trevi 2 focused on scientific and technical knowledge and police training. Trevi 3 was set up 
to deal with security procedures for civilian air travel, and redefined in 1985 to look at 
organised crime at a strategic, tactical & technical level and drug trafficking. Trevi 4 was 
concerned with safety and security at nuclear installations. Finally Trevi 5 dealt with 
                                                 
34 “The Trevi Group was set up in response to the proposal: adopted at the Rome European Council in 
November 1975, that Ministers of the Interior or Justice (depending on each Member State s constitutional 
arrangements), should meet to discuss matters coming within their competence, in particular with regard to law 
and order” Meetings of the Ministers Responsible For Migration, Summaries and Communiques, October 1986 – 
June 1993, Bull. EC 11- 1975 , point 1104 (Other business) 
http://www.coursehero.com/file/5182659/immigrationministers/ Retrieved 03. September 2009 
35 Fenton Bresler, Interpol der Kampf gegen das internationale Verbrechen von den Anfängen bis heute, Wiener 
Verlag, Himberg, 1993, p. 160 
36 Malcolm Anderson, op.cit., p. 229 
37 The informal version links Trevi with the groups first chairman, A. R. Fonteijn and the fountain in Rome, 
where it first met 
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contingency measures to deal with emergencies, like disasters, fire prevention and fire 
fighting.  
 
The working groups reported to the Trevi Senior Officials group, who then presented those 
reports to the annual meetings of the Trevi Ministers (the Interior Ministers). The Trevi 
Troika was comprised of three sets of senior officials from the current EC Presidency, the last 
Presidency and the next one. Trevi’s main purpose was to exchange information about 
terrorist activities, the security aspect of air traffic systems, nuclear plants and other 
vulnerable targets as well as the development of tactics and equipment to fight terrorism.38 
Some of these tools are still in use today, like the “black list” which is used by the EU to 
name terrorists or terrorist groups. This “black list” was originally used to exchange 
information to refuse the right of entry to undesired people.39
 
  
As the EC did at this time not have any mandate to cover questions of internal security, Trevi 
was working outside the traditional EC structures in a very informal manner. As mentioned 
above, it was a multinational body within the EC, but not part of any EC structure. The 
European Commission did not exert any significant influence, to co-ordinate and enhance 
police cooperation in specific matters of common interest and against common threats.40
 
 Nor 
was the European Parliament involved into the meetings.  
 
2.1.2. From Trevi to strategic Europol planning unit 
 
In the mid of the eighties, Trevi involved into a strategic planning unit for the future police 
and justice cooperation within the EU. This was linked to a series of terrorist attacks in 
France41
                                                 
38 Simon Hix, op.cit, p. 356 
, Karachi and Istanbul which lead to an emergency meeting of Trevi Ministers in 
London in September 1986. At this meeting, the Ministers also took note of the progress 
made in implementing the decisions taken by the Trevi Group 1 to strengthen liaison between 
police forces and experts in counter-terrorism and agreed to step up cooperation in liaison 
39 Kirstyn Inglis, Andrea Ott, The Constitution for Europe and an Enlarging Union: Unity in Diversity?, Europa 
Law Publishing, Groningen 2005., p. 210 
40 Rachel Woodward, Establishing Europol, op.cit., pp. 7-33 
41 France was hit by Algerian GIA militants by ten bombs targeted public squares and the transportation system. 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Terror+and+the+Fifth+Republic-a0140923681 Retrieved 23. May 2006 
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with the so called Pompidou group42 “on the prevention of drug abuse, the rehabilitation of 
drug addicts, aid to producer countries to combat the cultivation of toxic products the 
strengthening of controls at external frontiers and liaison between the departments responsible 
for controlling drug traffic.”43
 
  
It was at the same meeting, that the Commission pointed out that the Schengen Area – in 
which citizens of the Schengen country are able to move freely – would make a new security 
concept for the EU Member States and Schengen countries necessary. Therefore the 
Commission “welcomed the clear link made by Ministers between concern about public order 
and the Single European Act 2 and achievement of the area without frontiers by 1992”44 and 
it “agreed that the abolition of internal frontiers must go hand in hand with stricter controls at 
external frontiers and that the working group s remit should be coordinated with the measures 
needed to achieve the area without frontiers.”45
 
 
In 1989 two new working groups were installed: Trevi III focused on drugs and organised 
crime. As a consequence to the abolition of border controls, Trevi 92 was set up to 
specifically deal with "policing and security implications of the Single European Market" and 
to improve cooperation to "compensate for the consequent losses to security and law 
enforcement".46
 
 And even though its scope expanded, the board was again not included into 
the EC structures, and was as well not supervised by national parliaments. 
At a Council meeting of the Trevi Ministers in Den Haag in December 1991, it was agreed to 
setup Europol as central agency for the exchange of data among the Member States. It was 
decided that Europol should focus on transnational crime, and that it should fight illicit drug 
trafficking. From the very beginning it was made clear, that the field of operation could be 
enlarged in the future.47
                                                 
42 The Pompidou Group is a multidisciplinary co-operation forum to prevent drug abuse and illicit trafficking in 
drugs, set up in 1971 and incorporated into the Council of Europe in 1980 
 Furthermore the Trevi ministers discussed the “Action Programme 
43 Informal Meeting of the Ministers responsible for Immigration, Counter-Terrorism and Drugs, London, 20. 
October 1986, Reproduced from the Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 10, 1986, pp. 75-78 in Meetings 
of the Ministers responsible for Immigration, Summaries and Communiques, op.cit., p. 3 
44 lbid. 
45 lbid. 
46 Briefing note on Trevi prepared by MS18 (the European Unit in the Metropolitan Police) dated 26.2.90; Home 
Affairs Select Committee, 363-I, p.xxi, cited Trevi, Europol and the European state by Tony Bunyan in 
Statewatching the new Europe, 1993,  
http://www.statewatch.org/news/handbook-Trevi.pdf, Retrieved 28.April 2008 
47 “Les ministres ont décide de la création d’Europol. Ils ont approuvé un rapport qui esquisse les contours d’une 
organisation policière européenne (Europol) devant faciliter au niveau central la coordination et l’échange des 
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1992” to fight terrorism with regard of the single market which was to be achieved with the 1st 
of January 1993.48
 
  
 
2.1.3. Germany’s pressing for a European FBI 
 
Already in the late 80s, a number of police chiefs in the Member States put forward the idea 
of a European-style FBI. It was Trevi’s work, that formed the base upon which the German 
proposal for the creation of Europol was formed. In May 1991 in Edinburgh, the German 
Chancellor Kohl stated that in his view cooperation between internal security forces and 
judicial authorities - as a component the Political Union - was “vital and overdue”, and an 
essential accompaniment to the establishment of the Single European Market. He argued for a 
European police force “(…) that would be able to operate without let or hindrance in all the 
Community countries in important matters such as the fight against drug barons or organized 
international crime.”49
 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
données criminelles entre les Etats membres. Ce rapport a été élaboré à la requête du Conseil européen et sera 
transmis à ce dernier lors de sa réunion à Maastricht. 
L’objectif d’Europol est de rassembler et d’analyser les données relatives à la criminalité transfrontalière, y 
compris la criminalité dépassent les frontières de la Communauté. Les ministres ont approuvé la proposition de 
créer une Unité Europol sur les stupéfiants en tant qu’étape initiale de l’établissement d’Europol. Cette unité 
devrait recueillir auprès des Etats membres et analyser au niveau européen les informations de haut intérêt pour 
la lutte contre le trafic des stupéfiants.  
Cette étape est à mettre en relation avec la mise en œuvre d’une décision antérieure des ministres TREVI visant à 
la création d’une Unité européenne des renseignements en matière de stupéfiants (UERS). Le champ d’activités 
pourra donc être élargi étape par étape à d’autres formes de criminalité organisée. Il faudra alors concevoir des 
critères plus précis a cet effet.“ 
Meeting Ministers for Immigration and Trevi, 2 and 3 December 1991 in The Hague, by the Commissie Van de 
Europese Gemeenschappen, Bureau in Niederland, in Meetings of the Ministers responsible for Immigration, 
Summaries and Communiques, op.cit, p.34 
48 “Outre l’évaluation habituelle de la menace terroriste en Europe, les ministres ont discuté de l’état 
d’avancement des activités convenues dans le Programme D’Action 1992. Ce programme, établie à Dublin en 
juin 1990, comprend un certain nombre de mesures spécifiques visant à élargir la coopération existant entre les 
Etats membres dans le domaine de la lutte contre le terrorisme et le trafic des stupéfiants ainsi que celle en 
matière de criminalité organisée. Le Programme d’Action a été élaboré dans le contexte de l’abolition des 
frontières intérieures au 1er janvier 1993. 
Les ministres on également décidé de désigner dans les Etats membres des organes de contact dans le domaine 
du maintien de l’ordre public avec lesquels il sera possible de prendre contact assez rapidement si de désordres 
publics spécifiques prennent une dimension internationale. Les Ministres ont souligné à cet égard le droit 
fondamental de manifester.“ lbid., p.34 
49 Helmut Kohl, Our Future in Europe, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and Europa Institute, Edinburgh, 1991, p. 16, 
quoted in Rachel Woodward, Establishing Europol, op.cit., p. 6 
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Germany was already at that time fostering Europol much more than other countries.50 The 
creation of an EC-level policing body was formally put forward by the German delegation to 
the European Council meeting in Luxembourg in June 1991. Rachel Woodward claimed, that 
some Member States at the European Council were reported to have expressed surprise at the 
proposals as Helmut Kohl was even advocating for a European FBI. But this might also have 
been part of Kohl's political strategy: by taking quite an extreme position in advocating a 
European FBI, and in using surprise tactics, the German delegation scored an advantage 
against other Member States which were more reluctant about this idea.51
 
  
The Ministers accepted the proposal insofar as they asked for a detailed study of the potential 
for Europol to be undertaken and submitted to ministers before the 1991 Maastricht Council 
meeting.52 A two phase programme was envisaged for a gradual development of Europol 
functions: First relay station for exchange of information and experience were to be installed 
until 31.12.1992. Then, in the second phase, powers to act also within the member States 
would be granted. The Commission and individual Member States were envisaged to be 
granted the right of initiative.53
 
 Furthermore it was agreed, that relevant Ministers would 
come forward with concrete proposals for setting up Europol and adopt appropriate 
preparatory and transitional measures in Maastricht in December 1991. 
 
2.1.4. Trevi “Ad Hoc Group on Europol”  
 
The work on the establishment of Europol was being carried out under the auspices of Trevi. 
The above mentioned report of the Trevi Ministers on Europol at their meeting in Maastricht 
on 3 December 1991 set out the purpose of Europol as “a central organisation to facilitate the 
                                                 
50 “Trevi, for instance, is important in this context. Germany seems to be adopting a more positive attitude than 
we are to Europol, believing that it can be used as a positive force to combat international drug crimes in 
particular. My impression is that Germany wants Europol to have a dedicated operational arm dealing with 
international drug traffickers ; Britain, by contrast, seems to be dragging its feet. We say that we do not mind it 
having a role as an international intelligence gathering service--but no more. We should emulate the German 
approach to Europol.” Barry Sheerman, House of Commons Hansard Debates for 23 Jun 1992, Column 203 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199293/cmhansrd/1992-06-23/Debate-1.html Retrieved on 3. 
September 2009 
51 Rachel Woodward, Establishing Europol, op.cit., p. 7 
52“Treaty commitment to full establishment of a Central European Criminal Investigation Office (…) by 
31.12.1993 at the latest. Details to be laid down by unanimous decision of the Council” Conclusions of the 
Luxembourg European Council (28 and 29 June 1991), ANNEX 1, Future Common Action on Home Affairs 
and Judicial Policy, 1991, p 20 
53 lbid. 
 23 
exchange and coordination of criminal information, and the development of intelligence 
between member States in respect of crime extending across the borders of Member States, 
whether originating outside Europe or not.”54 It was agreed that, as a first step, a Europol 
drugs unit would be set up to facilitate the co-ordination of information and intelligence on 
drugs misuse and trafficking in member states.55
 
 
The Ad Hoc Group on Europol (Ad Hoc Group) – charged with this task - set up in June 1992 
and took over part of Trevi 92 and Trevi III’s work. At this time it was far from clear in which 
direction Europol should develop into. Another issue was cooperation with Interpol, and how 
it should be conducted.56 Even if most of the country agreed that the Police Office should 
function as a platform to exchange information, the pace went to fast for some Member States 
like Great Britain.57
 
  
The Ad Hoc Group eventually drafted the text of the Ministerial agreement on Europol which 
was agreed upon on 1 December 1992. The Ministerial agreement was intended to legitimise 
Europol until a Convention had been signed and then agreed upon in each country’s 
parliament. Progress on Europol was proving slow for the 12 Member States which was 
mainly due to the unanimity procedure. Even though the Member States agreed on a common 
goal – the setting up of Europol – many issues remained to be discussed; like where should 
the headquarters be located or to which nationality should the Director have, to name just a 
few.58
                                                 
54 The development of Europol, report from the Trevi Ministers to the European Council in Maastricht, 
December 1991, quoted in Tony Buyan, Trevi, Europol and the European state, op.cit, p. 6 
 
55 Peter Lloyd, House of Commons Hansard Debates for 23 Jan 1992, op.cit Column 320 
56 “I assure the hon. Member for Sedgefield that there is no question of Europol cutting across Interpol. That is 
the plain view of the vast majority of European Community members. However, we see a case for a criminal 
intelligence gathering operation between the 12 Member States, aimed at international organised crime, 
primarily drug trafficking.” Kenneth Clarke, House of Commons Hansard Debates for 15 Mar 1993, Column 
1116, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199293/cmhansrd/1993-03-15/Debate-14.html  
Retrieved on 3. September 2009 
57 “The important task is not to add another European body for information exchange, but to concentrate our 
efforts on focusing and enhancing the existing co-operation. It is far from clear which of those tasks Europol is 
primarily meant to undertake.  It would be right for the Home Secretary at this stage to say a word or two about 
Europol. It must be said that its beginnings have been rather inauspicious. There were disagreements over its 
location and when it was to become operational. Interpol has proposed to incorporate it within its own European 
secretariat, as a part of Interpol which will have separate functions. It will, in some senses, be a separate bureau 
but it will nevertheless still be under the aegis of Interpol.”, Tony Blair, House of Commons Hansard Debates 
for 27 Jan 1993, Column 1100, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo060126/debtext/60126-27.htm  
Retrieved on 3. September 2009 
58“Progress on Europol is still proving irritably slow for all 12 Member States. The delay illustrates the dangers 
of proceeding by unanimity. All 12 Member States want Europol, all want to begin with a drug information unit 
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Figure 1 Trevi organigram 59
 
 
 
This top-down approach (consent by the Ministers, who charge the bureaucracy) is why 
Mathieu Deflem thinks that Europol is distinctively different from other international police 
organisations. It was not formed from the bottom-up by police professionals but was the result 
of a top-down decision by the political and legislative bodies of the European Union. The 
activities of Europol are therefore more distinctly legally framed and bound to certain well-
defined areas of investigation. He therefore defines Europol not a supranational police force 
but as an international cooperative network that coordinates the activities of national police 
institutions in the various EU Member States via a central headquarters.60
                                                                                                                                                        
and all want Europol to start on 1 January 1993. We managed to reach agreement on the nationality of the 
director-general, but we failed to reach a unanimous conclusion about where the headquarters should be located. 
So scrupulous are the protections built into the procedure to satisfy sensitive Members of Parliament here and in 
other Parliaments who are concerned that sovereignty might be given away that until all 12 Member States agree 
on where the extremely important organisation should be located and until all 12 Ministers have given their 
consent, returned to their Parliaments and received approval, the organisation cannot be set up. If that process 
does not underline the extent of the security to protect our sovereignty and reassure those concerned about 
Community competence, few other factors will.“, Kenneth Clarke, House of Commons Hansard Debates for 15 
Mar 1993, Column 1116, op.cit. 
 
59 Johannes Peek 'International Police Cooperation Within Justified Political and Judicial Frameworks: Five 
Thesis on TREVI' in Jörg Monar & Roger Morgan (eds.) 'The Third Pillar of the European Union', European 
Interuniversity Press, Brussels 1994, pp201-207 
60 Mathieu Deflem, Europol and the Policing of International Terrorism: Counter- Terrorism in a Global 
Perspective, Justice Quarterly Volume  23 Number 3, September 2006, p. 340 
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2.1.5. Legal Background 
 
Trevi’s work was mainly based on two documents: the “Palma Document” (Madrid, June 
1989), the “Declaration of Trevi Group Ministers” (Paris, December 1989). The “Programme 
of Action” (June 1990) and the Coordinators report on the progress on the Palma Document 
(Edinburgh, 1992) reflected on the first two documents. 
 
The “Palma document” was drafted by the Coordinators Group and agreed upon at the EC 
Council meeting in Madrid in 1989. It was based on the instruction of the Rhodes European 
Council to propose measures for linking the free movement of persons and security together 
once controls at the internal borders had been abolished in 1988. In 1989 the same group put 
forward a proposal for a work programme: the “Palma document”. It advocated for a more 
coordinated approach to the different aspects of cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs. The 
European Council, feeling that free movement of persons was a priority for 1992, endorsed 
that document's conclusions and instructed the coordinators' Group, at the instigation of the 
General Affairs Council, “to spare effort to ensure that the programme of work proposed in 
the Palma document was completed as planned.”61
 
 With this document, Trevi's work was for 
the first time put in the overall context of the emerging policies on policing, law, immigration 
and asylum, and legal systems which underpin the European state.  
The Declaration of Trevi Ministers, agreed in 1989, spoke of the `new requirements' with the 
creation of a “European area without internal borders' and the need to cooperate on: fighting 
terrorism, international crime, narcotics and illegal trafficking of every sort“ 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
61 Europa, Rapid Press Release, DOC/89/1, from 27/06/1989, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=DOC/89/1&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&
guiLanguage=en  
Retrieved 28.April 2008 
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2.2.  Justice and Home Affairs in the Maastricht 
Treaty 
 
Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs was incorporated as matters of common interest in 
Article K, Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty. Willy Bruggeman thinks that putting the Third 
Pillar in place was a painstaking task. This was due to a number of reasons, such as the 
principle of sovereignty, national (often different) penal laws and the fact that provisions for 
international co-operation originate mainly from the 1950s.62
 
 The treaty was signed on 7th 
February 1992, in Maastricht and entered into force on 1st November 1993 during the Delors 
Commission. It led to the creation of the European Union and introduced the three pillars: The 
European Communities pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP pillar) and the 
Justice and Home Affairs pillar.  
Rachel Woodward sees the Treaty's importance to European police cooperation in its 
horizontal coordination of customs, policing, judicial and immigration issues, which until then 
had been dealt with by separate groups and agreements at the intergovernmental level. The 
new policy area established a legislative and administrative framework for Europol and 
formalized much of the work of Trevi.63
 
  
Title VI, Article K.1. introduced the following areas as matters of common interest: 
 
1. asylum policy;  
2. rules governing the crossing by persons of the external borders of the Member States 
and the exercise of controls thereon;  
3. immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries:  
a) conditions of entry and movement by nationals of third countries on the territory of 
Member States;  
b) conditions of residence by nationals of third countries on the territory of Member 
States, including family reunion and access to employment;  
                                                 
62 Willy Bruggeman, Europol and the fight against organised crime in the EU, EPC Issue paper 6, 21-11-2001 
http://www.epc.eu/en/ce.asp?TYP=CE&LV=177&see=y&t=42&PG=CE/EN/detail&l=3&AI=138  
Retrieved 03. June 2008 
63 Rachel Woodward, Establishing Europol, op.cit., p. 15 
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c) combating unauthorized immigration, residence and work by nationals of third 
countries on the territory of Member States;  
4. combating drug addiction in so far as this is not covered by 7 to 9;  
5. combating fraud on an international scale in so far as this is not covered by 7 to 9;  
6. judicial cooperation in civil matters;  
7. judicial cooperation in criminal matters;  
8. customs cooperation; 
 
Para 9 finally defined police cooperation as “preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful 
drug trafficking and other serious forms of international crime, including if necessary certain 
aspects of customs cooperation, in connection with the organization of a Union-wide system 
for exchanging information within a European Police Office (Europol).“ 
 
Europol was the first organisation to be created within the Third Pillar, under which the police 
and customs were able co-operate for the purposes of preventing and combating the listed 
crimes. A supplementary declaration appended to the Treaty referred to support, analysis of 
national prevention programmes, training and research and development (more below). 
 
 
2.2.1. From Trevi to Cats  
 
By the Maastricht Treaty, Trevi was integrated into the EU structure under the new name 
“Co-ordination Committee for Justice and Internal Affairs (K-4)” Later the group was named 
“Cats” after the French acronym for “Comité de l'Article Trente-Six” under the Treaty of the 
European Union. 
 
Its functions expanded to regulation proposals over law enforcement and intelligence issues, 
including the interception of communications, information databases and privacy. The 
Coordinating Committee was accountable to the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(Coreper) and to the Council of Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA Council). Three 
steering groups reported to the Coordinating Committee: the Immigration and Asylum Group; 
the Security, Police and Customs Cooperation Group; and the Judicial Cooperation Group. 
The preparatory work was done in these working groups. Monica den Boer claims, that the 
new structure had established a central form of coordination, but “it has also introduced more 
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bureaucracy and more levels of decision-making, thereby turning the rate of progress into a 
relatively slow one.”64
 
  
Council of EU Justice and Interior Ministers 
| 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) 
| 
Coordinating Committee (K.4 Committee) 
| 
Steering Groups 
 
 
2.2.2. Declaration on Police Cooperation 
 
The Declaration on police cooperation, which is appended to the Maastricht Treaty, stated that 
the Member States were willing to envisage the adoption of practical measures and the 
exchange of information and experience in the following functions: 
 
• support for national criminal investigation and security authorities, in particular in the 
coordination of investigations and search operations;  
• creation of data bases;  
• central analysis and assessment of information in order to take stock of the situation 
and identify investigative approaches;  
• collection and analysis of national prevention programmes for forwarding to Member 
States and for drawing up Europe-wide prevention strategies;  
• measures relating to further training, research, forensic matters and criminal records 
departments. 
 
The Declaration finished by stating that “Member States agree to consider on the basis of a 
report, during 1994 at the latest, whether the scope of such cooperation should be extended.” 
It committed the Member States to explore ways of coordinating their national investigation 
                                                 
64 Monica den Boer, Justice and Home Affairs Cooperation in the European Union: Current Issues,  
http://aei.pitt.edu/798/01/3.htm,  
Retrieved 05.May 2008 
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and search operations which have an international dimension, and enabled them to create new 
data bases and to provide a central analytical facility for planning criminal investigations. 
According to Bruggeman65
 
 the Declaration did in fact “not extend to executive powers by a 
long shot.”  
Interestingly enough, it was the European Parliament remarking that “Europol's remit should 
not only include combating drug trafficking but the whole field of organized crime, including 
economic crime and crime against property and that in the future, in addition to combating 
drugs, it should primarily concentrate on organized international financial and fiscal crime 
and combating crimes against the EC, such as subsidies fraud, an area in which Europol 
should have exclusive responsibility” 66
 
 
 
2.2.3. Commission allowed to join, EP kept outside 
 
Article K.4 enforced the role of the Commission, which “shall be fully associated with the 
work in the areas referred to in this Title.” But even if its powers were still far from those 
under the First Pillar, it (together with the Presidency) was now supposed to regularly inform 
the European Parliament of discussions about Justice and Home Affairs matters (Article K.6) 
and, more importantly, was given the right of initiative in the policy area. 
 
The role of the European Parliament improved slightly with Article 6 of the Maastricht 
Treaty: “The European Parliament receives the right to ask questions of the Council or make 
recommendations to it. Each year, it shall hold a debate on the progress made in 
implementation of the areas referred to in this Title.” But these new provisions did not give 
the European Parliament an effective mean of democratic control in Justice and Home Affairs 
matters. This was mainly due to the intergovernmental nature of cooperation. Furthermore the 
European Parliament could not force the Commission or the Presidency to inform it, which is 
an essential precondition for effective control available in time.67
                                                 
65 Willy Bruggeman, Europol and the fight against organised crime in the EU, op.cit. 
 The European Parliament 
heavily criticized the intergovernmental approach and its disadvantages as “a democratic 
66 European Parliament, Report of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs on Europol, 26 
November 1992 
67 Joerg Monar, Democratic control of Justice and Home Affairs: The European Parliament and the National 
Parliaments, in Roland Bieber and Joerg Monar (Eds.), Justice and Home Affairs in the European Union. The 
Development of the Third Pillar, op.cit., p. 246 and 247 
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deficit, disruption of relations between the Community Institutions and disruption of relations 
between citizens and national authorities and whereas it impedes proper parliamentary and 
judicial supervision”68
 
 A point which will be further discussed below. 
 
2.2.4. Accountability in the Maastricht Treaty 
 
Before that, neither the European Commission nor the European Parliament was involved in 
the Trevi structure. As Trevi was “played” strictly intergovernmental69, the line of 
accountability was the Council of Ministers structure. It was seen as a forum for discussion 
and co-operation between the Member States and preferred to be kept outside the European 
framework. This was also shown in a discussion in the British House of Commons, where the 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Douglas Hurd, insisted on the 
responsibilities of national legislators: “The point I am trying to make in this part of my 
speech and, indeed, in our negotiations is that it is perfectly possible and often better for that 
kind of European working together to be based on co-operation between Governments, and 
therefore based on responsibility to national Parliaments, rather than under the structure of the 
Treaty of Rome.”70
 
 
The various working parties set up over the years were working separately and drafting their 
reports for ministers sitting in different combinations. In fact neither the European Parliament 
nor the national Parliaments were to exercise any control over the measures taken in that 
context, owing to the very nature of the cooperation itself. It was criticised, that the 
deliberations of Trevi and its Working Groups might even be beyond the reach of democratic 
questioning and debate, and only determined by state officials, police officers, security and 
intelligence agencies. These state officials were to present their reports to their Ministers, who 
                                                 
68 European Parliament, Report of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs on Europol, 26 
November 1992 
69 “We co-operate on a totally intergovernmental basis over the issue of policing, and have done for a long time. 
The Trevi meetings have been conducted for a long time. The most important part of the Trevi process is the 
operational level and the co-operation that must develop between 12 police services in a community such as the 
European Community.“ Kenneth Clarke, House of Commons Hansard Debates for 15 Mar 1993, Column 1116, 
op.cit. 
70 Douglas Hurd, House of Commons Hansard Debates for 21 Nov 1991, Column 443 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199192/cmhansrd/1991-12-18/Orals-1.html 
Retrieved 3. September 2009 
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– in turn –reported to the governments. Afterwards national parliaments may have been– or 
may have not been – informed, depending on each country’s practice.  
 
This was defended and downplayed by the British Home Secretary:  
 
“It does not need any safeguards. You have to remember what Trevi is. Trevi is merely a 
gathering together of the Ministers of the Interior of the EC countries to give, hopefully, 
political impetus to various plans or closer policing co-operation. That is all it is. It is not an 
executive body. Therefore, accountability is from the individual Ministers of the Interior to 
their own governments, and there is no need for the body as a whole to be thought of as 
responsible to any other organisation.”71
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
71 Douglas Hurd, Practical Police Cooperation in the European Community, Home Affairs Select Committee, 
1989-90, HC 363-II, pp 162-163  
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2.3. The “Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice” in the Treaty of Amsterdam 
 
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, on the 1st of May 1999, the cooperation 
in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs was re-organised, setting as its objective the 
establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice. This new integration objective was 
strengthened through the introduction of a range of new policy objectives, the 
communitarisation of large parts of the former ‘Third Pillar’, the incorporation of the 
Schengen acquis, and improved judicial control.  
 
This was followed by the finalisation of new and more effective working structures within the 
Council of the European Union and the decision of the Commission to set up a new 
Directorate-General for Justice and Home Affairs. The European Council in Tampere, in 
October 1999, provided for a significant set of new guidelines for the areas of asylum and 
migration, judicial cooperation and the fight against cross-border crime. 
 
 
2.3.1. Goals set by the Treaty 
 
Title VI of the Treaty of Maastricht was replaced by the new wording of an “area of freedom, 
security and justice”:  
 
“Without prejudice to the powers of the European Community, the Union’s objective shall be 
to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice 
by developing common action among the Member States in the fields of police and judicial 
co-operation in criminal matters and by preventing and combating racism and 
xenophobia.”72
 
 
This objective was to be achieved by combating crime, terrorism, trafficking in persons and 
offences against children, illicit drug trafficking and illicit arms trafficking, corruption and 
fraud by enhancing cooperation in this field. “Closer co-operation between police forces, 
                                                 
72 Article K1, Treaty of Amsterdam 
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customs authorities and other competent authorities in the Member States, both directly and 
through the European Police Office (Europol) (…), closer co-operation between judicial and 
other competent authorities of the Member States (and) approximation, where necessary, of 
rules on criminal matters in the Member States”73
 
 where named as the means to achieve this 
goal. 
 
2.3.2. Police Cooperation under the Amsterdam Treaty 
 
Article K2 (1) listed the common actions in the field of police co-operation:74
 
 
• operational co-operation between the competent authorities, including the police, 
customs and other specialised law enforcement services of the Member States in 
relation to the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences; 
 
• the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of relevant information, 
including information held by law enforcement services on reports on suspicious 
financial transactions, in particular through Europol, subject to appropriate provisions 
on the protection of personal data; 
 
• co-operation and joint initiatives in training, the exchange of liaison officers, 
secondments, the use of equipment, and forensic research; 
 
• the common evaluation of particular investigative techniques in relation to the 
detection of serious forms of organised crime. 
 
 
                                                 
73 lbid. 
74 Article K2, Treaty of Amsterdam 
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2.4. Implementing JHA concepts with Action 
Plans 
 
Article 2 of the Treaty of Amsterdam referred rather vaguely to the assurance of the free 
movement of persons and “appropriate measures” with respect to external border controls, 
asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime. Later on, the “Action Plan 
on how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice”75 of December 1998 was adopted on the basis of a Commission 
Communication.76
 
  
This division of labour is symptomatic for the European Union: Treaties provided guiding 
principles in Justice and Home affairs, the real “substance” – especially with regard to 
Europol – was created by EU Action Plans and Programs, like the Vienna Action Plan, the 
Tampere Program or the Hague Program.  
 
There is no specific chapter for the Treaty of Nice, as it brought no changes for Europol.77
 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon will also not be dealt with. The Irish “No” at the referendum in June 
2008 makes the future of the Lisbon Treaty and its provisions on Justice and Home Affairs 
more than unclear. Later chapters will specifically deal only with certain aspects of the 
Treaty, and the changes they might have brought.  
                                                 
75 Para B 14 of this Action Plan was devoted to the reference the Treaty made to Europol. It underlined, that the 
Treaty recognised the essential and central role Europol will play, and that it was therefore important to start to 
work on the implementation of these measures as soon as possible. These developments were to build on the 
'acquis` of the Europol Drugs Unit which, as a precursor for the future Europol, had gained experience in areas 
like information exchange, technical and operational support, threat analyses and situation reports. OJ No. C 
19/1 of 23.1.1999 
76 Communication from the Commission, Towards an area of freedom, security and justice COM(1998) 459, 
Brussels, 14.07. 1998 
77 Europol is actually only mentioned once in relation with Eurojust: “The Council shall encourage cooperation 
through Eurojust by promoting support by Eurojust for criminal investigations in cases of serious cross-border 
crime, particularly in the case of organised crime, taking account, in particular, of analyses carried out by 
Europol”, Article 31 (2), Treaty of Nice 
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2.4.1. Vienna Action Plan 
 
The Vienna Action Plan of 1998 defined the “area of freedom” not only as an opportunity for 
the free movement of persons (according to the Schengen model) but also as an obligation to 
protecting fundamental rights and combating all forms of discrimination. Respect for private 
life and, in particular, the protection of personal data, was identified as a pivo element.78 The 
concept of an “area of security” includes combating crime, in particular terrorism, trade in 
human beings, crimes against children, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, corruption and 
fraud.79 The area of justice was understood to guarantee European citizens equal access to 
justice and to promote cooperation between the judicial authorities. On civil matters, judicial 
cooperation was aimed at simplifying the environment of European citizens. On criminal 
matters, it was to strengthen the coordination of prosecution and provide a common sense of 
justice by defining minimum common rules for criminal acts, procedures and penalties.80
 
 
                                                 
78 “A wider concept of freedom: The wider concept of freedom embodied in the Treaty of Amsterdam aims to 
give freedom" a meaning beyond free movement of people across internal borders. It is also freedom to live in ,a 
law-abiding environment in the knowledge that public authorities are using everything in their individual and 
collective power (nationally, at the level of the Union and beyond) to combat and contain those who seek to deny 
or abuse that freedom. Freedom must also be complemented by the full range of fundamental human rights, 
including protection from any form of discrimination.”, lbid. p.5  
79 “The full benefits of any area of freedom will never be enjoyed unless they are exercised in an area where 
people can feel safe and secure. Looking at the new Treaty it is clear that the agreed aim is not to create a 
European Security area in the sense of a common territory where uniform detection and investigation procedures 
would be applicable to all law enforcement agencies in Europe in the handling of security matters. Nor do the 
new provisions af1ect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States to maintain law and 
order and safeguard internal security. 
Amsterdam rather provides an institutional framework to develop common action among the Member States in 
the in dissociable fields of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The declared 
objective is to prevent and combat crime at the appropriate level, ‘organised or otherwise, in particular terrorism 
trafficking in persons and offences against children, illicit drug trafficking and illicit arms trafficking, corruption 
and fraud’ “, lbid., p 7 
80 “Judicial systems within the European Union have developed gradually and over a very long period of time. 
An independent and well-functioning judiciary is one of the backbones of our shared tradition of Rule of Law. 
As historic experiences vary among Member States, it is hardly surprising that judicial systems differ 
substantially both in terms of material content and procedural rules. But we cannot escape the fact that the 
obstacles and difficulties this creates are hard for Union residents to understand, especially when they are 
supposed to enjoy a frontier-free area, now also an area of freedom, security and justice, in which to move freely 
and live their lives. This also applies to firms operating in a single market.(…) 
It is in the framework of the consolidation of an area of freedom, security and justice that the concept of public 
order appears as a common denominator in a society based on democracy and the rule of law. With the entry into 
force of the Amsterdam Treaty, this concept which' has hitherto been determined principally by ,each individual 
Member State will also have to be assessed in terms of the new European area. Independently of the 
responsibilities of Member States ft)r maintaining public order, we will gradually have to shape a "European 
public order" based on an assessment of shared fundamental interests.” lbid., pp. 9 
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But the Vienna Action Plan was still somehow reluctant on the topic of police cooperation. It 
even stated that the Amsterdam Treaty - although aimed at developing common action in the 
fields of police and criminal justice cooperation and offering enhanced security to Union 
citizens - did not pursue the intention to create a ‘European security area’ in the sense of 
uniform detection and investigation procedures. And it provided that the Member States 
responsibilities to maintain law and order should not be affected by the new provisions of the 
Amsterdam Treaty. 
 
 
2.4.2. Tampere Programme 
 
The goal of constructing an “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” across the Union was 
agreed at the Tampere EU Summit of 1999. The Tampere programme was a five-year agenda 
that came to an end in 2004. It understood the area of freedom, security and justice as 
something that “can be enjoyed in conditions of security and justice accessible to all”81 in 
which “criminals must find no ways of exploiting differences in the judicial systems of 
Member States”82 and “people have the right to expect the Union to address the threat to their 
freedom and legal rights posed by serious crime.”83
 
  
Article 2 (2) focused at the co-operation through Europol and set a number of goals to be 
achieved within a period of five years after the date of entry into force of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam:84
 
: 
• enable Europol to facilitate and support the preparation, and to encourage the 
coordination and carrying out, of specific investigative actions by the competent 
authorities of the Member States, including operational actions of joint teams 
comprising representatives of Europol in a support capacity; 
• adopt measures allowing Europol to ask the competent authorities of the Member 
States to conduct and co-ordinate their investigations in specific cases and to develop 
specific expertise which may be put at the disposal of Member States to assist them in 
investigating cases of organised crime; 
                                                 
81 Tampere Conclusions, Council document SN 200/99, Para 2 
82 lbid. Para 5 
83 lbid. Para 6 
84 Article K2, Treaty of Amsterdam 
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• promote liaison arrangements between prosecuting/investigating officials specialising 
in the fight against organised crime in close co-operation with Europol; 
• establish a research, documentation and statistical network on cross-border crime. 
 
And for the first time, the Commissions Communication “Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice: Assessment of the Tampere programme and future orientations” 85
Should it be changed “to make it (Europol) truly operational and convert it into a Union 
agency, financed from the Community budget”? The Communication supported this idea by 
mentioning that “there will have to be greater democratic and judicial control of its 
(Europol’s) activities to correspond to this greater effectiveness.”
 raised a very 
important question regarding the legal framework of Europol:  
86
 
 
 
2.4.3. The Hague Programme 
 
When the Tampere Programme ran out in 2004 (it had been tied to the so-called “transitional 
period” provided for by the Amsterdam Treaty which ended in April 2004) there was 
therefore a general feeling that a successor programme was needed.  
 
Therefore the Commission proposed a follow-up programme, which was intensely discussed 
under the Dutch Presidency. After considerable changes to the original proposals, the Council 
agreed on the programme on the 5th November 2004 and named it after the Dutch capital. The 
main novelty of The Hague Programme was the emphasis on “operational” measures. It 
explicitly stated, that one of its aims was to “fight organised cross-border crime and repress 
the threat of terrorism, to realise the potential of Europol and Eurojust, (and) to carry further 
the mutual recognition of judicial decisions (…)”87
                                                 
85 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice: Assessment of the Tampere programme and future orientations, COM(2004) 401 final, Brussels, 
2.6.2004 
  
86 lbid. p. 14 
87 The Hague Program, 14292/1/04 REV 1, ANNEX I, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 4/5 November 2004, 
p. 12 
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2.4.3.1. Principle of availability 
 
The Hague Programme aimed in particular at boosting operational co-operation between 
national law enforcement agencies with regard to the principle of availability. This principle 
meant that  
 
“throughout the Union, a law enforcement officer in one Member State who needs 
information in order to perform his duties can obtain this from another Member State and 
that the law enforcement agency in the other Member State which holds this information will 
make it available for the stated purpose, taking into account the requirement of ongoing 
investigations in that State.”88
 
 
The principle of availability was subject to the following key conditions: 
 
• the exchange may only take place in order that legal tasks may be performed; 
• the integrity of the data to be exchanged must be guaranteed; 
• the need to protect sources of information and to secure the confidentiality of the data 
at all stages of the exchange, and subsequently; 
• common standards for access to the data and common technical standards must be 
applied; 
• supervision of respect for data protection, and appropriate control prior to and after the 
exchange must be ensured; 
• individuals must be protected from abuse of data and have the right to seek correction 
of incorrect data. 
 
On-line access for Europol should be granted (as well as reciprocal access) to national 
databases and central EU databases such as the SIS. The principle of availability was to be 
applied from 1 January 2008. In order to meet the deadline, the Commission tabled a proposal 
for a third pillar legal instrument.89 Allowing Europol to obtain information under the 
principle of availability within the scope of its mandate would boost its effectiveness.90
                                                 
88 “(…) which means that, The Hague Programm, op.cit. p. 27 
 And it 
89 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the exchange of information under the principle of availability, 
Commission, COM(2005) 490 final, Brussels, 12 December 2005 
90 lbid.,p. 4 
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would provide a standardised procedure at EU level to request and obtain information and 
allow direct information exchange between authorities without the intervention of National 
Units or contact points91 via online access to electronic databases.92
 
 
The Commission’s proposal limited the grounds for refusal of provision of information:93
(a) to avoid jeopardising the success of an on-going investigation;  
 
(b) to protect a source of information of the physical integrity of a natural person;  
(c) to protect the confidentiality of information at any stage of processing;  
(d) to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of persons whose data are processed under 
this Framework Decision 
 
Article 6 asked the Member States to “ensure that information shall be provided to equivalent 
competent authorities of other Member States and Europol, under the conditions set out in this 
Framework Decision, in so far as these authorities need this information to fulfil their lawful 
tasks for the prevention, detection or investigation of criminal offences.” 
 
The Member States tabled a counter-proposal, the Prüm Initiative, which is still under 
discussion. An agreement was signed on 27 May 2005 by Germany, Spain, France, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium at Prüm (Germany). This agreement was 
based on the above discussed principle of availability. It could enable the participants to 
exchange all data regarding DNA, fingerprint and Vehicle Registration Data of concerned 
persons and to cooperate against terrorism. This treaty is becoming known as the Schengen III 
Agreement. Certain provisions were adopted into EU law for all EU states Members in June 
2008, as Council Decision with its provisions falling under the third pillar of the EU94
Some authors even wonder whether the Prüm Initiative is in fact a realisation of the principle 
of availability as envisaged by The Hague Programme
. 
95
 
. Europol, however, is not mentioned 
once in the proposal while it seems as if The Hague Programme wanted Europol to profit 
from the principle of availability and is accordingly involved in the Commission’s proposal. 
                                                 
91 lbid.,p. 3 
92 lbid. Article 9 
93 lbid.,p. 20, Article 14 (1) 
94 e.g. Council Decision on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and 
cross-border crime, 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008; and Council Decision on the implementation of Decision 
2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-
border crime, 2008/616/JHA, of 23 June 2008 
95 Florian Geyer, Taking Stock: Databases and Systems of Information Exchange in the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice, CEPS challenge Research Paper No. 9, May 2008, p 10 
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2.4.3.2. Police cooperation in the Hague 
Programme 
 
With regard of the fight against terrorism, The Hague Declaration asked again for enhanced 
use of Europol and Eurojust and re-emphasised the importance of Europol in the field of 
police cooperation. It urged the Member States to enable Europol in cooperation with 
Eurojust to play a key role in the fight against serious cross-border crime and terrorism by96
 
 
• ratifying and effectively implementing the necessary legal instruments by the end of 
200497
• providing all necessary high quality information to Europol in good time; 
; 
• encouraging good cooperation between their competent national authorities and 
Europol. 
 
Furthermore it asked Europol to replace its “crime situation reports” by yearly “threat 
assessments” on serious forms of organised crime, based on information provided by the 
Member States and input from Eurojust and the Police Chiefs Task Force from the 1st January 
2006. These “threat assessments” should be used by the Council to establish yearly strategic 
priorities, which serve as guidelines for further action and could be seen as a next step 
towards intelligence-led law enforcement at EU level.  
 
Europol was by the Member States designated as central office of the union for euro 
counterfeits within the meaning of the Geneva Convention of 1929. And The Hague 
Declaration asked Europol and Eurojust to encourage the use of – and the participation in – 
Member States joint investigation teams (JIT). As experience in the Member States with JITs 
was limited, each Member States was supposed to designate a national expert. This 
establishment was also supposed to encourage the use of such teams and the exchange of 
experience on best practice.  
 
                                                 
96 The Hague Program, op.cit., p. 31 
97 Europol Protocols: the Protocol amending Article 2 and the Annex to the Europol Convention of 30 November 
2000, OJ C 358 13.12.2000, p. 1, the Protocol on the privileges and immunities of Europol, the members of its 
organs, its Deputy Directors and its members of 28 November 2002 OJ C 312 16.12.2002, p.1  
and the Protocol amending the Europol Convention of 27 November 2003, OJ C 2 6.1.2004, p. 3.  
The Convention of 29 May 2000 on mutual assistance in criminal matters between the Member States, OJ C 197, 
12.7.2000, p. 1 and its accompanying Protocol of 16 October 2001 OJ C 326, 21.11.2001, p. 2 and Framework 
Decision 2002/465/JHA of 13 June 2002 on Joint Investigation Teams, OJ L 162, 20.6.2002, p. 1. 
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2.4.3.3. Cooperation with Eurojust 
 
The Hague Programme mentioned that effective combating of cross-border crime and 
terrorism requires the cooperation and coordination of investigations, and – if possible – 
concentrated prosecutions by Eurojust in cooperation with Europol.  
 
Therefore it urged the Member States to  
• effectively implement the Council Decision on Eurojust by the end of 200498
• ensure full cooperation between their competent national authorities and Eurojust. 
 with 
special attention to the judicial powers to be conferred upon their national members; 
and 
 
But while asking Eurojust to make maximum use of the cooperation agreement with Europol 
and continue cooperation with the European Judicial Network and other relevant partners, its 
role was cut down significantly. The establishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office, 
which was mentioned as an objective in earlier drafts, was removed entirely from the final 
version of the Programme.  
 
 
                                                 
98 Council Decision setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime .of 28 February 
2002, 2002/187/JHA, OJ L 63, 6.3.2002, pages 1-3 
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2.5. Conclusion 
 
As we have seen in this chapter, it took a relatively long time span until Europol became 
operationally in 1999. Police cooperation was until then based on informal gatherings and ad-
hoc working groups. The legal precondition for the agency was the establishment of the third 
pillar which was done by the Maastricht Treaty.  
 
Member States realised that organised crime could not be faced by one State on its own; that 
terrorism and drugs posed a threat too serious to be faced by one single player. As a 
consequence, they installed an expert system to cope with the problems. But the cumbersome 
slowness in which Europol was created, and the reluctance with which its additional protocols 
were ratified in the parliaments of the Member States also indicate a certain reluctance to 
grant the agency too much powers.. In the end it was Germany, with Chancellor Kohl, who 
strived for the agency. Europol was forged on the anvil of “Realpolitik”. The opposing ideas 
of the European Union were reflected by Europol and its convention.  
 
As I will explain in the next chapter, the set-up of Europol is quiet complex. The agency 
actually consists of two different bodies: the “European” part with international staff and the 
other, intergovernmental part with the Liaison Office network and national units. This factual 
separation allows the Member States to either fully use Europol and its resources to tackle 
crime; or to actually bypass the international staffers by simply using the Liaison Office 
network to exchange information only bilaterally.  
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3. Europol – The European Police Office 
 
The political framework of Europol as a body within the structures of the EU creates certain 
opportunities that other international police organizations lack. As Europol’s mandate is 
legally specified, the organization has a clearly defined and limited field of operations. 
Other international police organizations – e.g. like Interpol - have often experienced problems 
in coming to terms among the many participating police agencies about the proper boundaries 
of their law enforcement objectives and activities, because the legal systems and police 
traditions of countries vary considerably.99
 
 
Should Europol now purely be used as an organisation gathering, analysing and distributing 
information? Should it, in addition to an Intelligence Agency, also be an operational 
coordinator and a platform for new initiatives? Do the Member States want Europol do deal 
with serious crime only, or should it also take upon all law enforcement tasks, such as public 
order? And do the Member States want Europol to be a mainly police organisation or should 
other services such as customs and intelligence services also be included?100
 
 Those questions 
were also posed when a possible re-organisation of Europol was discussed along with the 
need for a new legal basis for the agency. 
 
3.1. From Convention to Council Decision 
 
From 12 to 14 January 2006, at the Justice and Home Affairs Informal Ministerial Meeting, 
the Austrian Presidency proposed to hold a discussion on the framework and objectives for 
the further development of Europol. A “High Level Conference on the Future of Europol”, 
held in Vienna on 23 and 24 February 2006, aimed at continuing the discussion held at the 
Informal JHA Council. The role of Europol in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice; 
                                                 
99 Mathieu Deflem, (2006). Global rule of law or global rule of law enforcement? International police 
cooperation and counter-terrorism, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 603, 
2006, pp. 240–251 
100 Based on Ellen de Geest, Friends of the Presidency: Future of Europol, Room document Friends of 
Presidency, Federale Politie Belgium to Austrian Presidency of the Friends of the Presidency concerning the 
Future of Europol, CGI-EDG/2006/0320-01, Meeting of 16th March 2006 
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Europol’s operational work from the starting days in 1999 until today and beyond; and the 
potential value of cooperation via Europol was discussed.101
 
  
It was agreed that Europol needs better access to information – especially with regards to the 
principle of availability – and even the creation of a system to make Member States visible 
which do not supply information was discussed. 102
 
  
The reluctance of some Member States to share information was linked to the difference in 
legal background that “still creates certain problems with regard to mutual confidence and 
trust. Some information is still not supplied to Europol because the potential providers in the 
Member States do not know what will happen with that information at Europol.”103
 
 
Surprisingly enough, the “High Level Conference on the Future of Europol” agreed that the 
present legal framework allows for sufficient parliamentary control and that democratic 
supervision was hence guaranteed. It is characteristic that the conference which was initiated 
by the European Council still works strictly in the conceptual framework of 
intergovernmentalism. 
The high level conference agreed that “a careful (emphasis added) widening of the mandate 
would be in the interest of all Europol stakeholders.”104 The widening should enable Europol 
to become “more operational” meaning that it could more directly support joint investigation 
teams and deal with crimes of a particular European nature such as trafficking in human 
beings or counterfeiting of the Euro.105 Some countries think that Europol should not focus on 
organised crime106 but towards transborder serious crime.107
 
 However the enlargement of 
Europol, or a deepening of its mandate, does not necessarily contradict each other, as the 
process could be carried out simultaneously. 
The “High Level Conference on the Future of Europol” identified cooperation with third 
States and International Organisations as an issue of particular relevance. The modalities for 
                                                 
101 Presidency to Article 36 Committee, Chairman’s Summary of the High Level Conference on the 
Future of Europol (23 and 24 February 2006), Council of the European Union, Doc. No. 7868/06, 
Brussels, 29 March 2006 
102 lbid.p. 4 
103 lbid. 
104 lbid, p. 3 
105 lbid. 
106 Finland thinks e.g. that the mandate of Europol should cover all forms of serious international crime, see 
Ministry of the Interior, Finland, Finland’s comments on the options paper, Helsinki, 24 March 2006 
107 Presidency to Article 36 Committee, op.cit., p. 4 
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Europol to enter into structured cooperation with third parties would clearly need 
improvement. Like the need to find a way to enable Europol to exchange information also 
with countries, that do not have the same data protection standards as those that are applicable 
within the EU.108 Peter Gridling would have wished that Europol would be faster in making 
agreements with international partners.109
 
 
As a consequence of the “High Level Conference on the Future of Europol” in February 2006, 
a “Friends of the Presidency Group” was set up to prepare a options paper on the future 
development of Europol. In March and April 2006 three meetings of a “Friends of the 
Presidency” working group at the Council took place to work on the options paper.  
This report110 was discussed on 1–2 June 2006 by the JHA Council, which concluded that 
work should begin on considering whether and how to replace the Europol Convention by a 
Council Decision. On 5th of January 2007 the Commission tabled a Proposal for a Council 
Decision establishing the European Police Office.111 Negotiations on the proposal lasted a 
year and a political agreement was reached on the 18th of April 2008. On the 24th of June 2008 
the “Council Decision establishing the European Police Office (Europol)”112
 
 was published in 
the Official Journal, which will apply from 1 January 2010. 
Peter Storr is the International Director at the Home Office and the United Kingdom member 
of the Article 36 Committee (United Kingdom was also a member of the Friends of the 
Presidency Group). In a report to the House of Lords, he gave evidence, that “the way in 
which Europol was originally structured was inflexible and rather bureaucratic. It meant that 
if there were new developments, new crime trends and new mandates for Europol, it became a 
rather cumbersome process for Europol to be able to change its priorities in order to take these 
on board.” He did not want to over-sell the Council Decision but thought that the changes 
were in the right direction: “They are modest changes and they reflect the fact that there are 
different approaches among Member States as to how Europol should be run and 
governed.”113
                                                 
108 Presidency to Article 36 Committee, op.cit., p. 3 
 
109 Peter Gridling, Head of Anti Terrorism Unit, Europol, Den Haag, 10 March 2006 
110 Friends of the Presidency's report to the Future of Europol, Brussels, Doc. No. 9184/1/0619, Brussels, 19 May 
2006 
111 Proposal for a Council Decision establishing the European Police Office (EUROPOL) - consolidated text, 
Doc. No. 6427/08, Brussels, 14 March 2008 
112 Council Decision establishing the European Police Office (Europol), Doc. No. 8706/08, Brussels, 24 June 
2008 
113 Peter Storr, quoted in EUROPOL: coordinating the fight against serious and organised crime, Report with 
Evidence of the HOUSE OF LORDS European Union Committee, 29th Report of Session 2007–08, p. 14 
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This perception was also shared by the authors of the House of Lord report on Europol. They 
think that “his caution is justified, since the changes are indeed modest—in our view, too 
modest.” They claimed that the transition from the Convention to the Decision was an 
opportunity for making important changes to the constitution and working of Europol which 
was not used.114
 
 
At the informal meeting of Ministers of Interior and Immigration in Dresden in January 2007, 
an informal Group at ministerial level with the objective to consider the future of the 
European area of justice, freedom and security was created. The findings and 
recommendations of the “Future Group” were meant to be an important contribution and a 
source of inspiration for the European Commission's proposal for the next multi-annual 
programme in the field of Justice and Home Affairs.115
 
  
In its executive summary the “Future Group” concluded that “Europol is to function as close 
partner and focal point for national police forces at the European level. Improving data 
transfers from Member States to Europol is necessary if it is to become a genuine information 
platform for Member States. (…) Furthermore, Europol should be, within its legal framework, 
increasingly used and expanded into a competence centre for technical and coordinative 
support.”116
 
 
 
                                                 
114 lbid. 
115 Freedom, Security, Privacy – European Home Affairs in an open world, Report of the Informal High Level  
advisory Group on the Future of European Home Affairs Policy („The Future Group“), June 2008 
116 lbid. Para 7 
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3.2. Europol’s mandate 
 
According to Mathieu Deflem, Europol has four main functions117
a) the facilitation of information exchange among the Europol Liaison Officers 
:  
b) the supply of operational analysis in support of relevant police operations conducted 
by the member states; 
c) the drawing up of strategic reports ( threat assessments), and crime analyses on the 
basis of information supplied by police of the Member States or generated at Europol 
headquarters; and  
d) the offering of technical support for police investigations conducted in the EU 
Member States.  
 
In reality Europol’s work is framed by a formal set of documents that lays out the 
organization’s functions and structure. And it relies on formal agreements of cooperation with 
the various participating police institutions, the Member States governments and formally 
maintains external agreements with non-EU states. This setup also poses certain restrictions to 
the organization’s structure and capabilities as it was shown in 2004, when the contract of 
Europol’s first Director, Jürgen Storbeck, had expired, and it took the Council of Ministers 9 
months to agree on a successor.  
 
The Council Decision establishing Europol brought an extension of Europol’s mandate so that 
it may support Member State investigations into serious crimes that are not necessarily 
thought to be carried out by organised gangs. However this extension is limited by the 
requirement that any such investigation must at least two Member States and thus be cross 
border in nature. 
 
                                                 
117 Mathieu Deflem, Europol and the Policing of International Terrorism:  Counter-Terrorism in a Global 
Perspective,  Justice Quarterly Volume 23 Number 3, p.:336-359, September 2006, p. 342 
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3.2.1. Europol’s objective 
 
According to Article 2 of the Europol Convention, the objective of Europol is to improve the 
effectiveness and cooperation of the competent authorities118
 
 in the Member States in 
preventing and combating serious international crime, where there are factual indications or 
reasonable grounds for believing that:   
• an organised criminal structure is involved, and 
• two or more Member States are affected in a way that requires a common approach by 
the Member States (owing to the scale, significance and consequences of the offences 
concerned) 
 
The Convention defines the following forms of crime as serious international crime, and 
therefore within Europol’s sphere of competence: 
 
• Crimes committed or likely to be committed in the course of terrorist activities against 
life, limb, personal freedom or property, 
• Unlawful drug trafficking 
• illegal money-laundering activities,  
• trafficking in nuclear and radioactive substances, 
• illegal immigrant smuggling,  
• trade in human beings,  
• motor vehicle crime and  
• the forms of crime listed in the Annex119
                                                 
118 “For the purposes of this Convention, “competent authorities” means all public bodies existing in the Member 
States, which are responsible under national law for preventing and combating criminal offences.” Article 2 
replaced by the Council Act drawing up, on the basis of Article 43(1) of the Convention on the Establishment of 
a European Police Office (Europol Convention), a Protocol amending that Convention (2004/C 2/01), Council 
Act of 27 November 2003 (Official Journal 002, 06/01/2004, p. 0003) 
 or specific manifestations thereof. 
119 “Against life, limb or personal freedom: 
− murder, grievous bodily injury 
− illicit trade in human organs and tissue 
− kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking 
− racism and xenophobia 
Against property or public goods including fraud: 
− organized robbery 
− illicit trafficking in cultural goods, including antiquities and works of art 
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The Council can lay down the priorities for Europol in respect of combating and prevention of 
serious international crime within its mandate on proposal from the Management Board. 
 
The new framework decision moves away from this exhaustive listing of crimes, and uses a 
more global objective of Europol. 120  Europol’s competence ““shall cover organised crime, 
terrorism and other forms of serious crime (…) affecting two or more Member States in such 
a way as to require a common approach by the Member States owing to the scale, significance 
and consequences of the offences.”121
 
 
 
3.2.2. Europol’s tasks 
 
Article 3 of the Europol convention describes the principal tasks of Europol: 
 
1. to facilitate the exchange of information between the Member States; 
2. to obtain, collate and analyse information and intelligence; 
3. to notify the competent authorities of the Member States without delay via the 
National Units referred to in Article 4 of information concerning them and of any 
connections identified between criminal offences; 
4. to aid investigations in the Member States by forwarding all relevant information to 
the national units; 
5. to maintain a computerized system of collected information containing  
                                                                                                                                                        
− swindling and fraud62 
− racketeering and extortion 
− counterfeiting and product piracy 
− forgery of administrative documents and trafficking therein 
− forgery of money and means of payment 
− computer crime 
− corruption 
Illegal trading and harm to the environment: 
− illicit trafficking in arms, ammunition and explosives 
− illicit trafficking in endangered animal species 
− illicit trafficking in endangered plant species and varieties 
− environmental crime 
− illicit trafficking in hormonal substances and other growth promoters”, Annex of the Europol Convention 
120 Article 3, The objective of Europol shall be to support and strengthen action by the competent authorities of 
the Member States and their mutual cooperation in preventing and combating organised crime, terrorism and 
other forms of serious crime affecting two or more Member States”., Council Decision establishing the European 
Police Office, op.cit. 
121 Article 4, Council Decision establishing the European Police Office, op.cit. 
 50 
6. to participate in a support capacity in joint investigation teams 
7. to ask the competent authorities of the Member States concerned to conduct or 
coordinate investigations in specific cases 
 
Europol is supposed to improve the cooperation and effectiveness of the competent authorities 
in the Member States through National Units on one hand. On the other hand it should 
develop specialist knowledge of the investigative procedure of the Member States; provide 
advice on these investigations; provide strategic intelligence for operations at national level, 
and prepare general situation reports.122  To achieve these goals, Europol is able to receive, 
store, process and give meaning to personal data and intelligence forwarded by law 
enforcement agencies in the Member States, providing both strategy assessments and 
operational support to ongoing investigations. These strategic assessments are directed to the 
Council, the Police Chiefs Task Force and law enforcement decision makers in the Member 
States.123
 
  
Operational analysis is aimed at improving the understanding of the composition, structure, 
modus operandi and networking of crime groups. It is supposed to help the investigation 
teams in the Members States to achieve better coordination, to identify new lines of 
investigation and to collect essential material for the dismantling and further prevention of 
International criminal networks.  
 
Furthermore Europol may assist the Member States through advice and research  
• in the training of members of Member States competent authorities, and  
• organisation and equipment of these authorities 
• crime prevention methods, and 
• technical and forensic police methods and investigative procedures124
 
. 
And finally Europol acts as the European Union contact point in its contacts with third States 
and organisations for the suppression of counterfeit euro currency.125
 
 
                                                 
122 Article 3 (2) Europol Convention 
123 Antonio Saccone, Combating International Crime in an Enlarging European Union: What is the Role of 
Europol? Lecture in the International Seminar for Experts “Combating Terrorism and International Organised 
Crime in the European Union – The Hague Programme and the Role of Europol and Eurojust”, organised by the 
Cicero Foundation in the series ‘Great Debates’ Paris, 14 and 15 December 2006, p. 7 
124 Article 3(3) replaced by the Council Act of 27 November 2003 (Official Journal 002, 06/01/2004, p. 0004) 
125 Article 3(4) amended by the Council Act of 27 November 2003 (Official Journal 002, 06/01/2004, p. 0004) 
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3.2.3. Requests by Europol to initiate criminal 
investigations 
 
The formulation of the Europol Convention of this topic leaves room for interpretation: 
“Member States should deal with any request from Europol to initiate, conduct or coordinate 
investigations in specific cases and should give such requests due consideration. Europol 
should be informed whether the requested investigation will be initiated.“126 If the Member 
States competent authorities decide not to comply with the request, they need to inform 
Europol of their decision and of the reason for it, unless:127
 
 
• Doing so would harm essential national security interests; or 
• Doing so would jeopardise the success of investigations under way or the safety of 
individuals.  
 
Europol also needs to inform Eurojust of a request to initiate criminal investigations.128
The Council Decision establishing Europol did not change in this respect, which still enables 
the Member States to simply deny a request made by Europol without explaining the reasons 
in depth. The fact that Europol does not have any real means to order national police agencies 
to act again shows the limited competences of the European agency. 
 
 
 
3.2.4. Annual Publications by Europol 
 
As one of the aims of Europol is to provide criminal intelligence the agency publishes 
different reports. The two most important annual reports are the “European Organised Crime 
Threat Assessment (OCTA)” and “EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT)”. 
  
                                                 
126 Article 3b (1), Europol Convention 
127 Article 3b (2), Europol Convention 
128 Article 3b inserted by the Council Act drawing up a Protocol amending the Convention on the establishment 
of a European Police Office (Europol Convention) and the Protocol on the privileges and immunities of Europol, 
the members of its organs, the deputy directors and the employees of Europol of 28 November 2002, 2002/C 
312/01, (Official Journal 312, 16/12/2002, p. 0002) 
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3.2.4.1. OCTA Report 
 
The OCTA covers the EU as well as countries which a direct influence on the Member States. 
It is based on a multi-source approach, including law enforcement and non-law enforcement 
contributions, which include various European agencies as well as the private sector. The 
OCTA tries to close the gap between strategic findings and operational activities. It aims at 
identifying the highest priorities, which should then be effectively tackled with the 
appropriate law enforcement instruments.  
 
OCTA reports on issues like the “General assessment of the Organised Crime groups”, 
“Criminal markets” or the “The Organised Crime landscape”129. In 2008 the third OCTA was 
presented in order to “to provide a forward looking approach to fight organised crime in a 
more proactive than re-active manner (and) allows the EU to develop complementary 
measures to countering organised crime, linking those at the ministerial and political levels 
with those of practitioners and law enforcement agencies who operate at the front line.”130 As 
Director Max-Peter Ratzel underlines, the „OCTA marks a new approach to the way in which 
Europol and the Member States operate and it is a first step to a change of paradigm in 
policing” as well as it “already had a significant impact on the law enforcement community 
throughout Europe in terms of practices and priorities.”131
 
 
How glorious these words may sound, OCTA was also heavy criticised. Petrus van Duyne for 
example points out that even though according to Europol OCTA is an example of a core 
product of intelligence led policing and one of Europol top priorities, “one becomes curious at 
the meaning of ‘intelligence based policing,’ (and) the reader can at any rate deduce that in 
this case the phrase ‘intelligence led’ does not mean: ‘evidence based’”132
                                                 
129 See OCTA 2007 and OCTA 2008, Europol 
 His reasoning is 
draws on the fact, that the information on which OCTA is build is transmitted by the Member 
States on the basis of a questionnaire. During his research he was neither able receive one of 
the replies (which would still be arguable) nor a blank questionnaire itself. Furthermore Van 
Duyne underlines that there is in fact no “secret” OCTA version vis-à-vis the “public” OCTA 
version which one is able to download from the Europol website. Those who have read 
national “secret” threat assessment reports know that in many cases these reports produce 
130 Max-Peter Ratzel, OCTA 2008, Europol, p. 5 
131 lbid. 
132 Petrus C. van Duyne, OCTA 2006: the unfulfilled promise, Trends Organ Crime 10, 2007, pp 126 
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“much ado about nothing”. An uninformed reader of the “public” OCTA version would 
however assume that there are many secrets hidden in “secret” version. Well, this is 
apparently not the case. Again, one could have the impression that Europol is investing much 
time and effort into PR and marketing.133
 
 
Max-Peter Ratzel nevertheless defends the effort made for the OCTA. According to him, it 
was the first time for Member States to be tasked to collect data centrally. Some of them did 
not even have any central data collection plan, so Europol provided them with a data 
collection plan. The feedback received was quite different from Member State to Member 
State: the smallest feedback was one page; the largest more than 300 pages, and everything in 
between. About ten different languages were offered, and Europol had to translate them. 
Based on the Organised Crime Threat Assessment in 2006 and later on in 2007, the Council 
took conclusions on the priorities to be followed at the European and national level.134 And 
his point of view is supported by the British Home Office, which thinks that there are 
indications that OCTA is developing a momentum, which is likely to be due in part to the 
improving intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities within Member States, and as a 
result of the growing realisation of the benefits of the OCTA.135
 
 
3.2.4.2. EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 
 
The TE-SAT 2007 was the fifth edition of the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, but 
constitutes also the very first “Europol TE-SAT”, as it was the first TE-SAT produced after 
the Council of the European Union delegated to Europol the power to approve the final 
version of the report.136
Reorientation and a widening of the data collection to enhance the quality of the report and to 
make it a better awareness tool for decision makers. 
 The formal change was accompanied by a methodological 
 
                                                 
133 This impression is supported by the comments of a former Europol official, who indicated that the quality of 
OCTA was perceived to very low even within Europol, Interview with former Europol official, Vienna, 4th 
December 2008 
134 Max-Peter Ratzel, House of Lords, Select Committee on European Union Minutes of Evidence,  Examination 
of Witnesses (Question 176), 24 June 2008 
135 Memorandum by the Home Office, Minutes of Evidence, TAKEN BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE 
ON THE EUROPEAN UNION, (SUB-COMMITTEE F), WEDNESDAY 21 MAY 2008 
136 “Europol's Proposal for the New TE-SAT”, General Secretariat, Doc. No. 8196/2/06 REV 2, Brussels, 18 
May 2006 
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TE-SAT include (subject to the limitation on the use of classified information):137
• Open sources; 
 
• EU and Member States' reporting related to the phenomenon of terrorism (such as 
various documents produced by the TWG, the SITCEN, the CTG, Eurojust and the 
Commission); 
• Europol's own information including strategic output from the relevant AWFs; and 
• Information provided to Europol by Third States and Organisations. 
 
TE-SAT is a situation report which describes the outward manifestations of terrorism i.e. 
terrorist attacks and activities. It does not attempt to analyse the root causes of terrorism as 
well as it does not assess the impact or effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies and law 
enforcement measures taken. It aims at providing an overview of the situation in the EU 
instead of describing the situation in single Member States as it was the case in earlier 
editions of the TE-SAT. It is based mainly on information contributed by the Member States, 
resulting from criminal investigations into terrorism offences. TE-SAT provides information 
on “Islamist Terrorism”, “Ethno-Nationalist and Separatist Terrorism”, “Left-Wing and 
Anarchist Terrorism”, and “Right-Wing Terrorism”.138
 
 
Max-Peter Ratzel describes TE-SAT a forward-looking document: “Its aim is not only to 
describe the situation in the European Union regarding terrorism and related phenomena, but 
also to identify trends.” His confession, that “as an annual product, the TE-SAT is still in its 
infancy (and that) awareness in the Member States about the importance of such a tool is 
growing” indicates that TE-SAT is facing similar problems as OCTA, even though the 
“contributions for TE-SAT 2008 have increased significantly in quantity and quality.”139
 
 
                                                 
137 lbid. 
138 TE-SAT 2007, Europol 
139 Max-Peter Ratzel, TE-SAT 2008, p. 5 
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3.3. The crux of two separate entities at Europol 
 
In December 2007 the total number of personnel working at Europol was 592. This includes 
421 Europol staff and 114 Europol Liaison Officers appointed by the Europol National Units 
of the EU Member States and other states and organisations with cooperation agreements with 
Europol. 57 persons were working at Europol in other categories (seconded and national 
experts, trainees and contractors).140
 
 
Personnel working at Europol headquarter may be sorted into two categories: Europol staff, 
and staff working in the National Units and the Liaison Officers Network.  
 
 
Figure 2 Personnel working at Europol, December 2007141
 
 
The interesting aspect is that the Liaison Officers Network and its work – which in fact 
constitutes a complete separate body from Europol – are very often mistaken for Europol 
headquarter itself. “Europol itself can be seen either as the headquarters (…) or it can be seen 
                                                 
140 Europol Annual Report 2007, p. 42 
141 lbid. 
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in a wider understanding as representing all competent authorities in the Member States.“142 
Press news referring to Europol’s achievements in the fight against organized crime, actually 
report about the work done by the Liaison Officers Network. One could even assume that is 
not too interested in clarifying this misunderstanding.143
 
 This artificial separation poses 
however one of the key problems of Europol: Member States are able to use the Liaison 
Officers Network and the National Units as a simple communication channel between each 
other (very much like Interpol already has been working for decades). To transfer this 
information, they do not need to include Europol officers themselves. 
According to the House of Lords Report on Europol, up to 80 % of the information is 
exchanged outside the formal system by bilateral engagement. Europol is deprived of a huge 
amount of intelligence data which is of concern for it. This leaves not only Europol as one of 
the losers; but also includes all the others Member States not party to these bilateral or 
multilateral exchanges, since they have no access to the information through Europol, or are 
able to contribute to it. Their inability to contribute may also be detrimental to the Member 
States involved in the exchanges.144
 
  
Designing Europol in a different way, for example like Eurojust, could help avoiding this 
problem. Eurojust is composed of 27 National Members, one seconded from each member 
state in accordance with its legal system being a prosecutor, judge or police officer of 
equivalent competence. All of these National Members are represented in the so-called 
College of Eurojust. This body meets the decisions for the judicial agency, and its support 
teams (see figure). 
 
                                                 
142 Max-Peter Ratzel, House of Lords, Select Committee on European Union Minutes of Evidence,  Examination 
of Witnesses (Question 167), TUESDAY 24 JUNE 2008 
143 A former Europol official claimed, that Europol is actually quite happy about this misunderstanding, as it 
helps to improve the image of the agency, Interview with former Europol official, Vienna, 4th December 2008 
144 House of Lords, EUROPOL: coordinating the fight against serious and organised crime, Report with 
Evidence, Ordered to be printed 28 October 2008 and published 12 November 2008, Published by the Authority 
of the House of Lords, Report with Evidence of the House of Lords European Union Committee, 29th Report of 
Session 2007–08, pp. 22 
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Figure 3 Eurojust College Teams Structure145
 
 
This structure is much simpler than the one Europol uses. This way the National Members are 
the liaison officers of their home countries as well as the representatives of the EU agency. 
Hugo Brady even proposes to merge Europol and Eurojust to form a single European law-
enforcement co-ordination body, incorporating also the police chiefs’ task force. According to 
him, a single body could underpin a uniform level of co-operation across the EU whatever the 
national law enforcement structures and would also prevent duplication in intelligence-
gathering and analysis and ensure better follow-through from investigation to prosecution in 
cross-border cases.146
 
 As Police officers in some countries and public prosecutors in other 
countries have very similar competences, this idea will definitely need more consideration in 
the future. 
 
3.3.1. Europol Staff 
 
Staff at headquarters is usually recruited from police professionals from existing national 
police and intelligence agencies, with the implication that Europol can operate only within the 
                                                 
145 http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/coll_org_struc.htm    26.01.2009 
146 Hugo Brady, Europol and the European Criminal Intelligence Model: A Non-state Response to Organised 
Crime, Area: Europe – Security & Defence. ARI 126/2007, 1/12/2007, p. 5 
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context of an existing professional culture of policing. The main problem of Europol staff is, 
that Member States only provide information voluntary, and the level of involvement from the 
various National Units in Europol varies greatly from one country to the next.  Very often the 
level of cooperation between Europol and different police agencies changes with the 
recruitment of a new Europol officer. If a project team is headed by – let’s say a French police 
officer – the flow of information between Europol and France is made a lot easier. While the 
absence of a Greek team member, might impede cooperation with the Greek police 
authorities. The level of participation with Europol also depends on the level of expertise a 
certain police agency in Member States posses in a certain topic. The Russian Mafia poses a 
bigger problem in some Member States than in others. 
 
 
3.3.2. National Units & Liaison officers network 
 
Europol has a liaison bureau network operating on its premises at The Hague with a bureau 
for each of the 27 EU Member States, as well as offices representing those countries and 
international organisations with which Europol has co-operation agreements. Europol 
headquarter also provides room for the exchange of communication and information exchange 
among the participating agencies via their National Units, like e.g. Interpol. Participating 
agencies need not contact one another directly but can route information via The Hague to be 
passed on to all other member agencies. Bilateral communication simply happens by crossing 
the floor and contacting the National Units of other Member States. 
 
3.3.2.1. National Units 
 
Each Member States designates a National Unit who acts as the only liaison body between 
Europol and the competent national authorities147
 
. Direct contacts between designated 
competent authorities and Europol may be allowed under conditions determined by the 
Member States in question, including prior involvement of the National Unit.  
                                                 
147 Article 4(1), Europol Convention 
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The relationship between Europol and the National Unit is governed by national law and the 
relevant national constitutional requirements. 148 The Member States need to ensure, that 
National Units are able to fulfil their tasks and have access to relevant national data. National 
Units need to:149
 
 
1. supply Europol on their own initiative with the information and intelligence necessary 
for it to carry out its tasks; 
2. respond to Europol's requests for information, intelligence and advice; 
3. keep information and intelligence up to date; 
4. evaluate information and intelligence in accordance with national law for the 
competent authorities and transmit this material to them; 
5. issue requests for advice, information, intelligence and analysis to Europol; 
6. supply Europol with information for storage in the computerized system; and to 
7. ensure compliance with the law in every exchange of information between themselves 
and Europol. 
 
The National Units are not obliged to supply information and intelligence, if this could turn 
out to be:150
 
 
1. harming essential national security interests;  
2. jeopardizing the success of a current investigation or the safety of individuals;  
3. or involving information pertaining to organizations or specific intelligence activities 
in the field of State security. 
 
Furthermore the costs incurred by the National Units for communications with Europol must 
be borne by the MSs151, and the Heads of National Units must meet on a regular basis to assist 
Europol.152
 
 
Article 8 of the Council Decision establishing Europol introduces the “head of the national 
unit” (HENU). The heads of the national units shall meet on a regular basis to assist Europol 
in improving Europol’s operational effectiveness and encourage commitment from Member 
                                                 
148 Article 4(2) replaced by the Council Act of 27 November 2003, op.cit. p. 4 
149 Article 4(4), Europol Convention 
150 Article 4(5), Europol Convention 
151 Article 4(6), Europol Convention 
152 Article 4(7) replaced by the Council Act of 27 November 2002, op.cit, p.3 
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States; evaluate the reports and analyses drafted by Europol and develop measures in order to 
help to implement their findings; and provide support in the establishment of joint 
investigation teams.153 The Austrian Ministry of the Interior considers this new legislation to 
strengthen the national units,154
 
 if such an empowerment of the Member States will help to 
solve above explained bi-body problem could hardly be imagined. 
3.3.2.2. Liaison Officers Network 
 
Europol hosts an institutional, permanent and structured network of liaison officers linked to 
the network of National Units in all Member States. This network consists of nearly 100 
Liaison Officers who link their national authorities and Europol and allow a fast exchange of 
information at European level, focussing on trans-national investigations for a limited 
typology of crimes of serious nature.  The liaison officer’s network allows bilateral as well as 
multilateral cooperation and is the only channel for the provision of data to Europol’s 
projects.155
 
 
Each National Unit needs to second at least one liaison officer to Europol,156 who represents 
the national interests within Europol.157 He ensures the exchange of information between the 
National Unit and Europol158 and enjoys the privileges and immunities necessary for the 
performance of his/her tasks.159
 
 The network is supplemented by the presence of liaison 
officers from 9 countries that have signed an agreement for the exchange of personal data 
with Europol such as Norway, Switzerland and the US. 
                                                 
153 Article 8 (7), Council Decision establishing Europol, op.cit. 
154 Europol: Rob Wainwright ist neuer Europol-Direktor, Artikel Nr.: 5406 vom Mittwoch, 15. April 2009, 
http://www.bmi.gv.at/bmireader/_articlepages/artikel_smallpics.aspx?id=45416D307677444C782B6B3D&textv
ersion=0&inctop= Retrieved 02.October 2009 
155 Antonio Saccone, Combating International Crime in an Enlarging European Union: What is the Role of 
Europol? Lecture in the International Seminar for Expert. op.cit. , p. 6 
156 Article 5(1), Europol Convention 
157 Article 5(2), Europol Convention 
158 Article 5(3), Europol Convention 
159 Article 5(8), Europol Convention 
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3.3.3. Further Problems entailing 
 
Another problem with this factual bi-body is the data protection rules. The JSB is concerned 
only with data held and used by Europol. Data used on Europol’s premises for bilateral 
exchanges belong to the Member States involved and not to Europol. They are therefore not 
subject to Europol’s rules on data protection, or to supervision by the JSB. Instead are subject 
to the data protection rules of the Member States.  
Likewise, all the data on Europol’s databases come from the Member States. Until they are 
inputted into Europol’s databases they are the sole responsibility of the Member States, and 
even after they have been inputted the Member State retains a responsibility.160
A date protection regime which neglects the bulk of information exchanged, does not really 
earn the remit of such a name. This issue will also be discussed in the chapter on data 
protection. 
 
 
                                                 
160 House of Lords, EUROPOL: coordinating the fight against serious and organised crime, op.cit. p. 57 
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3.4. Administering and funding Europol 
 
Europol – which has its own legal personality161 – is constituted and administered by a 
number of bodies, namely the Management Board, the Director, the Financial Controller and 
the Financial Committee.162
 
  
Figure 4 Organisational chart of the Europol Headquarters163
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
161 Article 26, Europol Convention 
162 Article 27, Europol Convention 
163 Europol Annual Report 2007, p. 10 
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3.4.1. The Management Board 
 
Management Board is composed of one representative of each Member State (each member 
has one vote) and the European Commission who only has an observer status. It meets at least 
twice a year.164
 
 Its duties include helping to determine Europol's priorities, unanimously 
determining the rights and obligations of liaison officers, laying down data-processing rules, 
preparing rules for work files, and examining problems brought to its attention by the Joint 
Supervisory Body.  
Each year the Management Board unanimously adopts a general report on Europol's activities 
during the previous year and a report on Europol’s future activities which take the Member 
States' operational requirements for Europol into account. These reports are submitted to the 
Council to take note and endorse, and also send to the European Parliament for 
information.165 The Management Board is chaired by the representative of the Member State 
holding the Presidency of the Council.166
 
 
The Council Decision Establishing Europol introduced a new function in the management 
board: the Chairperson and the Deputy Chairperson. They are selected by and from within the 
group of three Member States – who jointly prepare the Council's eighteen-month programme 
(the “Troika”). They serve during this eighteen-month period corresponding to a Council 
programme, and act no longer as representatives of their Member States in the Management 
Board.167
 
  
This amendment was strongly opposed by the to the House of Lords report. It does not see 
any logical connection between the nationality of the person best qualified to be Chairman of 
the Management Board and the identity of the Member States holding the Troika Presidency: 
“there is no reason why the other members of the Management Board should be excluded 
from the selection of their Chairman; and the length of three Presidencies should be irrelevant 
to the term of office. (…) We regard it simply as a missed opportunity.”168
                                                 
164 Article 28 (9), Europol Convention 
 Instead they 
recommend that the Decision should be amended before its entry into force to adopt for 
165 Article 28(10), Europol Convention, replaced by the Council Act of 27 November 2003 (Official Journal 002, 
06/01/2004, p. 0007) 
166 Article 28 (6), Europol Convention 
167 Article 37, Council Decision establishing Europol 
168 House of Lords, EUROPOL: coordinating the fight against serious and organised crime, op.cit., p. 41 
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Europol a system identical to that of Frontex: a Chairman of the Management Board elected 
by and from among his colleagues for a term of two years, renewable once. The report further 
recommends that the dates of appointment of the Chairman and Director should be such as to 
give several months of overlap between their respective terms of office.169
 
 
 
3.4.2. The Director 
 
Europol is headed by a Director.170 He is appointed by the Council of the European Union 
(acting unanimously) - after obtaining the opinion of the Management Board - for a four-year 
period renewable once.171 He is assisted by three Deputy Directors appointed by the Council 
of the European Union for a four-year period renewable once. Their tasks are determined by 
the Director.172
 
  
The Director's responsibilities include173
1. performance of the tasks assigned to Europol; 
 
2. day-to-day administration; 
3. personnel management; 
4. proper preparation and implementation of the Management Board's decisions; 
5. preparing the draft budget, draft establishment plan and draft five-year financing plan 
and implementing Europol's budget; 
6. on a regular basis, updating the Management Board on the implementation of the 
priorities in respect of the combating and prevention of the forms of serious 
international crime within its mandate;174
7. all other tasks assigned to him in this Convention or by the Management Board.
 
175
 
 
                                                 
169 lbid. 
170 Article 29 (5), Europol Convention 
171 Article 29 (1), Europol Convention, amended by the Council Act of 27 November 2003 (Official Journal 002, 
06/01/2004, p. 0008) 
172 Article 29 (2), Europol Convention 
173 Article 29 (3), Europol Convention 
174 Article 29 (3) point 6, Europol Convention, replaced by the Council Act of 27 November 2003, op.cit., p. 7 
175 Article 29 (3) point 7, lbid. 
 65 
The Director is accountable to the Management Board176 and he and his Deputy Directors 
may be dismissed by a decision of the Council by a two-thirds majority of the Member States, 
after having obtained the opinion of the Management Board.177
 
 
Europol’s Directorate is appointed by the EU Council of Ministers for Justice and Home 
Affairs in unanimity. As the appointment is a political decision, it proved to be a hard finding 
in the past. In 2004, the Council of Ministers was unable to appoint a new Director for more 
than half a year. In July of 2004, the renewal of Storbeck’s contract was opposed by France, 
while Germany staunchly backed the renewal almost up to the last minute. As a result, 
Storbeck was finally informed that he had to leave only a few days before the end of his 
contract and Europol had to be headed by an interim director from July onwards.  
 
While Mariano Simancas of Spain served as Interim Director, four countries (Spain, Italy, 
Germany, and France) each proposed their own candidate for the vacancy and no new 
Director could be agreed upon until February 2005, when the German Max-Peter Ratzel was 
finally appointed and chosen over France's Gilles Leclair, Spain's Mariano Simancas and 
Italy's Emanuele Marotta.178
 
  
On the 24th of February 2005, the Justice and Home Affairs Council decided to appoint Mr 
Max Peter Ratzel as Director of Europol for a period of four years. He took up his position as 
Director on the 16th of April 2005. His appointment finally broke a deadlock among the 25 
EU Member States, who could not agree on a new director for Europol. Four countries (Spain, 
Italy, Germany, and France) each proposed their own candidate for the vacancy, and it took 
more than a year to find a compromise. The matter was eventually resolved by a ‘gentlemen's 
agreement' in which only a simple majority was needed. 
 
This dispute happening while the 2004 terrorist bombings in Madrid killed 191 people and 
wounded more than 1,800 clearly shows the shortcomings of international cooperation when 
nationalist sentiments and political concerns drive the agenda, rather than considerations of 
expertise in matters of law enforcement. “A rather poor reward for years of dedicated work 
for the institution”, as Jörg Monar puts it.179
                                                 
176 Article 29 (6), Europol Convention 
 
177 Article 29 (6), Europol Convention, amended by the Council Act of 27 November 2003, op.cit, p. 8 
178 Press Article: Justice and Home Affairs Council: Germany gets the Job at Europol, European Report, 26. 
February 05 
179 Jörg Monar, Justice and Home Affairs, JCMS 2005 Volume 43. Annual Review p. 140 
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Another row among Member States over the appointment of the next director of Europol in 
spring 2009 again almost prevented the finding of a new candidate. Most countries were 
backing a UK candidate, Rob Wainwright, but Hungary, supported by some new member 
states, insisted on its candidate, Ferenc Banfi. 
 
The disagreement was so deep, particularly following a sharp exchange of views at a Council 
of Ministers meeting that it seemed possible that a finalisation of the appointment would only 
be possible after a change in the voting rules. The appointment currently requires unanimity, 
but from 1 January 2010, new rules will allow a decision with a two-thirds majority.  
 
The Czech EU presidency was keen to obtain agreement at the meeting of justice ministers on 
6 April – despite doubts among some member states about Czech neutrality. Ivan Langer, the 
Czech interior minister, signed a letter endorsing the Hungarian candidate before the start of 
the Czech presidency, although a spokesman later insisted that Langer took no position on the 
matter in the Council. “We are definitely neutral, we just want to get a deal,” said a statement 
from the presidency. The Council's legal service has also declared that the selection process 
was fair and correct, following complaints over a lack of transparency.180
 
  
Eventually the Member States agreed on Rob Wainwright at the justice ministers meeting. He 
is a 41-year-old, managed police co-operation with other countries at the UK's Serious 
Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), which investigates organised crime and targets the 
proceeds from it. He also headed the UK's contact bureau for Europol and Interpol and was 
previously the UK's representative on the Europol management board. He was ranked first in 
order of merit among the candidates by the Europol management board. Ferenc Banfi – the 
Hungarian candidate – headed the EU's border assistance mission to Moldova and Ukraine 
(Eubam). Mariano Simancas Carrión, a Spaniard and Europol's current deputy director, was 
the third candidate on the short-list.181
 
 
                                                 
180 European Voice, Row over Europol top job intensifies, by Judith Crosbie, 26.03.2009 
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/row-over-europol-top-job-intensifies/64396.aspx  
Retrieved 02. October 2009 
181 European Voice, Briton tipped for Europol top job, by Judith Crosbie, 25.02.2009 
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Retrieved 02. October 2009 
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As explained above, the Council Decision establishing Europol will bring a shift from 
unanimity to a decision with a two-thirds majority. This should enable a faster procedure from 
now on.  
 
 
3.4.3. The Budget 
 
Europol’s budget is so far financed by Member States contributions. Each Member States 
financial contribution is determined according to the proportion of its gross national product 
to the sum total of the gross national products of the Member States for the year preceding the 
year in which the budget is drawn up.182
 
 The draft budget and budget implementation are 
examined by the Council of the European Union. 
The budget for 2007 was €70.35 million. Of this, €2.46 million was covered by a contribution 
from the host state the Netherlands (referred to as “part C” in the next table). The remaining 
amount of €67.89 million was covered by the Member States. €64.86 million of the budget 
was called up.183
 
 
 
Figure 5 Development of the Europol budget from 2000 to 2007 (excl. part C, host state)184
                                                 
182 Article 35 (2), Europol Convention 
 
183 Annual Report 2007, Europol, p. 42 
184 lbid. 
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The Council Decision establishing Europol brought a significant change with regards to 
funding. Europol will no longer be financed by Member States contributions, but by 
Community funds: “The revenues of Europol shall consist, without prejudice to other types of 
income, of a subsidy from the Community entered in the general budget of the European 
Union (Commission section) as from the date of application of this Decision.”185 This means, 
that with 2010, the influence on Europol will shift significantly away from the Member States 
and bring in another European player who has been desperately waiting for this change: the 
European Parliament. The Council Decision therefore states explicitly, that “the financing of 
Europol shall be subject to an agreement by the European Parliament and the Council 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the budgetary authority’)”.186
 
 
For the period 2010-2013, an amount of EUR 334 million is allocated to Europol in 
accordance with its latest five-year financial plan. 
 
 
3.4.4. Privileges and Immunities 
 
Since Europol is not yet a Community body and its staff are not staff of the Community, their 
privileges and immunities are dealt within the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of 
Europol, the Members of its Organs, the Deputy Directors and employees of Europol from 19 
June 1997. 187
 
   
All of them, as well as liaison officers seconded from the Member States and their families, 
enjoy certain privileges and immunities.188
 
 Article 15 of the Protocol provides that the staff 
members of Europol enjoy immunity from suit and legal process in respect of acts, including 
words written or spoken, done by them in the exercise of their official functions.  
It provides for two exceptions:  
                                                 
185 Article 42, Council Decision establishing Europol 
186 lbid. 
187 Protocol drawn up, on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 41 (3) of the 
Europol Convention, on the privileges and immunities of Europol, the members of its organs, the deputy 
directors and employees of Europol, Official Journal C 221 , 19/07/1997 P. 0002 - 0010 
188 Article 41 (1), Europol Convention 
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• either the privilege or immunity of staff members is waived by the Director, or 
• it is waived in respect of civil liability in the case of damage arising from a road traffic 
accident caused by staff members.  
It was amended to create exceptions in relation to official acts required to be undertaken in 
fulfilment of the tasks set out in Article 3a of the Europol Convention regarding the 
participation of Europol officials in Joint Investigation Teams as required by Article 2 of this 
Protocol189
 
 (see chapter JIT). 
From 1 January 2010 – with the entry into force of the Council Decision establishing Europol 
– the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Communities will apply 
directly to Europol, it’s Director, Deputy Directors and staff and supersede the regulation of 
the Europol Convention. A specific area of concern was linked to the immunity of Europol 
officers who work with Joint Investigation Teams. This issue will be dealt with in the relating 
chapter on Joint Investigation Teams. 
 
 
3.4.5. Cooperation agreements 
 
Europol also engages in cooperation agreements at an institutional and nation state level. 
Europol maintains relations with countries outside the European Union.  
 
Figure 6 Overview of cooperation agreements in place as of 31 December 2007190
 
 
                                                 
189 Protocol amending the Convention on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention) 
and the Protocol on the privileges and immunities of Europol, the members of its organs, the deputy directors 
and the employees of Europol, OJ C 312/2, 16.12.2002 
190 Europol Annual Report 2007, p. 49, * Countries and organisations that have liaison officers at Europol 
headquarters 
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As of 31 December 2007, Europol was ratifying or negotiating cooperation agreements with 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (strategic), Liechtenstein (operational), Monaco 
(operational), Montenegro (strategic), Serbia (strategic), Ukraine (strategic), and Frontex 
(strategic).191
 
 
Even if Europol’s cooperation agreements have to be approved by the EU Justice and Home 
Affairs Ministers, they are initiated at the request of Europol’s Management Board. Europol’s 
agreements with other police organizations have distinct implications in terms of the 
organization’s autonomy as an international police body. Mathieu Deflem thinks that Europol 
is acting as an international organization in the EU, as the independent structure of 
international cooperation (at the bureaucratic level of police institutions) indicates. 
Furthermore the interlinking of multiple international police organizations is also 
accomplished by overlapping memberships in their respective leadership structures.192
                                                 
191 lbid. 
 
192 Assistant Commissioner of the Irish National Police Service also acts as representative on the Europol 
Management Board, the Police Chiefs Task Force, and the Club of Berne 
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3.5. Europol’s IT Database 
 
To perform its tasks, Europol maintains an IT database. The National Units are responsible 
for security measures concerning data-processing equipment, and for carrying out checks on 
the storage and deletion of data files. This database is not allowed to be linked to other 
automated processing systems, except for the systems of the National Units.  
 
It is made up of three components:  
 
1. the Europol IT information system (EIT)
It serves as a reference check of suspects in investigations on serious crime and 
terrorism in the EU and only stores information strictly necessary for the cross-
checking of targets and crime events. It also keeps track of the authorities that are 
investigating in order to identify the need for coordination and develop a common 
approach to targets. The IT database represents the largest database on organised 
crime groups available to law enforcement agencies in the EU.  
  
 
2. the analysis system for the work files
The work files are stored in the analysis system whose purpose is the reception, 
storage, processing and analysis of all kind of information and intelligence gathered 
during criminal investigations. The system has a limited access and provides an 
exhaustive audit log for the data protection authority.  
 (AWFs)  
 
3. and the index system.193
The index system is aimed at querying the presence of entities stored in the analysis 
system. It is accessible to Europol staff and liaison officers and gives a “hit or no-hit” 
result.  
 
 
The Council Decision establishing Europol enables the agency to add new systems for 
processing personal data to the main systems already established and used by the European 
Police Office (notably IS and AWFs). This could refer, for example, to new databases on 
terrorist groups or child pornography sites. For these new tools, the Council, after consulting 
                                                 
193 Article 6, Europol Convention 
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the European Parliament, would determine the conditions on data access, usage and 
storage.194
  
 
 
3.5.1. The information system 
 
Europol maintains a computerized information system, into which the National Units and 
liaison officers directly input data in compliance with their national procedures. The Europol 
Information System (IS) provides a general information exchange service, as opposed to the 
specificity of the Analytical Work Files. It is available to all Member States through their 
Liaison Officers and the Europol National Units. It is used to store personal information about 
people who, under the national law of that country, are suspected of having committed a 
crime or having taken part in a crime for which Europol has competence, or where there are 
serious grounds to believe they will commit such crimes. 
 
Europol also directly inputs data supplied by third States and third bodies, which is than 
accessible by National Units, liaison officers, the Director, the Deputy Directors and 
empowered Europol officials. 195
 
 
At the end of 2007 the IS held 62,260 data objects an increase of 80% over the year. A 
majority of the data held on the IS relates to Euro counterfeiting. The significant increase was 
largely due to the introduction of so-called automatic data loaders. At the moment only five 
countries are using the automated loading system - Germany and the Netherlands; and last 
year Denmark; Spain and Belgium started using auto-loaders.196
 
 
The data relates to197
1. persons who, in accordance with the national law of the Member State concerned, are 
suspected of having committed or having taken part in a criminal offence for which 
Europol is competent under Article 2, or who have been convicted of such an offence; 
 
                                                 
194 Article 10 (2), Council Decision establishing Europol 
195 Article 7, Europol Convention 
196 Memorandum by the Home Office, Minutes of Evidence, TAKEN BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE 
ON THE EUROPEAN UNION, (SUB-COMMITTEE F), WEDNESDAY 21 MAY 2008 
197 Article 8 (1), Europol Convention 
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2. persons who there are serious grounds under national law for believing will commit 
criminal offences for which Europol is competent under Article 2. 
 
The data may include details like surname, maiden name, given names and any alias or 
assumed name; date and place of birth; nationality; sex; and where necessary, other 
characteristics likely to assist in identification.198
 
 
In addition, there can be more data inputted:199
1. criminal offences, alleged crimes and when and where they were committed; 
 
2. means which were or may be used to commit the crimes; 
3. departments handling the case and their filing references; 
4. suspected membership of a criminal organization; 
5. convictions, where they relate to criminal offences for which Europol is competent 
under Article 2. 
 
In 2007 136,784 searches were performed in the Information System and, at the end of 1997, 
it contained 62,660 objects. The figures show a significant increase, mainly due to the use of 
automatic data loaders. Following Germany (November 2005) and the Netherlands 
(September 2006), three other Member States started to upload data automatically in 2007: 
Denmark (March 2007), Spain (November 2007) and Belgium (December 2007):200
 
 
                                                 
198 Article 8 (2), Europol Convention 
199 Which might be linked to persons or may also not yet contain any reference to persons, Article 9 (3), Europol 
Convention 
200 Europol Annual Report 2007, p. 34 
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Figure 7 Monthly progression of the Information System content in 2007201
 
 
Only the unit which entered the data may modify, correct or delete such data. The 
responsibility for the permissibility of retrieval from, input into and modifications within the 
information system lies with the responsible unit who must be identifiable.202 Other 
competent authorities may also query the information system, but the results of the query will 
only indicate whether the requested data is available in the information system. Further 
information may then be obtained via the national unit.203
 
 
A new provision brought by the Council Decision establishing Europol concerns access to IS 
data. As explained above, Article 7 of the Convention provided that the national units could 
consult these data, but only in the case of need for a specific enquiry and only via the liaison 
officers. Article 11 of the Council Decision allows the national units full and direct access to 
all the information available in the IS.204
 
 
                                                 
201 lbid. 
202 Article 9 (3), Europol Convention 
203 Article 9 (4), Europol Convention 
204 The sentence „Direct access by the national units to the information system in respect of the persons referred 
to in Article 8(1), point 2 shall be restricted solely to the details of identity listed in Article 8(2). If needed for a 
specific enquiry, the full range of data shall be accessible them via the liaison officers.“ was not transferred into 
the new legislation 
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3.5.2. The analysis work files (AWF) 
 
Analysis Work Files can hold factual hard data but also soft data. They can be dedicated to 
specific crime phenomena, to an ethnic approach, or to a regional approach. Unlike the 
information system, where all the Member States are duty bound to participate, it is up to the 
individual Member State to explain and declare their willingness and readiness to participate 
in up to all Analysis Work Files. To very specific Analysis Work File only three or four or 
five Member States but not all 27 Member States may participate. In 2008 there were two 
Analysis Work Files dealing with terrorism issues, one dealing with money laundering, one 
dealing with counterfeiting of products and the counterfeiting of money, one dealing with 
trafficking in human beings, and another one dealing with illegal migration and with eastern 
European organised criminals.205
 
 
Files opened for the purposes of analysis with the aim of helping a criminal investigation 
concern:206
 
 
1. persons who, under the national law of a Member State, are suspected of having 
committed or having taken part in a criminal offence for which Europol is competent 
or who have been convicted of such an offence;207
2. persons who might be called on to testify in investigations in connection with the 
offences under consideration or in subsequent criminal proceedings; 
 
3. persons who have been the victims of one of the offences under consideration or with 
regard to whom certain facts give reason for believing that they could be the victims of 
such an offence; 
4. contacts and associates, and 
5. persons who can provide information on the criminal offences under consideration. 
 
The file may not be retained for a period of more than three years. Before this period has 
expired, Europol reviews the need for the continuation of the file. When it is strictly necessary 
                                                 
205 Max-Peter Ratzel, House of Lords, Select Committee on European Union Minutes of Evidence,  Examination 
of Witnesses (Question 167), TUESDAY 24 JUNE 2008 
206 Article 10 (1), Europol Convention 
207 as referred to in Article 8(1), Europol Convention 
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for the purpose of the file, the Director of Europol may order the continuation of the file for a 
new period of three years.208
 
 
By using AWF, the Member States communicate via Europol as a platform for a safe and well 
regulated sharing of criminal information and intelligence on ongoing cases for the purpose of 
analysis. The data is either provided for a specific project created on request of a Member 
States or as a result of analysis carried out at Europol. The feasibility of the project and the 
legality of its aim and objectives are subject to the opinion of the JSB and the authorisation of 
the Management Board of Europol. According to Antonio Saccone, the fist years the AWF 
framework suffered from lack of awareness, inexperience and an obvious sense of scepticism 
and mistrust deriving from the fact that it was an untested tool. He thinks however, that 
nowadays Europol AWFs are fully functional and represent one of the ways in which concrete 
and practical help is given to criminal investigations of law enforcement in the Member 
States. 209
 
  
In 2007, Europol dealt with a total of 16 AWFs operational projects: 
 
 
Figure 8 Number of operational projects (AWFs) in 2007210
 
 
 
                                                 
208 Article 12(4), Europol Convention 
209 Antonio Saccone, Combating International Crime in an Enlarging European Union: What is the Role of 
Europol? Lecture in the International Seminar for Experts. op.cit , pp. 8 
210 Europol Annual Report 2007, p. 28 
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The opening of such an AWF is linked to the establishment of an analysis group, including 
analysts and other Europol officials designated by the Europol Directorate and liaison officers 
and/or experts of the Member States supplying the information or concerned by the 
analysis.211 Access to the working files is strictly limited to the participants of the analysis 
group under the principle of “need to know and right to know”, and only analysts are 
authorised to enter or modify data.212
 
  
Europol may also request, that other entities forward relevant information to it, and might 
accept information provided by those groups and bodies (the European Communities and 
bodies governed by public law established under the Treaties establishing those Communities; 
other bodies governed by public law established in the framework of the European Union; 
bodies which are based on an agreement between two or more Member States of the European 
Union; third States; International Organizations and their subordinate bodies governed by 
public law; other bodies governed by public law which are based on an agreement between 
two or more States; and the International Criminal Police Organization) on their own 
initiative. The Council - acting unanimously and after consulting the Management Board - 
draws up the rules for this information exchange.213
 
 
Europol may also invite experts of these groups and bodies when,214
1. an agreement is in force between Europol and the third State or third body, which 
contains appropriate provisions on the exchange of information, including the 
transmission of personal data, as well as on the confidentiality of exchanged 
information; 
  
2. the association of the experts of the third State or third body is in the interest of the 
Member States; 
3. the third State or third body is directly concerned by the analysis work; and 
4. all participants of the analysis group agree on the association of the experts of the third 
State or third body with the activities of the analysis group. 
 
 
                                                 
211 Article 10 (2), Europol Convention 
212 Article 10(2) first point replaced by the Council Act of 27 November 2003, op.cit., p. 5 
213 Article 10(4), lbid. 
214 Article 10(9), Europol Convention 
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3.5.3. The Index System 
 
As access to the working files is very restricted, Europol also created an Index System. The 
Director, Deputy Directors and duly empowered officials of Europol and liaison officers have 
the right to consult the index system, to find out if the working files contain data concerning 
their MS215
 
. The access for liaison officers is created in a “hit or no-hit” way, that allows to 
find out whether or not an item of information is stored, without establishing connections or 
further conclusions regarding the content of the files. 
 
3.5.4. Data Protection & Security 
 
Data protection and security are crucial for an agency that handles sensitive data concerning 
private citizens throughout the European Union. My analysis distinguishes between the 
technical part (data security) and the wider concept of data protection.  
 
Data security relates to the “protection of data from accidental or intentional but unauthorized 
modification, destruction or disclosure through the use of physical security, administrative 
controls, logical controls, and other safeguards to limit accessibility.”216
 
  
Data protection entails more than physical access prevention. “Data-processing systems are 
designed to serve man; whereas they must, whatever the nationality or residence of natural 
persons, respect their fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy, and 
contribute to economic and social progress, trade expansion and the well-being of 
individuals”217 therefore Member States “shall protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of 
personal data.”218
                                                 
215 Article 11, Europol Convention 
 With regards to Europol data protection is linked to the installation of 
supervisory authorities (Joint Supervisory Board, Data Protection Officer) as well as the 
216 Government Information Exchange, Social Security Online,  
http://www.ssa.gov/gix/definitions.html  
Retrieved 02. October 2009 
217 Para 2, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
Official Journal L 281 , 23/11/1995 P. 0031 - 0050 
218 Article 1, lbid.  
 79 
creating a query opportunity for individuals who wish to access data relating to them stored at 
Europol. 
 
3.5.4.1. Data Security 
 
Europol is committed to a very high data protection standard. Europol and each Member 
States processing data at Europol need to:219
 
 
• deny unauthorized persons access to data processing equipment used for processing 
personal data (equipment access control); 
• prevent the unauthorized reading, copying, modification or removal of data media 
(data media control); 
• prevent the unauthorized input of data and the unauthorized inspection, modification 
or deletion of stored personal data (storage control); 
• prevent the use of automated data processing systems by unauthorized persons using 
data communication equipment (user control); 
• ensure that persons authorized to use an automated data processing system only have 
access to the data covered by their access authorization (data access control); 
• ensure that it is possible to verify and establish to which bodies personal data may be 
transmitted using data communication equipment (communication control); 
• ensure that it is subsequently possible to verify and establish which personal data have 
been input into automated data or processing systems and when and by whom the data 
were input (input control); 
• prevent unauthorized reading, copying, modification or deletion of personal data 
during transfers of personal data or during transportation of data media (transport 
control); 
• ensure that installed systems may, in case of interruption, be immediately restored 
(recovery); 
• ensure that the functions of the system perform without fault, that the appearance of 
faults in the functions is immediately reported (reliability) and that stored data cannot 
be corrupted by means of a malfunctioning of the system (integrity). 
 
                                                 
219 Article 25, Europol Convention 
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Oral evidence given at different occasions by Europol staff, only confirms the high 
importance of data security for the agency. During interviews, Europol officer expressed more 
than once their surprise concerning the perceived over-proportionality of IT staff at Europol 
headquarters. 
 
3.5.4.1. Access for Individuals 
 
Individuals wishing to access data relating to them which have been stored at Europol may 
make a request to that effect free of charge to the national competent authority in the Member 
State of their choice.220
 
 The competent authority refers the matter to Europol and informs the 
enquirer that Europol will reply to them directly.  
Individuals have the right to ask Europol to correct or delete incorrect data concerning 
them.221 If data that are incorrect or contravene this Convention have been passed directly to 
Europol by a Member State, it must correct or delete them in collaboration with Europol.222 
Europol informs requesters that the data concerning them have been corrected or deleted. If 
they are not satisfied with Europol's reply or have received no reply within three months, they 
may refer the matter to the joint supervisory body.223  Individuals also have the right to ask 
their national supervisory body to check that the data concerning them were input, transmitted 
and consulted in accordance with the law.224 This right is exercised in accordance with the 
national law of the Member State in which the application was made.225
 
 
The request might only be refused, to226
1) enable Europol to fulfil its duties properly; 
 
2) protect security and public order in the Member States or to prevent crime; 
3) protect the rights and freedoms of third parties, 
 
                                                 
220 Article 19 (1), Europol Convention 
221 Article 20 (1), Europol Convention 
222 Article 20 (4), Europol Convention 
223 Article 20 (4), Europol Convention 
224 Article 19, Right of access: “1. Any individual wishing to exercise his right of access to data relating to him 
which have been stored within Europol or to have such data checked may make a request to that effect free of 
charge to the national competent authority in any Member State he wishes, and that authority shall refer it to 
Europol without delay and inform the enquirer that Europol will reply to him directly. 
225 Article 19 (7), Europol Convention 
226 Article 19 (3), Europol Convention 
 81 
Europol however needs to inform the enquirer that he may appeal to the Joint Supervisory 
Body if he is not satisfied with the decision.227 The person requesting, may also refer the 
matter to the Joint Supervisory Body if there has been no response to his request within the 
time limit of three months.228
 
 
3.5.4.2. The Joint Supervisory Board 
 
According to Article 23 of the Europol Convention, each Member States has to designate a 
national supervisory body, which monitors independently – in accordance with its respective 
national law – the permissibility of the input, the retrieval and any communication to Europol 
of personal data by the Member States concerned. Therefore the supervisory body has access 
to the National Unit or the liaison officers’ premises to the data entered by the Member States 
into the information system and into the index system.  
 
To review the activities of Europol and ensure that the rights of the individual are not violated 
by the storage, processing and utilization of the data held the position of an independent Joint 
Supervisory Body was set up by Article 24. This body is also responsible of monitoring the 
permissibility of the transmission of data originating from Europol. 
 
The Joint Supervisory Body is composed of one or two members of the national supervisory 
bodies (one vote per MS) and draws up activity reports at regular intervals, which are 
forwarded to the European Parliament and the Council, after the Europol management Board 
had the opportunity to deliver an opinion which is attached to the reports.229
 
 
Europol must assist the Joint Supervisory Body230
a) supplying the information it requests, give it access to all documents and paper files as 
well as access to the data stored in the system; and 
, especially by 
b) allow it free access at any time to all its premises; 
c) carry out the joint supervisory body's decisions on appeals  
 
                                                 
227 Article 19 (6), Europol Convention 
228 Article 19 (3), Europol Convention 
229 Article 24(6) amended by the Council Act of 27 November 2003 (Official Journal 002, 06/01/2004, p. 0006) 
230 Article 24 (2), Europol Convention 
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If the Joint Supervisory Body notes and violations of the Convention in the storage, 
processing or utilization of personal data, it can make a complaint to the Director of Europol, 
and ask him to reply within a certain time limit. In the case of any difficulties, the Joint 
Supervisory Body can also refer the matter to the Management Board.231
 
 
3.5.4.3. Data Protection Officer 
 
The Council Decision establishing Europol includes one provision which is a distinct 
improvement on the Convention. It foresees the installation of a Data Protection Officer who 
is put on a statutory basis as an independent member of staff responsible for ensuring 
compliance with the data protection provisions of the Decision.232
 
  
The Data Protection Officer will be a member of the staff and be appointed by Management 
Board (on the proposal of the Director). Next to the above explained function, the Data 
Protection Officer shall also ensure that a written record of the transmission and receipt of 
personal data is kept; that data subjects are informed of their rights under the Decision at their 
request; cooperate with Europol staff responsible for procedures, training and advice on data 
processing; cooperate with the Joint Supervisory Body; prepare an annual report and 
communicate it to the Management Board and to the Joint Supervisory Body.233
 
 In the 
performance of these tasks, the Data Protection Officer shall have access to all the data 
processed by Europol and to all Europol premises. 
The European Data Protection Supervisor welcomed this development, but also pointed out 
that in the case of similar officials in other EU institutions there were provisions giving him 
the necessary staff and budget, and allowing him to be dismissed only in very exceptional 
circumstances.234 Mr Smith235
                                                 
231 Article 24 (5), Europol Convention 
 also welcomed this provision: "We are very supportive of the 
principle of setting up this quasi-independent data protection officer. It is a system which 
232 including the processing of personal data on Europol staff which are protected by Article 24 of Regulation 
(EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the 
free movement of such data; OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1. 
233 Article 28, Council Decision establishing Europol 
234 Paragraph 63, Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a Council Decision 
establishing the European Police Office (Europol) — COM(2006) 817 final, (2007/C 255/02), 27.10.2007, 
Official Journal of the European Union 
235 Mr David Smith was the United Kingdom representative on the Europol Joint Supervisory Body (JSB), as 
well as its chairman in fall 2007  
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Eurojust has adopted and works well under the Eurojust Decision. We are particularly pleased 
that it emphasises the importance of data protection within Europol, emphasises that the 
responsibilities there go straight to the Director and that data protection has to be taken 
seriously. There is also a very clear duty to cooperate with the Joint Supervisory Body."236
 
 
3.5.4.4. Possible shortcomings 
 
In October 2005 the Commission tabled a proposal for data protection provisions applying to 
the third pillar (which would therefore as well apply to Europol): a draft Data Protection 
Framework Decision (DPFD) to apply to all third pillar instruments.237
 
 Negotiations on this 
were taking place in January 2007, when the Commission brought out its proposal for the 
Europol Decision.  
The conclusions of the Council meeting on 12-13 June 2007238 note that the new framework 
decision will be based on the Council of Europe established minimum data protection 
principles set by the Convention of 28 January 1981 for the protection of individuals with 
regard to automatic processing of personal data and its Additional Protocol of 8 November 
2001, including Recommendation (87)15 regulating the use of personal data in the police 
sector. So instead of using the DPFD as a data protection regime, the Council Decision 
establishing Europol actually draws on the much older Council of Europe Convention of 
1981. 239 The DPFD will only be applicable to the transfer of personal data by Member States 
to Europol, but does not affect the specific data protection provisions in the Europol 
Decision.240
                                                 
236 EUROPOL: coordinating the fight against serious and organised crime Report with Evidence, Ordered to be 
printed 28 October 2008 and published 12 November 2008, Published by the Authority of the House of Lords 
Report with Evidence of the HOUSE OF LORDS European Union Committee, 29th Report of Session 2007–08, 
Q434, p. 177 
 Under Article 27 the general standard of data protection has reverted to that of 
237 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of 
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, document 13019/05 
238 Council Conclusions concerning the Council Framework Decision on the protection of personal data 
processed in the framework of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters, 12.06.2007 
239 Council of Europe Convention of 28 January 1981 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, and Recommendation, and Recommendation No R (87) 15 of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe of 17 September 1987 
240 The relevant set of data-protection provisions in this Decision will not be affected by that Framework 
Decision and this Decision should contain specific provisions on the protection of personal data regulating these 
matters in greater detail because of the particular nature, functions and competences of Europol. Paragraph 12, 
Council Decision establishing Europol 
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the Council of Europe Data Protection Convention, as it was already under the Europol 
Convention. 
 
A fact which was heavily criticized by the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) as 
the Council Decision “contains specific rules on data protection and data security, that can be 
considered as lex specialis providing for additional rules on top of a lex generalis, a general 
legal framework on data protection”241 as well as by the House of Lords report which regrets 
that “the negotiations for a Data Protection Framework Decision, which could and should 
have resulted in an instrument setting a high general standard of protection for third pillar data 
exchanges, have instead produced an anodyne and toothless document which the Europol 
Decision does not trouble to apply to Europol’s work.”242
 
 
                                                 
241 Para 4, Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a Council Decision 
establishing the European Police Office (Europol) — COM(2006) 817 final (2007/C 255/02) 
242 House of Lords, EUROPOL: coordinating the fight against serious and organised crime, op.cit. 
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3.6. Access to European Databases  
3.6.1. Schengen Information System II 
 
The Schengen Information System (SIS) has been operational since March 1995 and covers 
13 of the 15 EU countries, plus Norway and Iceland. SIS is a central police cooperation tool 
and was created to compensate for the removal of internal borders by increased information 
sharing between police forces. Member States contribute data to the SIS on people wanted for 
arrest, people to be placed under surveillance or subject to specific checks, people to be 
refused entry at external borders and lost or stolen items.  
 
The effect of listing a person in the SIS (or later in SIS II), is that a person will be banned in 
principle from entering or remaining in any Schengen State. This is enforced by checking the 
SIS whenever a third country national (non-EU national) applies for a ‘Schengen visa’ to 
enter the Schengen States, and generally when such persons cross the external Schengen 
borders or apply for a long-term visa or residence permit.243
 
 
In 2005 SIS contained 13.000.000 data sets, including around 15.000 wanted suspects. 
 
3.6.1.1. From “SIS” via “SIS one4all” to “SIS II” 
 
The current SIS was not designed to cope with the increased number of EU Member States 
after the enlargement and United Kingdom and Ireland to join. The technology was outdated 
and did not provide the flexibility for adding easily new functionalities. Therefore the Council 
decided to develop the new generation Schengen Information System SIS II, which contains 
the existing and potential new functionalities like the use of biometrics.244
 
  
SIS II should have entered into force in fall 2007; hence the last tests would have needed to be 
done by March 2007. Some of the new Member States were not proceeding within the time 
frame what might lead to a longer transition period. In 2006, some Member States emphasised 
                                                 
243 Articles 5, 15 and 25 of the Schengen Convention 
244 Development of the Schengen Information System II and possible synergies with a future Visa Information 
System, COM(2003) 771 final, Brussels, 11 December 2003 
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in a communication to the Austrian Presidency that “for reaching the ambitious political goal 
of operation of the SIS II (…) a lot of additional effort is needed from all involved Parties.”245
 
  
In October 2006 Portugal put forward a proposal for “SIS one4all” (or SIS+), to allow the SIS 
to be adapted to include the new MSs, to enable them to join Schengen by October 2007.246 
Some of those States were initially unenthusiastic; others feared that this would further delay 
SIS II. The Commission believed that it would add nine months to the planning of SIS II. On 
the 5th December 2006 the Justice and Home Affairs Council welcomed – even though “the 
development of the SIS II remains the absolute priority”247 –decided to implement the 
SISone4all for those Member States.248
 
 SIS II might only be completed by the end of 
September 2009, as the Slovenian Minister of the Interior, Dragutin Mate, pointed out at the 
“Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European 
Union” (COSAC) at the 7th of May 2008, during the Slovenian Presidency. 
3.6.1.2. SIS access for Europol 
 
The SIS Working Group asked the Presidency in February 2002 to examine the case for 
giving Europol access to the SIS.249
 
 It was argued that Europol works on a wide range of 
operational projects and its analysts could make checks on people, vehicles and other objects 
in the SIS system. In the context of its strategic and operational work “Europol needs to check 
whether the data it obtains in the course of its duties appear in other European Union 
information systems; such checks could be of mutual benefit to Europol and the Member 
States.”  
                                                 
245 Czech Republic, Latvia, Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania and Slovakia in Joint declaration on the SIS II legal 
framework discussions, Council Doc. No. 8610/06, Brussels, 24 April 2006 
246 Portuguese Proposal called SISone4all, Doc. No.: 13540/06 SIS-TECH 101 
247 Presidency to the Council, Council Conclusions on the SIS II, the SIS 1+ and the enlargement of the 
Schengen area,  Brussels, 5 December 2006, Doc. No.: 16324/06, p. 3 
248 EE, HU, LV, LT, MT, PL, CZ, SK and SI 
249 Access by Europol to the Schengen Information System (SIS), Council Doc. No. 5970/02, Brussels, 8 
February 2002,p. 2 
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Reluctance to grant access 
This obtained data “could enhance quantitatively and qualitatively Europol’s products and 
services, or in any case obviate unnecessary extra effort.”250 On-line access to the SIS would 
help in identifying related or relevant activities in the Member States, allowing additional 
interesting data to be gathered for operative analysis and ensure that data that can be kept 
within the European framework are properly exploited.251
 
 This would enable strategic analysis 
and allow forecast by identifying and comparing changes in different levels of crime over a 
period of time, identifying possible relationships between relevant variables which have an 
impact on the crime rate and compare ethnic and demographic trends. Finally the report asks 
for immediate access of Europol to all information in the SIS and the possibility of partial 
downloading of data in order to carry out analyses and statistical studies and furthermore for 
the possibility to update SIS by adding, deleting and modifying information. 
Article 6 (2) Europol Convention expressly prohibits the linking of the Europol Databases 
with any other national database “The computerized system of collected information operated 
by Europol must under no circumstances be linked to other automated processing systems, 
except for the automated processing systems of the national units.”  
 
 
Climate change after 9/11 
The climate changed after the attacks of 9/11: “the new idea is: if something is available, we 
should use it as much as possible.”252According to the Commission253 Europol should have 
the authority to access to alerts and additional data on persons wanted for arrest: “The 
European Police Office (Europol) shall have the right to access the data contained in alerts for 
arrest which is necessary for the performance of its tasks (…)”254 “(…) to the data of the 
alerts referred to in Article 31 which are necessary to perform its tasks in accordance with the 
Europol Convention.”255
                                                 
250 lbid. 
 According to Article 31, Member States shall “for the purpose of 
prosecuting criminal offences and for the prevention of threats to public security, issue in the 
Sis II alerts on person or vehicles, boats, aircrafts and containers for the purpose of discreet 
251 Access by Europol to the Schengen Information System (SIS), Council Doc. No. 5970/02, Brussels, 8 
February 2002,p. 2 
252 Interview with Peter Michel, Data protection secretary, Joint Schengen Supervisory Board, Brussels, 
14 February 2006 
253 Proposal for a Council Decision on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen 
information system (SIS II), COM(2005) 230 final, Brussels, 31 May 2005 
254 lbid. Article 18 (2) 
255 lbid. Article 33 (3) 
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surveillance or of specific checks”256 when “there is a clear evidence that the person 
concerned intends to commit or is committing numerous and extremely serious criminal 
offences”257 or “where an overall assessment of the person concerned (…) gives reason to 
suppose that that person will also commit extremely serious criminal offences in the 
future.”258 The possible alerts range, according to article 35, from motor vehicles with a 
cylinder capacity exceeding 50cc, boats and aircraft; trailers with an unlade weight exceeding 
750 kg, firearms, blank official documents, issued identity papers vehicle registration 
certificates and vehicle number plates, banknotes and securities and means of payment which 
have been stolen, misappropriated or lost. SIS II will also make links between different alerts 
possible. One could e.g. link a missing person to a stolen vehicle which is impossible with the 
old SIS.259
 
 
Europol argued, that the main added value of granting access to the SIS “is the possibility to 
cross-check information obtained by Europol through its standard communication channels 
against other information available in the countries of the Schengen area. This would be 
especially valuable in the cross-checking of Europol information originating from outside the 
European Union.260
 
“ 
In a Council Decision Europol and Eurojust were finally granted access to the SIS261 in 
February 2005: “The European Police Office (Europol) shall within its mandate and at its own 
expense have the right to have access to, and to search directly, data entered into the 
Schengen Information System”262 as well as “the national members of Eurojust and their 
assistants shall have the right to have access to, and search, data entered.”263
 
 
                                                 
256 lbid. Article 31 
257 lbid. Article 31 (1) a 
258 lbid. Article 31 (1) b 
259 Interview with Yves Joannesse, DG Justice Liberté et Sécurité, European Commission, Brussels, 22. March 
2006 
260 Europol to SIS Working Party (EU/Iceland and Norway mixed committee), (Legal) Issues raised during the 
last session1 of the EU Working Party SIS in relation to access to the SIS for Europol, Document No. 9323/02, 
Brussels, 28 May 2002 
261 Council Decision 2005/211/JHA concerning the introduction of some new functions for the Schengen 
Information System including in the fight against terrorism, 24 February 2005 (OJ 2005 L 68/44) 
262 Article 101A Schengen Convention, amended by Council Decision 2005/211/JHA concerning the 
introduction of some new functions for the Schengen Information System including in the fight against terrorism, 
24 February 2005 (OJ 2005 L 68/44) 
263 Article 101B Schengen Convention, amended by Council Decision 2005/211/JHA concerning the 
introduction of some new functions for the Schengen Information System including in the fight against terrorism, 
24 February 2005 (OJ 2005 L 68/44) 
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However, Europol has no power to take any action based on the alerts which it accesses, but 
will contact the Member States concerned for permission to use an alert found. “The 
information that Europol will get from the Member State that has been activated by our 
Schengen alert will be considered by Europol as a Member State contribution to Europol’s 
system, so it is no longer Schengen information … and from then on we handle it according to 
Europol’s Convention.”264 Which means that his information could - under the terms of the 
Europol Convention – consequently be transferred to third states or third parties, with which 
Europol has agreements in place for the exchange of personal data (Canada, Croatia, Eurojust, 
Iceland, Interpol, Norway, Switzerland and the United States).265
 
 
 
Data Protection 
Article 35 ensures data protection by the Europol Joint Supervisory Body (JSB). The Europol 
JSB supported the technical proposal for Europol’s access to certain SIS data but also 
proposed that all search requests made by Europol should be logged, including the identity of 
the enquirer, date and time of the action, search key and result, as a number representing the 
number of hits.266 One should not forget that the SIS does not work without problems. Article 
96 allows to refuse entry to “aliens who are reported for the purpose of being refused entry” 
by a MS. The grounds include “a threat to public order or national security”267 In June 2005 a 
report from the Schengen Joint Supervisory Authority recommended that Member States 
prevent “Article 96 alerts on nationals from EU Member States”268
 
 
Yet a check on 31 March 2006269
 
 found 414 citizens from the EU and associated countries 
registered under Article 96. 
                                                 
264 Daniel Drewer, Europol Data Protection Officer, Examination of Witness, 28 November 2006, Question 450 
and 458 
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldeucom/49/4902.htm, 01 July 2008 
265 9th Report of Session 2006–07,  Schengen Information System II (SIS II), Report with Evidence, Published 
by the Authority of the House of Lords, 2 March 2007, p. 33 
266 Opinion of the JSB in respect to the technical proposal for Europol’s access to the SIS, Council Doc. No. 
14079/05, Brussels, 7 November 2005,p. 2 
267 Article 98 (2) 
268 Article 96 Inspection, Schengen Joint Supervisory Authority, Report of the Schengen Joint Supervisory 
Authority on an inspection of the use of Article 96 alerts in the Schengen Information System, Brussels, 20 June 
2005 
269 Alerts of EU citizens in the SIS pursuant to Article 96 SIC, Council Doc. 8281/06, Brussels, 6 April 2006 
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3.6.1.3. SIS II – Management by Europol? 
 
Currently, the SIS is managed by France270. The Commission proposed to be responsible for 
the operational management of the System271 “during a first transitional or interim phase” 272 
of SIS II. The Member States rejected this idea, and concluded that the Commission will 
nominally be designated as the manager of SIS II, but that in practice the Commission will in 
fact delegate this management to France and Austria273. This is linked to the fact, that the 
principal central system is located in Strasbourg (France) and the backup central system is 
located in Sankt Johann in Pongau (Austria). They will be held accountable according to EC 
rules.274
 
 
According to a report of the House of Lords, there might be the possibility to grant the 
operational management to either Europol or Frontex, 275 as they are subject to Community 
law as the jurisdiction of the European Data Protection Supervisor is limited to data processed 
carried out by the EC institutions: “We were told about five possible options concerning the 
future Management Authority. The Authority could be operated by the Commission, by 
Frontex (the EU’s border control agency), by Europol, by one Member State on behalf of all 
of them, or by a new body to be established276
 
“The House of Lords assumes, that this 
problem is linked to the question of a management authority for the Visa Information System 
(VIS), and that it is rather unlikely that Europol will take this task over. 
                                                 
270 “The French Republic shall be responsible for the technical support function, which shall be located in 
Strasbourg.”, 92 (3) Schengen Convention 
271 Article 12, Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen information system (SIS II), 
COM(2005) 236 final, Brussels, 31.5.2005 
272 Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation 
Schengen information system (SIS II), COM(2005) 230 final, Brussels, 31.5.2005 
273 Article 12, DRAFT COUNCIL REGULATION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT, OPERATION AND USE OF 
THE SECOND GENERATION SCHENGEN INFORMATION SYSTEM (SIS II), Doc. No.: 5709/06, Brussels, 
27 January 2006 
274 lbid. 
275 9th Report of Session 2006–07,  Schengen Information System II (SIS II), Report with Evidence, Published 
by the Authority of the House of Lords, 2 March 2007 
276 lbid. P. 28 
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3.6.2. The Visa Information System (VIS) 
 
The Council adopted the Council Decision 2004/512/EC, establishing the Visa Information 
System (VIS), on the 8 June 2004. It constituted the required legal basis to allow for the 
inclusion in the budget of the European Communities of the necessary appropriations for the 
development of VIS and the execution of that part of the budget; defined the architecture of 
the VIS and gave the Commission the mandate to develop the VIS at technical level. 
 
The VIS consists of a central information system, the "Central Visa Information System" (CS-
VIS), and an interface in each Member State, the "National Interface" (NI-VIS) which 
provides the connection to the relevant central national authority of the respective Member 
State, and the communication infrastructure between the Central Visa Information System and 
the National Interfaces.277
 
 
3.6.2.1. The purpose of VIS 
 
It enables border control authorities to check a visa application history and to verify whether a 
person presenting a visa is the same person to whom it was issued. It does – however - not 
keep track of the various entries of third-country nationals or check on whether persons have 
left by the end of their entitlement to stay; and does not concern third country nationals who 
are not required to hold a visa to enter the EU.278
 
 
The VIS was created to facilitate the application of the “Dublin II Regulation”279
 
, and hence 
to improve the administration of the common visa policy, the consular cooperation and the 
consultation between central consular authorities in order to prevent threats to internal 
security and ‘visa shopping’, to facilitate the fight against fraud and checks at external border 
checkpoints and within the territory of the Member States, and to assist in the identification 
and return of illegal immigrants 
                                                 
277 Article 1, Council Decision of 8 June 2004 establishing the Visa Information System (VIS), 2004/512/EC, 
Official Journal L 213 , 15/06/2004 P. 0005 - 0007 
278 Point 24, Communication from the Commission on Policy priorities in the fight against illegal immigration of 
third-country nationals, COM(2006) 402 final, Brussels, 19.7.2006 
279 Dublin II Regulation” (EC) No 343/2003, OJ L 50 of 25.2.2003, p. 1. 
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The original proposal of the Commission envisaged the following categories of data stored in 
the VIS:280
 
 
a) alphanumeric data on the applicant and on visas requested, issued, refused, annulled, 
revoked or extended; 
b) photographs; 
c) fingerprint data; 
d) links to other applications. 
 
Which was later expanded by more data, like the current nationality of the applicant, the 
purpose of travel, or the main destination and duration of the intended stay281
and shall, in case of a hit, give access to all of the above data as well as to”
 and finally 
“details of the person issuing an invitation and/or liable to pay costs of living during the stay 
282
 
 was added by 
the European Parliament during the consultation procedure. 
3.6.2.2. Access by Europol 
 
The proposal for the Council Decision concerning access of VIS by Europol, already 
mentioned the possible data concerning about 20 million visa applications annually, which 
would result in 70 million fingerprint data to be stored for a five-year term.283
 
 Therefore the 
proposal was introduced with the objective to grant Europol access to VIS for the purposes of 
the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and the types of crime and the 
offences in respect of which Europol is competent to. 
                                                 
280 Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL concerning 
the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between Member States on short stay-visas, 
COM(2004) 835 final, Brussels, 28.12.2004 
281 Article 5, Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION concerning access for consultation of the Visa Information 
System (VIS) by the authorities of Member States responsible for internal security and by Europol for the 
purposes of the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and of other serious criminal 
offences, COM(2005) 600 final, Brussels, 24.11.2005 
282 Article 5, European Parliament legislative resolution of 7 June 2007 on the proposal for a Council decision 
concerning access for consultation of the Visa Information System (VIS) by the authorities of Member States 
responsible for internal security and by Europol for the purposes of the prevention, detection and investigation of 
terrorist offences and of other serious criminal offences (COM(2005)0600 – C6-0053/2006 – 2005/0232(CNS)) 
283 p. 4,  Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION concerning access for consultation of the Visa Information 
System (VIS) by the authorities of Member States responsible for internal security and by Europol for the 
purposes of the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and of other serious criminal 
offences, op.cit. 
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The Joint Supervisory Body (although it has no supervisory role relating to VIS) also assessed 
the proposal and concluded that - although the conditions for Europol's access to VIS were 
defined in that proposal - more limitations to the access rules for Europol should be 
introduced. The JSB argued that granting Europol access to VIS data by simply referring to 
Europol's general task and without any specific explanation and limitation was in itself 
insufficient to justify the exception from the purpose of processing VIS data. Access to the 
VIS should only be allowed within the limits of a specific Europol task; and only when 
necessary for the performance of this task and for the purpose of a specific analysis file.284
 
 
Europol had to designate a specialised unit for the purpose of consultation (as well as each 
Member States had to designate a single national authority as central access point),285 and 
keep records of all data processing operations resulting from access to the VIS (as well as the 
Member States and the Commission)286. After the amendments of the European Parliament, 
the records also have to show “the exact purpose of the access for consultation”287
 
 
The agreement on VIS between the Council and the European Parliament was reached on the 
7th of June 2007, under the German Presidency.  
 
 
3.6.3. Access to Eurodac 
 
Eurodac, a Community-wide information technology system for the comparison of the 
fingerprints of asylum seekers, was adopted on 11 December 2000288
                                                 
284 Third Activity Report of the Joint Supervisory Body of Europol, November 2004 – October 2006, p 12 
 and started operations 
on 15 January 2003. It was created in the context of the Dublin Convention, which came into 
force in 1997, and was replaced by the regulation (EC) 343/2003 establishing criteria and 
mechanism for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum 
285 Article 7, lbid. 
286 Article 10.lbid. 
287 Article 10, European Parliament legislative resolution of 7 June 2007 on the proposal for a Council decision 
concerning access for consultation of the Visa Information System (VIS) by the authorities of Member States 
responsible for internal security and by Europol for the purposes of the prevention, detection and investigation of 
terrorist offences and of other serious criminal offences , op.cit. 
288 Council Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 concerning the establishment of 'Eurodac' for 
the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention, Official Journal L 316 , 
15/12/2000 P. 0001 - 0010 
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application lodged in one of the Member States of the European Union.289
 
 Member States 
anticipated that identifying aliens who had already lodged an asylum application in another 
Member State would be difficult, if not impossible unless an IT system would store 
fingerprints for identifying asylum seekers and irregular border-crossers.  
Asylum applicants and irregular border-crossers over the age of 14 have their fingerprints 
taken as a matter of European Community law. These are then sent in digitally to a central 
unit at the European Commission, and automatically checked against other prints on the 
database. This enables authorities to determine whether asylum seekers have already applied 
for asylum in another EU Member State or have illegally transited through another EU 
Member State ("principle of first contact"). All EU Member States currently participate in the 
scheme, plus three additional European countries: Norway, Iceland and Switzerland... 
 
On the 8th of July 2009, the Commission proposed to authorise the comparison of fingerprints 
which are contained in EURODAC with fingerprints in the possession of national law 
enforcement authorities or Europol for the fight against terrorist offences and serious crime, 
including trafficking in human beings and in drugs.290
 
 The Commission made the proposal 
following a request from member states, led by Germany, to allow their law enforcement 
authorities and Europol access to the Eurodac database to help investigations into terrorism 
and other serious crimes. 
The move has been criticised by campaigners who say the Eurodac database was set up to 
identify asylum-seekers rather than to allow police to search for criminals. “Accessing 
Eurodac data by law enforcement bodies would increase the risk of stigmatisation of asylum-
seekers and raise concerns about discrimination,” said Gilles van Moortel, a spokesman for 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Brussels.291
                                                 
289 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member 
States by a third-country national,  OJ L 50, 25.2.2003, p. 1–10 
 The European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) said the move could potentially put asylum-seekers in danger, 
since Europol would also be allowed access. Europol can exchange data with other EU bodies 
and third countries. “How would it be ensured that information about people fleeing 
290 AGENDA/09/23 Brussels Friday 26 June 2009, Top News from the European Commission, 29 June to 26 
July 2009 
291 UNHCR Comment on Eurodac recast, 18 March 2009 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/49c0ca922.pdf 02/10/2009 
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persecution doesn't reach their persecutors?” said Bjarte Vandvik, the ECRE's secretary-
general.292
 
 
Experience with other European databases - as VIS or SIS - indicate however, that Europol 
will also be granted access to Eurodac.  
 
                                                 
292 openeurope.org http://www.openeurope.org.uk/media-centre/summary.aspx?id=882 02/010/2009 
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3.7. Conclusion 
 
As we have seen, the Council Decision establishing Europol brought some changes for the 
agency. From my point of view, the main alteration is the enhanced role of the European 
Parliament, which developed its position into that of a budget authority. This sincerely 
improves its abilities to exert influence. Later in the chapter on democratic accountability, I 
will explain why this was a change absolutely necessary. Another innovation brought by the 
Council Decision is the widening of the mandate, as Article 4 extends it to cover all forms of 
serious cross-border crime, as defined in Annex I. The new list of offences regarded as serious 
crime includes the forms of organised crime and terrorism, but also adds others, such as 
murder, organised or armed robbery, and rape. The new procedure in the nomination of a 
Director – only qualified majority instead of unanimity – presents a small step from 
intergovernmentalism to more towards integration.  
 
The “bi-body” concept of Europol – with one “European” part with international staffers, and 
one intergovernmental part with Liaison Offices and National Units – makes it possible to use 
the agency in two different ways. The Member States are either able to exchange information 
by completely shutting out the “European part”, or may feed data into Europol’s IT system 
and benefit from a “greater perspective”. As shown above, the Member States largely prefer 
to exclude the agency from their knowledge and continue to work bi-laterally. So far 
intergovernmentalism plays a major role in The Hague. As explained above, e.g. the 
Management Board is composed by one representative by Member State, while the European 
Commission only acts as an observer. And the Council Decision establishing Europol 
strengthens the heads of the national units (HENU) even further.  
 
As an “expert system”, Europol has a number of IT databases which clearly work very well. 
Data protection is – against claims sometimes heard – a very important issue. Individuals 
have the right to demand information if data is stored connected to them; there is a Joint 
Supervisory Board responsible for complaints and supervision, and the Council Decision 
establishing Europol introduces another control mechanism: the Data Protection Officer. 
Additionally Europol is very successful in gaining access to European databases, like the 
Schengen Information System or the Visa Information System. Right now there is a 
discussion going on grant the agency access to Eurodac. A move heavily criticized by NGOs 
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and UNHCR, as the fear that Europol could e.g. exchange information on people who are 
fleeing corrupt regimes with their countries of origin. We have also seen, that with the 
introduction of the Council Decision a chance was missed, to introduce a broader data 
protection regime for the third pillar and all of its agencies. 
 
In order to create an added value for the national law enforcement agencies, Europol needs to 
publish reports like the OCTA report or the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. This is 
impossible without receiving relevant information; therefore Europol fully depends on data of 
national police authorities.  
 
Consequently we have to look into the willingness of national law enforcement agencies to 
share their knowledge and know-how. Furthermore we need to analyse how effectively the 
different European agencies and bodies can actually cooperate in fighting crime; how much 
room of manoeuvre the law grants them. My next chapter will concentrate on these questions.  
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“The trouble is that the al-Qaeda terrorists are 
thinking more European than Europe’s 
national anti-terrorism agencies.”293
 
 
4. The Institutional Framework and Cooperation 
 
The Europol Work Programme lists European agencies, institutions and working groups with 
which it wants to cooperate closely in the fight against crime. This includes Eurojust, the Joint 
Situation Centre, the Counter Terrorism Group, and the Police Chiefs Task Force. At the 
same time, the Member States police agencies are interlinked on a bilateral basis, having 
liaison officers based at various other capitals. A number of non-EU states also maintain close 
ties to the diverse law enforcement bodies, including the American FBI or the Russian Federal 
Police. 
 
The complexity of this organisational reality could best be characterised as a “crowded police 
space” 294
 
. European police co-operation can be viewed positively as such a space, with 
different countries and interest groups, being responsible for placing the emphasis on 
particular areas of co-operation. Almost all the European Member States are member 
countries of Interpol, the WCO and the United Nations. Therefore Europe can be considered, 
in policing terms, as being made up of a series of concentric and overlapping circles. There 
are overlaps according to institutional sources, territorial remits, functional specialisations and 
strategic emphasis. My research excludes the “Office européen de Lutte Anti-Fraude” 
(OLAF) as it is a General Service Directorate General of the European Commission, and does 
therefore not have the same organisational independence as the other below mentioned 
bodies. 
                                                 
293 Wolfgang Muchau, Europe must tackle terrorism, Financial Times, 10 July 2005 
http://news.ft.com/cms/s/930466c8-f16c-11d9-9c3e-00000e2511c8.html 08 May 2006 
294 quoting Bill Hebenton and Terry Thomas, Policing Europe. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995 in Willy 
Bruggeman, International law enforcement co-operation: a critical assessment, European Journal on Criminal 
Policy and Research 9: 283–290, Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001, p 284 
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4.1. The working structure of the Council 
 
The Article 36 Committee (Cats) coordinates the works of the various Third Pillar Working 
Groups dealing with police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. It also 
brings together the Schengen Information System as well as EU agencies and various bodies 
working in the field of police and judicial cooperation.295
 
  
Carol Harlow describes the Article 36 Committee as the engine of third-pillar policy-making. 
It is composed of one official per Member States, plus a Commission representative, and its 
composition changes according to the matter under discussion. As a Committee advisory to 
the Council it is composed by national civil servants and responsible to national governments 
as a Community body. This is important, as officials who operate policies are not always in 
line with their ministers.296 Jörg Monar thinks that it is the most important Council Committee 
for preparing ministerial decisions in the third pillar.297
 
 
The Article 36 Committee also works as an intermediate between the Management Board of 
Europol and the Council Secretariat. When Council working groups had asked “Europol to 
carry out tasks originally not foreseen by its yearly work programmes and budgets which are 
approved by the Council upon the recommendation of the Management Board”298 the 
Management Board expressed to the Article 36 Committee its wish for the “application of the 
appropriate procedures”299
 
, which shows the important coordination position Cats has.  
Within the third pillar a big number of Working Groups if concerned with the fight against 
Organised Crime. There are single Working Groups for the topics of Frontiers, Asylum, 
Visas, Expulsion, Customs, Civil Law Matters, Migration, Drug Trafficking, SIRENE, SIS, 
and a couple more. Working Groups concerned with Europol and Police Co-operation exist as 
well. They mainly do the preparatory work, which is then passed on to Cats, Coreper, and 
finally to the JHA Council.  
 
                                                 
295 Working structures of the Council in terrorism matters – Options paper, op.cit., p. 3 
296 Carol Harlow, Accountability in the European Union, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002,p. 42 
297 Jörg Monar, op.cit.p. 392 
298 Letter from Rodolfo Ronconi, Chairman of the Management Board, to Mr. Marotta, Article 36 
299 lbid. 
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4.2. Eurojust 
 
Eurojust is in many respects the counterpart to Europol in the judicial cooperation area and 
has been designed as a facilitator of cooperation between national prosecution authorities. 
This includes the speeding up of legal assistance and extradition and support for the 
coordination of parallel prosecution operations in several Member States and information 
exchange.300 It is made up of one national representative from each Member State who enjoys 
very different powers and status (mostly either being nation prosecutor or judge). They form 
the College of Eurojust and facilitate the work of national magistrates, to make their work 
easier and more effective, as “of course, one can combat terrorism in each country separately 
(…) however, one will never be able to tackle the whole network without this crucial 
exchange of information between the Member States concerned.”301
 
 
Eurojust was established as a result of a decision by the European Council of Tampere (15 – 
16 October 1999) in order to improve the fight against serious crime by facilitating the 
optimal co-ordination of action for investigations and prosecutions covering the territory of 
more than one Member State with full respect for fundamental rights and freedoms.  
On 14 December 2000 the Council of the European Union formally established the 
provisional judicial co-operation unit “Pro-Eurojust”. Prosecutors from all the Member States 
tried and tested concepts to improve the fight against serious crime by facilitating co-
ordination of action for investigations and prosecutions within the EU.  
 
Pro-Eurojust started its work on 1 March 2001. Eurojust itself was set up by a Decision of 28 
February 2002 as a body of the EU with legal personality,302
 
 Eurojust is the first permanent 
body established for judicial co-operation in the European legal area, and is financed through 
the European Union’s general budget.  
                                                 
300 Jörg Monar, op.cit., pp 394 
301 Michèle Coninsx, Eurojust and EU Judicial Cooperation in the Fight against Terrorism, in Legal Instruments 
in the Fight against International Terrorism, A transatlantic Dialogue, edited by Cyrille Fijnaut, Jan Wouters 
and Frank Naert, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden – Boston, 2004 , p. 177 
302 Article 1, Council Decision of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight 
against serious crime, 2002/187/JHA 
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Eurojust is monitored by an independent Joint Supervisory Body, ensuring that the processing 
of personal data is carried out in accordance with the Eurojust Decision. It also hears appeals 
lodged by individuals regarding access to personal information.303
 
  
Eurojust is stimulating and improving the co-ordination of investigations and prosecutions 
between the competent authorities in the Member States, in particular by facilitating the 
execution of international mutual legal assistance and the implementation of extradition 
requests. Eurojust supports in any way possible the competent authorities of the Member 
States in order to render their investigations and prosecutions more effective when dealing 
with cross-border crime.304
 
  
At the request of a Member State, Eurojust may assist investigations and prosecutions 
concerning a particular Member State - or a non-Member State - if a co-operation agreement 
has been concluded or if there is an essential interest in providing such assistance.305
Eurojust's competence covers the same types of crime and offences for which Europol has 
competence, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, counterfeiting, 
money laundering, computer crime, crime against property or public goods including fraud 
and corruption, criminal offences affecting the European Community's financial interests, 
environmental crime and participation in criminal organisations. For other types of offences 
Eurojust may assist in investigations and prosecutions at the request of a Member State.
  
306
 
  
Eurojust may ask the competent authorities of the Member States concerned307
• undertaking an investigation or prosecution of specific acts; 
:  
• accepting that one of them may be in a better position to undertake an investigation or 
to prosecute specific acts; 
• coordinating between the competent authorities of the Member States concerned; 
• setting up a joint investigation team in keeping with the relevant cooperation 
instruments; 
                                                 
303 Article 23, Council Decision of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight 
against serious crime, 2002/187/JHA 
304 Article 3, Council Decision of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight 
against serious crime, 2002/187/JHA 
305 lbid. 
306 Article 4, Council Decision of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight 
against serious crime, 2002/187/JHA 
307 Article 6, Council Decision of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight 
against serious crime, 2002/187/JHA 
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• providing it with any information that is necessary for it to carry out its tasks; 
 
In order to carry out its tasks, Eurojust maintains privileged relationships with the European 
Judicial Network, Europol, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and Liaison Magistrates. 
Via the Council, Eurojust is enabled to conclude co-operation agreements with non-Member 
States and international organisations or bodies for the exchange of information or the 
secondment of officers. 
 
 
4.2.1. Number of cases on the increase 
 
Jean-Marie Cavada (ALDE, FR), the chair of the European Parliament Civil Liberties 
Committee, thinks that Eurojust should have a more central role in justice cooperation: “The 
reality is that many countries prefer to work with Interpol, even though they could use 
Eurojust.”308 Michael G. Kennedy, the President of Eurojust, finds at least moderate 
optimism: “Although there has been a series of successes lately that led to the arrest of 
criminals in Bulgaria, Belgium and the UK, there are still limits to the activity of Eurojust. 
Two Member States (Greece and Spain) had not transposed the Eurojust decision into their 
national legislation until 2006 and only four countries gave structured information and four 
countries are forwarding at least information”.309 In 2007, the Eurojust Decision was still not 
fully implemented into national legislation.310 Nevertheless Eurojust is gaining influence. In 
2004 Eurojust participated in 33 terrorist cases and 2005 in 25 terrorist cases. On first sight 
the number of cases decreased, but in the 2005 cases “the core business (of Eurojust) was 
echoed. The quality of cases increased incredibly.”311
 
 
 
                                                 
308 Police and judicial cooperation: better parliamentary scrutiny needed, European Parliament meeting, 18 
October 2005 
309 lbid 
310 Eurojust, Annual report. 2007, p 8 
311 lbid. 
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Figure 9: Evolution of Cases 2002 – 2007312
 
 
This figure shows that National Members registered 1 085 cases (increase of 41% compared 
to 2006, 771 cases) in 2007. Eurojust assumes that these figures do not only indicate a 
positive trend, but reveal that Member States are more aware than ever of the work and 
services provided by Eurojust and the added value resulting from our involvement.  
According to Eurojust, 1 065 cases dealt with operational issues, while only 20 cases were 
registered to provide support to and expertise on general topics on legal matters related to 
each legal system or judicial questions or practicalities not involving the operational work of 
the College.  
 
                                                 
312 Eurojust, Annual Report 2007, p 12 
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Figure 10: State of Play of Ongoing Cases313
 
 
This figure provides overview of the work of the College as it refers to the number of cases 
still open, or closed during all the years of Eurojust's activity.  At the end of 2007 782 cases 
covering the period 2003 – 2007 were still active.  
 
In 2007, Eurojust dealt with 813 bilateral cases, and 272 multilateral cases.  
 
 
4.2.2. Obstacles on the way 
 
One, maybe the major obstacle, in the role of Eurojust in the fight against crime is the 
reluctance of national prosecutors to cooperate in sensitive investigations, which are deemed 
to be top secret information. The Subcommittee F proposes the establishment of Eurojust 
national correspondents dealing exclusively with terrorism and the adoption of high data 
protection standards, as “Eurojust can play a crucial part in fighting terrorism.”314
                                                 
313 Eurojust, Annual Report 2007, p 13 
 The 
314 European Union Committee, Judicial Co-Operation in the EU: The Role of Eurojust, 23rd Report of Session 
2003-04, London, 21 July 2004,p. 36 
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Council decision on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist 
offences315 makes provision for the designation of a Eurojust national correspondent for 
terrorist matters or an appropriate judicial or other competent authority which shall have 
access to and can collect all relevant information concerning prosecutions and convictions for 
terrorist offences316
 
.  
The information that should be transmitted to Eurojust should include317
• data which identify the person, group or entity that is the object of a criminal 
investigation or prosecution;  
  
• the offence concerned and its specific circumstances;  
• information about final convictions for terrorist offences and the specific 
circumstances surrounding those offences;  
• links with other relevant cases; 
• request for judicial assistance, including letters rogatory, addressed to or by another 
Member State and the response. 
 
 
4.2.3. Cooperation with Europol 
 
It did not happen by chance that Eurojust was situated in Den Haag. A close cooperation 
between Eurojust and Europol was intended from the very start on. Nevertheless the two 
agencies work in two opposite areas of the city and are not only separated in a geographical 
matter.318 Hubert Haenel, chair of the EU affairs delegation at the French Senate, indicates the 
lack of coordination between Eurojust and Europol319 while Max-Peter Ratzel thinks that 
things are improving.320
                                                 
315 Council Decision on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences, 
2005/671/JHA, Brussels, 20 September 2005 
 The number of cases dealt with by Eurojust involving Europol almost 
316 lbid., Article 2 (2) 
317 lbid., Article 2 (5) 
318 Max-Peter Ratzel, Alle haben ihre Lektion gelernt, FAZ, Frankfurt, 13 January 2006 
www.pds-europa.de/dokumente/presse/vie-dok-html?zid=2030 07 May 2006 
319 Police and judicial cooperation: better parliamentary scrutiny needed, European Parliament meeting, 18 
October 2005 
320 Max-Peter Ratzel “Ich stelle mit großer Zufriedenheit fest, dass wir kooperativ auf einem guten Weg sind”, 
Mehr liefern als erwartet wird, Öffentliche Sicherheit, 9-10/05, Vienna, 2005 
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quadrupled from 7 cases in 2006 and 25 cases in 2007. 12 Co-ordination meetings were held 
between the two bodies in 2007.321
 
 
As success story would be “Operation Koala” which was successfully launched against child 
sex offenders in 2006. A child abuse video - produced in Belgium - was discovered in 
Australia, and lead to a homepage of an Italian who offered more than 150 self-made, 
sexually explicit videos of underage girls. In a co-ordinated action, 2.500 “customers” in 19 
countries were identified, thousands of computers videos and photographs were seized and 
more than a million files and pictures found. On the judicial level Eurojust took the lead and 
organised, together with Italy and Europol, four co-ordination meeting, resulting in 
simultaneous actions.322 “They key to the success of this operation is the provision of valuable 
data by Member States and crime analysis carried out by specialists in dealing with online 
child sex abuse cases. The quality of the intelligence reports has been praised by the countries 
involved and has been considered crucial in relation to obtaining search warrants”323
 
 
The relations between Eurojust and Europol are regulated by an agreement which enables 
personal data to be exchange. According to Mr Kennedy, the agreement is not as ambitious as 
Eurojust would have hoped “We would have thought that there could have been a much 
stronger capacity for joint working and co-operation, a stronger sense of sharing their 
strategic analysis; our being able to initiate that strategic analysis, then feeding off it and 
working it; and initiating our own files.”324
 
  
It took until June 2007 to create a secure data connection between Eurojust and Europol. 
Eurojust was only able to access Europol via the Member States.325 Franco Frattini described 
the new secure communication link between two “of the key actors in the EU architecture for 
internal security (as) another step towards the realisation of an area of freedom, security and 
justice in Europe.”326
                                                 
321 Eurojust, Annual report. 2007, p 8 
 Michael Kennedy pictured the secure network line as one of his key 
priorities to ensure the effectiveness of Eurojust’s cooperation with Europol, and as a mean to 
develop the project on Joint Investigation Teams more efficiently. Detlef Wasser and Oliver 
322 Michele Coninsx, Eurojust’s National member for Belgium, Press Conference, The Hague, 05 November 
2007 
323 Mariano Simancas, Europol’s Deputy Director, Press conference, The Hague, 05 November 2007 
324 Kennedy in European Union Committee, op.cit., p. 29 
325 Interview with Michèle Coninsx, op.cit. 
326 Franco Frattini, Commissioner for Freedom, Security and Justice, The Hague, 07 June 2007, 
http://eurojust.europa.eu/press_releases/2007/08-06-2007.htm 29. Retrieved May 2008 
 108 
Fawzy however feel that the legal relationship between Europol and Eurojust is relatively 
vague. According to them, Europol has better access to information than Eurojust, which 
enables it to take on a lead function, even though the legal background only talks about 
complementing each other’s competences.327
 
  
The Protocol of 27 November 2003 amending the Europol Convention, the so-called "Danish 
Protocol", created the possibility for Europol to invite experts of third States or third bodies to 
be associated with the activities of an analysis group328
 
. Eurojust signed six Arrangements 
with Europol on 7 June 2007 and appointed National Members and case analysts to be 
associated as experts from Eurojust on judicial co-operation. A Europol - Eurojust joint 
working party on analysis work files has been established to examine legal and practical 
difficulties of Eurojust's involvement. Another provision of the Danish Protocol (which will 
be carried over into the Decision) allows Member States to authorise direct contacts between 
designated competent authorities and Europol. 
 
4.2.4. Under the Lisbon Treaty 
 
The Constitutional Treaty would have transformed Eurojust into the “embryo” of a European 
Public Prosecutor (EPP). It could have taken the role of national judges who supervise the 
police, Europol, under the control of judges “but has unfortunately not yet reached this 
stage”.329 An idea which was also supported by the Subcommittee F: “But if (…) an EPP is 
eventually created, we agree that (…) it should build on Eurojust. Eurojust is an institution 
which in our view is already showing its effectiveness: it works with the grain of different 
national legal systems and different criminal codes.”330
                                                 
327 Detlef Wasser & Oliver Fawzy, Eurojust aus der Perspektive der Justiz, Referat der Verfasser im Rahmen der 
Tagung ,,Eurojust" der Europäischen Rechtsakademie Trier am 31. März 2003, p. 97 
 
328 Article 10, (9): “Europol may invite experts of third States or third bodies within the meaning of paragraph 4 
to be associated with the activities of an analysis group, (…)The association of experts of a third State or a third 
body with the activities of an analysis group shall be subject to an arrangement between Europol and the third 
State or third body. The rules governing such arrangements shall be determined by the Management Board 
acting by a majority of two thirds of its members. Details of the arrangements between Europol and third States 
or third bodies shall be sent to the Joint Supervisory Body referred to in Article 24 which may address any 
comments it deems necessary to the Management Board”, Council Act of 27 November 2003, drawing up, on 
the basis of Article 43(1) of the Convention on the Establishment of a European Police Office (Europol 
Convention), a Protocol amending that Convention , 2004/C 2/01 
329 Police and judicial cooperation: better parliamentary scrutiny needed, op.cit. 
330 European Union Committee, Judicial Co-Operation in the EU: The Role of Eurojust, 23rd Report of op.cit., 
p. 36 
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The Lisbon Treaty states that “In order to combat crimes affecting the financial interests of 
the Union, the Council, by means of regulations adopted in accordance with a special 
legislative procedure, may establish a European Public Prosecutor's Office from Eurojust. The 
Council shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.”331 
Experts assume, that Eurojust could be broadened into becoming the office of the European 
Public Prosecutor, which would have a - relatively narrow - remit of protecting EU 
finances.332 Sooner or later, the EPP might even have been installed to supervise Europol 
Right now there is, according to Michèle Coninsx, no need for such supervision as Europol 
does not have the means of a normal police force.333
 
 
Alternatively, the Treaty gives Member States the right - provided a minimum of nine of them 
want to do so - to apply “enhanced cooperation” in judicial matters to establish a EPP.334 
Unanimity in the Council is needed to broaden its scope to transnational serious crimes. It 
gives this group the further possibility of changing the decision-making procedures and 
introducing legislative reforms if the circumstances require.335
 
 
Andrew Duff claims that if plans for an EPP materialise, Member States will have to proceed 
very cautiously to ensure that there is sufficient mutual trust to create a new entity336
                                                 
331 Article 69 E (1), Lisbon Treaty 
. The 
EPP will be based on Eurojust and, once it starts work, Member States officials will have to 
go further in “harmonising” what constitutes criminal behaviour and agreeing the penalties to 
be applied. There would need greater collaboration among defence lawyers needed to ensure 
332 Intergovernmental Conference, European Policy Center, Brussels 
http://www.epc.eu/en/er.asp?TYP=ER&LV=293&see=y&t=2&PG=ER/EN/detail&l=&AI=769 03.June 2006 
333 Interview with Michèle Coninsx, op.cit. 
334 Article 69 E (1): “In the absence of unanimity, a group of at least nine Member States may request that the 
draft regulation be referred to the European Council. In that case, the procedure in the Council shall be 
suspended. After discussion, and in case of a consensus, the European Council shall, within four months of this 
suspension, refer the draft back to the Council for adoption. 
Within the same timeframe, in case of disagreement, and if at least nine Member States wish to establish 
enhanced cooperation on the basis of the draft regulation concerned, they shall notify the European Parliament, 
the Council and the Commission accordingly. In such a case, the authorisation to proceed with enhanced 
cooperation referred to in Article 10(2) of the Treaty on European Union and Article 280 D(1) of this Treaty 
shall be deemed to be granted and the provisions on enhanced cooperation shall apply.”, Lisbon Treaty 
335 Article 69 E (4): “The European Council may, at the same time or subsequently, adopt a decision amending 
paragraph 1 in order to extend the powers of the European Public Prosecutor's Office to include serious crime 
having a cross-border dimension and amending accordingly paragraph 2 as regards the perpetrators of, and 
accomplices in, serious crimes affecting more than one Member State. The European Council shall act 
unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament and after consulting the Commission.”, 
Lisbon Treaty 
336 Andrew Duff, British MEP, Leader of the Liberal Democrat European Parliamentary Party, 
Intergovernmental Conference, EPC, op.cit. 
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that their clients are adequately protected. According to him, another “thorny issues” would 
be to clarify rules on jurisdictional competence, deciding which national enforcement system 
should be used as a model, given, for example, that the Dutch model would be more lenient in 
criminalising drug use than a French one. 
 
Eurojust would surely like to extend its existing powers, e.g. by setting up joint prosecuting 
teams and liaise between prosecutors from different countries working on the same case.  
François Falletti thinks that the Lisbon Treaty would have given Eurojust additional - but 
limited - powers337
 
, as Member States can still ignore its strictures since judicial powers 
remain at national level. Eurojust recommendations are non-binding to national judges who 
can choose either to cooperate or ignore them, depending on whether they accord with 
national practices. According to him, the EPP would bring added-value to Eurojust by making 
it possible to refer ongoing cases to a central information-gathering system, ensuring that 
individual lawyers are aware of what is happening across the EU. In order to use this 
properly, the relevant national police and judiciary will have to be involved. 
Regarding the co-operation with Europol, the Lisbon Treaty clearly states, that “the European 
Public Prosecutor's Office shall be responsible for investigating, prosecuting and bringing to 
judgment, where appropriate in liaison with Europol, the perpetrators of, and accomplices in, 
offences against the Union's financial interests, as determined by the regulation provided for 
in paragraph 1. It shall exercise the functions of prosecutor in the competent courts of the 
Member States in relation to such offences.”338
 
 
 
                                                 
337 François Falletti, National Member for Eurojust in France and President of the International Association of 
Prosecutors, , Intergovernmental Conference, EPC, op.cit. 
338 Article 69 (2), Lisbon Treaty 
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4.3. The Joint Situation Centre 
 
The Situation Centre was set up in Brussels in 2002 and counts around 45 staff.  It is situated 
in the Council Secretariat and provides strategic analysis on terrorist threats for the 
Council.339 It is responsible for monitoring potential crisis regions concerning terrorism and 
weapons of mass destruction,-proliferation. It furnishes the EU Council with strategic 
intelligence-based assessments on counter-terrorism matters.340  Wiliam Shapcott, the head of 
SitCen, describes the position of the SitCen in the institutional framework as kind of cross 
pillar: “We have been quite careful, even from the beginning, not to formally have it in the 
Second Pillar. We have played with Solana's double-hating. He is the Secretary General; we 
are attached to his cabinet, so we are squarely in the Secretariat General. We are not 
exclusively a Second Pillar body.”341
 
  
 
4.3.1. No European CIA 
 
Statewatch, an English government watch dog, thinks that SitCen was “clearly needed as 
attempts to bring together meaningful intelligence on terrorism through Europol was doomed 
to fail – internal security and external intelligence agencies are loath to share information with 
police agencies.”342 The basic worries to share intelligence might be one of the reasons why 
SitCen processes only strategic information without personal data. Daniel Keohane claims 
that this seemingly small development of installing SitCen is significant because it “can 
encourage EU foreign, defence and internal security officials, as well as national security 
services, to better coordinate their thinking on the terrorist threat.”343
 
 
                                                 
339 “With effect from 1 January 2005, SitCen will provide the Council with strategic analysis of the terrorist 
threat based on intelligence from Member States' intelligence and security services and, where appropriate, on 
information provided by Europol.” The Hague Program, cit.op., p. 29 
340 Information by the Institute of International & European Affairs, 
http://www.iiea.com/eventsxtest.php?event_id=238, 15. July 2008 
341 William Shapcott , Committee on European Union, op.cit., question 181 
342 Statewatch bulletin, Vol. 14, no 5, August – October 2004 
343 Daniel Keohane, One step forward, two steps back, E!Sharp, November – December 2005, p. 38 
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SitCen is however not likely to develop into a “European Intelligence Agency” as Anthony 
Glees points out who even insists that344
 
 “with great respect, to say we need a European CIA 
would be an admission that we are out of our minds. The one thing we do not need to 
replicate is the jungle that exists within the American intelligence community”.  
Austria proposed the establishment of such an agency, which would have included security 
intelligence into the EU system, but was rejected by the Council on 19 February 2004, mainly 
because Member States considered it far too ambitious.345 The five EU governments with the 
greatest intelligence resources (Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain) strongly opposed 
this idea as their intelligence agencies would rather share their most sensitive information 
with a few countries than with other governments which would increase the chance of 
leaks.346
 
 
In the minutes of a conversation with the European Committee of the House of Lords, 
William Shapcott answers the question after the nature of SitCen’s work at first with “I do not 
want to go into too much detail of precisely how we build the reports”347
 
 and proceeds rather 
cryptically: “An uninitiated reader might not read a sentence and conclude that beneath that 
sentence there is a piece of concrete intelligence, but, nevertheless, it is intelligent conclusions 
drawn from more fundamental material. You should think in those terms in how you regard 
our products. I think, for those reasons, it is fairly evident that we are quite a long way from 
the operational information.”  
The answer of the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ursula Plassnik, to a parliamentarian 
query concerning the sources of SitCen, sheds more light on this topic: the analysis by SitCen 
is based on information of the media, reports of Member States and the Commission, reports 
and analysis of national intelligence agencies.348
                                                 
344 Anthony Glees, Director for the Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security, E.U. Works to Improve 
Counterterror Intelligence, Interview by Mary Louise Kelly, NPR, 10 November 2004 
 The information retrieved is not only 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4163613 08 May 2006 
345Björn Müller-Wille, Building a European Intelligence Community in response to terrorism, European Security 
Review, Isis Europe, Number 22, April 2003 
346 Daniel Keohane, One step forward, two steps back, E!Sharp, November – December 2005,p. 38 
347 William Shapcott, Committee on European Union, Minutes of Evidence, Questions 175 and 176, London, 3 
November 2004 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/ 27 April 2006 
348 Anfragebeantwortung durch die Bundesministerin für europäische und internationale Angelegenheiten Dr. 
Ursula Plassnik zu der schriftlichen Anfrage (750/J) der Abgeordneten Dipl.-Ing. Karlheinz Klement, 
Kolleginnen und Kollegen an die Bundesministerin für europäische und internationale Angelegenheiten 
betreffend dem "Situation Centre" (SitCen) der Europäischen Kommission, 705/AB (XXIII. GP) dem "Situation 
Centre" (SitCen) der Europäischen Kommission, 4. June 2007 
 113 
important for the international fight against terrorism, but also used to ensure the best possible 
security for ESDP missions outside the EU.349
 
 
 
4.3.2. Cooperation with Europol 
 
On the question about the relation to Europol, William Shapcott answered, that ”we are 
committed to working with Europol to produce joint reports where that is appropriate, but 
there will be some limitations. I think, also, just as in the national structures, if producing a 
joint report means you have to dumb down the quality of information needed in order to share 
it with a wider group then that is perhaps a disadvantage, so I think from time to time we will 
have to not share information directly. It is an area which is not fully resolved.”350 Basically 
SitCen provides tailored situation and threat assessments based on national intelligence, open 
sources, diplomatic reports from Member States and the Commission’s representations.351 Its 
reports for European politicians and national Ambassadors are essentially of diplomatic and 
preventive nature and do not include strikes against identified terrorist, proliferators or 
criminals on territory that falls under the authority of third states. SitCen’s products are of a 
strategic rather than operational nature while any operations, like assaults on vessels in 
international waters or clandestine operations are executed by Member States 
independently.352 Through the cooperation with Europol, Europol can improve their threat 
assessment which serves primary the national police forces and SitCen is in a better position 
to advise the political branch.353
 
 
 
                                                 
349 lbid. 
350 lbid., question 157 
351 Björn Müller-Wille, op.cit. 
352 lbid. 
353 Max-Peter Ratzel, Alle haben ihre Lektion gelernt, FAZ, Frankfurt, 13 January 2006 
www.pds-europa.de/dokumente/presse/vie-dok-html?zid=2030 08 May 2006 
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4.4. Frontex 
 
Frontex (“European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders of the Member States of the European Union”) is a specialised expert body tasked 
with improving the coordination of operational cooperation between Member States in the 
field of external border management.  
 
According to its home-page, Frontex promotes a pan European model of Integrated Border 
Security, which consists not only of border controls but also other important elements. The 
first tier of the model is formed by exchange of information and cooperation between Member 
States on immigration and repatriation. The second tier is represented by border and customs 
control including surveillance, border checks and risk analysis. The third tier is linked to 
cooperation with border guards, customs and police authorities in neighbouring countries. The 
forth tier concerns cooperation with third countries including common activities.354
 
  
Frontex was created by the Council Regulation establishing Frontex on the 26th October 2004. 
The agency started to be operational on the 3rd October 2005 and was the first EU agency to 
be based in one of the members who joined in 2004, namely in Warsaw, Poland.  
 
Its main tasks are to355
a) coordinate operational cooperation between Member States in the field of 
management of external borders; 
  
b) assist Member States on training of national border guards, including the 
establishment of common training standards; 
c) carry out risk analyses; 
d) follow up on the development of research relevant for the control and surveillance of 
external borders; assist Member States in circumstances requiring increased 
e) technical and operational assistance at external borders; 
f) provide Member States with the necessary support in organising joint return 
operations. 
 
                                                 
354 http://www.frontex.europa.eu/origin_and_tasks/origin/, 30. Juni 2008 
355 Article 2 (1), Council Regulation  (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency 
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union 
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In the beginning Frontex suffered from a lack in professionals who were willing to work for 
the Agency because the salaries on offer are lower than in Western Europe. This was mainly 
linked to a ceiling which had been set equivalent to 81.4% of Brussels based officials' pay and 
lead to the delay of at least two or three projects in 2007.356
 
 
 
4.4.1. Frontex’ joint operations  
 
Frontex started joint operations with the Member States immediately after being set up, 
increasing their number from 2006 to 2007: 
 
 
Figure 11 Frontex' Operational Coordination357
 
 
On an operational basis, Frontex mainly concentred on intercepting third country nationals: 
 
                                                 
356 Adam Easton,  Staff woes hit EU border agency, BBC News, Warsaw, 26 January 2007 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6303089.stm, Retrieved  1. July 2008 
357 Background Note, To the attention LIBE Committee of the European Parliament, Information on the 
activities of Frontex during the years 2006 and 2007, by Frontex, p. 1 
http://www.infinitoedizioni.it/fileadmin/InfinitoEdizioni/rapporti/FRONTEX_activities_2006-2007.pdf    
30. Juni 2006 
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Figure 12 Number of intercepted/apprehended third country nationals358
 
 
 
4.4.2. Frontex and Europol 
 
Article 13 enables Frontex to cooperate with Europol and other international organisations, in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty and the provisions on the competence of 
those bodies.359
 
 Both agencies make intense use of this opportunity.   
The first project launched between Europol and Frontex was named Agelaus and focused 
upon standard procedures of dealing with minors (passengers under 18 years of age) arriving 
from third countries by air at the external borders of the EU.  A total of 18 Member States out 
of 25 (Bulgaria and Romania were not members at the commencement of the project) joined 
the project and 27 airports participated in this joint operation. During the four week 
operational period local border guard authorities carried out the checks and procedures 
described by the project team in the operational plan and at the initial project meeting.360
 
  
In September 2007 Europol and Frontex jointly produced a Report on the determination of 
“High Risk Routes Regarding Illegal Migration in the Western Balkan Countries” which was 
                                                 
358 Background Note, To the attention LIBE Committee of the European Parliament, Information on the 
activities of Frontex during the years 2006 and 2007, by Frontex, p. 2 
http://www.infinitoedizioni.it/fileadmin/InfinitoEdizioni/rapporti/FRONTEX_activities_2006-2007.pdf    
Retrieved 30. Juni 2006 
359 Article 13, Council Regulation  (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for 
the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union 
360 http://www.frontex.europa.eu/examples_of_accomplished_operati/art13.html , 30. June 2008 
 117 
discussed during the MDG meeting on 26 September 2007.361 In February 2008, the 
Slovenian Presidency stressed the plan of Frontex and Europol to continue work on the region 
by delivering smaller intelligence products with an operational focus and involving both 
Member States and Western Balkan Countries. “Frontex and Europol will explore the 
opportunities to proceed with operational follow up to the intelligence process, especially 
emphasising on the concept of ‘Joint Teams’”,362 and “(they) will explore the possibilities of 
providing training to the Western Balkan Countries. In particular, Europol will check the 
possibilities of including representatives of the Western Balkan Countries in training on 
strategic intelligence analysis. Europol has already agreed to provide strategic analysis 
training to the SECI Centre. Frontex will look into the possibility of including Western 
Balkan representatives in training sessions organised for Frontex and Member States.”363
 
  
In December 2007, the Commission reported that significant steps had been taken to improve 
the exchange of information between Frontex and Europol, and that there are regular 
exchanges of information between them on the Eastern and South-Eastern regions 
neighbouring the EU. They also stepped up their work on Intelligence and Risk Analysis, 
notably through the production of tailored assessments and analytical bulletins.364 
Furthermore Europol experts started to participate in the new Frontex Risk Analysis 
Network.365 As Frontex understands itself as a connection facilitator between Intelligence 
Services and Boarder Control Services, this network is used to pass on classified 
information.366
                                                 
361 Summary Record of the Expert Meeting on the Follow-up of the Joint Frontex Europol Report on the High 
 Frontex – on the other hand - contributing to Europol’s Organised Crime 
Threat Assessment Report (OCTA). According to the Commission, these “joint risk analysis 
Risk Routes of Illegal Migration in the Western Balkan Countries within the Frontex Risk Analysis Network,  
19 September 2007, in the Annex of  Conclusions from the Expert Meeting on the Follow-up of the Joint 
Frontex Europol Report on the High Risk Routes of Illegal Migration in the Western Balkan Countries within the 
Frontex Risk Analysis Network, COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Doc. No. 5685/08, Brussels, 15 
February 2008 
362 Conclusions from the Expert Meeting on the Follow-up of the Joint Frontex Europol Report on the High Risk 
Routes of Illegal Migration in the Western Balkan Countries within the Frontex Risk Analysis Network, 
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Doc. No. 5685/08, Brussels, 15 February 2008, p. 2 
363 lbid. 
364 This included an assessment of high risk routes of illegal migration through the Western Balkans, with the 
operational objective of setting up joint teams in the region. Member States cooperate closely on these issues, for 
example through the Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) exercise, during which they provide data for 
further analysis on a regular basis. 
365 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Towards a Common Immigration Policy 
= Interim progress report on the Global Approach to Migration, {COM(2007) 780 final} 
366 Bernd Kasparek, Struktur und Aufgaben der Frontex-Agentur, FRONTEX - Broschüre zur europäischen 
Grenzschutzagentur FRONTEX, in der Reihe "Materialien gegen Krieg, Repression und für andere 
Verhältnisse" (Nr. 4), 7. Januar 2008 - S. 7. Online-Zeitschrift "IMI-List" Nummer 0274 - 9. Januar 2008, 
http://www.no-fortress-europe.eu/upload/FRONTEX-Broschuere.pdf, Retrieved 30. June 2008 
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with Europol, international organisations and relevant third countries (based on the respective 
working arrangements) should be given priority, including more frequent geographical and/or 
theme oriented joint risk analysis, with relevant partners.”367
 
 
On 28th March 2008, Europol and Frontex signed a cooperation agreement to enhance the 
cooperation between Europol and Frontex, in particular through the exchange of strategic and 
technical information.368
 
 
                                                 
367 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Report on the evaluation and future development of the 
FRONTEX Agency,  COM(2008) 67 final, Brussels, 13.2.2008 
368 http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=news&news=pr080402.htm 30. Juni 2008 
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4.5. The Police Chiefs Task Force (PCTF) 
 
The Tampere European Council created the Police Chief Task Force (PCTF, which has been 
established in 2000) by recommendation no 44 which called for "the establishment of a 
European Police Chiefs Operational Task Force to exchange, in cooperation with Europol, 
experience, best practices and information on current trends in cross-border crime and 
contribute to the planning of operative actions". Statewatch criticizes PCTF for the lack of 
any constitutional or legal basis and a “wholly unaccountable arrangement which has no place 
in a democratic Europe.”369
 
 
The PCTF and its cooperation with Europol intended to facilitate the exchange of 
experiences, common evaluations and the planning of common operations in the fight against 
cross-border crime. The Task Force is, unlike Europol, not an institution with legal 
competences and a permanent infrastructure but a high level coordination group that meets at 
least once per Presidency with changing priorities.370 The Slovenian Presidency described it 
as “a forum where the highest police representatives of the EU Member States take strategic 
decisions. At PCTF meetings, its members discuss the challenges and problems faced by all 
European police forces, striving to find solutions.”371
 
 
In April 2002 the PCTF agreed to set up a new structure involving the previous, current and 
forthcoming EU Presidencies, Europol and the Commission which should meet between 
PCTF meetings and improve coordination.372 While the PCTF has focused its work on 
concrete operations, its relation to the Council structures and Europol stayed unclear.373
 
  
The Commission describes the PCTF as a platform to “develop personal and informal links 
between the heads of the various law-enforcement agencies across the EU, to exchange 
                                                 
369 Tony Bunyan, The EU’s Police chief Task Force (PCTF) and Police Chiefs Committee, Statewatch analysis, 
13 March 2006,p. 13 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/mar/pctf.pdf   
Retrieved 8 May 2006 
370 Jörg Monar, op.cit.p. 394 
371 European Police Chiefs Task Force (EPCTF) Expanded Troika Meeting in Ljubljana, Press Release, 15. 
January 2008, http://www.eu2008.si/en/News_and_Documents/Press_Releases/January/0115MNZ.html, 15. July 
2008 
372 European Union action plan to combat terrorism – update of the roadmap, Council Doc. No. 13909/1/02 Rev 
1, Annex, at 28, 14 November 2002 
373 Presidency conclusion of extraordinary meeting of the European Chiefs of Police Task Force, Brussels, 
Council Doc. No. 9453/04, Brussels, 10 May 2004 
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information and assist with the development of more spontaneous interaction and closer 
cooperation between the various national and local police forces and other EU law-
enforcement agencies (…) to help to drive a more spontaneous interaction and closer 
cooperation between national and local police forces in EU Member States in the continuing 
fight against crime.”374
 
 
At a meeting of PCTF with the expanded Troika375 under the Slovenian Presidency in January 
2008, the strengthening of further cooperation with other agencies such as Frontex and the 
Customs Cooperation Working Party (CCWP), and improvement of conditions for the 
operation of Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) in the new legal framework was discussed. 
Europol was invited as well. Europol’s Director Max-Peter Ratzel highlighted the fight 
against crime in the Western Balkans. In that context he also underlined the discussion on the 
report relating to Southeast Europe Organised Crime Threat Assessment.376
 
 
On the 11th of July 2008, the PCTF met at the Paris-Sorbonne University under the French 
Presidency to discuss the future of the Task Force in the architecture of Europe's internal 
security. This became necessary, as the Commission had pointed out the structural 
shortcomings of the Task Force, including too few meetings, inequalities between its 
participants' levels of representation, overloaded agendas, etc.377
 
 
 
 
                                                 
374 Police Chiefs Task Force, Building personal links between police chiefs across the EU, European 
Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/police/chief/wai/fsj_police_task_force_en.htm, 15. July 2008 
375 The main purpose of each EPCTF Expanded Troika Meeting is to finalise the selection of topics to be 
discussed under each Presidency. At the same time, such meetings serve as preparation for two formal meetings 
of the task force that are held under each Presidency, i.e. the strategic meeting taking place in the Council of the 
EU in Brussels, and the operational meeting taking place at Europol headquarters in the Hague. 
376 European Police Chiefs Task Force (EPCTF) Expanded Troika Meeting in Ljubljana, Press Release, op.cit. 
377 lbid. 
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4.6. Europol and the Member States 
 
According to Walsh, there were two major incentives for Member States to start sharing 
intelligence within the European Union378
1. the EU instituted the free movement of people between its Member States, a single 
market for capital, goods and services and a single currency which has reduced 
national controls on cross-border activities and created a demand for sharing of 
intelligence about terrorism and other criminal activities;  
:  
2. the development of an EU defence and security policy has led the Member States to 
integrate some aspects of their defence policy planning, including intelligence on 
overseas developments. 
 
Europol encourages intelligence-sharing by obtaining and analysing intelligence provided by 
the Member States, notifying Member States when it has information concerning them, 
especially of any connections identified between criminal offences, providing strategic 
intelligence and preparing general situation reports.379
 
 
Never the less, the relation between Europol and national police forces is a difficult one and 
exemplary for the lack of mutual trust between law enforcement and security agencies, as well 
as the judicial authorities in the EU.380 Balzacq and Carrera link this to the different legal and 
historical traditions, visions and philosophies of the Member States.381 Trust is essential for 
maintaining stable relationships in the JHA area and the “establishment of a high level of trust 
is closely intertwined with the progressive establishment of an Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice.”382 According to Deflem383
                                                 
378 James I. Walsh, Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union: Institutions Are Not Enough, JCMS 2006 
Volume 44., Number 3. p. 627 
, the preference of bilateral cooperation of Member States 
is most noticeably revealed in the relations between Europol and the FBI. Despite the 
cooperation agreement between Europol and the United States, the FBI prefers to conduct its 
international cooperation directly with the police of the EU Member States in a bilateral 
context. The police agencies of some Member States, have their own liaison officers stationed 
379 Article 3, Europol convention 
380 Mirjam Ditrich, op.cit., p. 32 
381 Thierry Balzacq and Sergio Carrera, The EU’s fight against International Terrorism, CEPS Policy Brief, No. 
80, Brussels, July 2005,p. 4 
382 lbid. 
383 Mathieu Deflem, Europol and the Policing of International Terrorism:  Counter-Terrorism in a Global 
Perspective,  Justice Quarterly Volume 23 Number 3, p.:336-359, September 2006, p. 353 
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in Washington, others pass on their request via the FBI legal attaché in the specific Member 
States. 
 
“There is a difference between an agreement on paper and the actual performance. Europol 
can only perform, if Member States perform a better stream of information investing in what 
the Europol Convention allows.”384
 
 This might be linked to the relatively short timeframe, as 
“a new institution needs at least five years to be on the map.” And finally all central 
organisations suffer from the same thing: they do not get information and if they get it, they 
do not get it in time. The classical turf fights between different agencies is now also repeated 
on the European level. The creation of different data categories could help fostering 
cooperation, trust and recognition which lead to the result of being recognised as added value. 
And this added value is necessary to convince a police man to not only solve a crime but also 
feed the Europol information system.  
 
National intelligence services seek to limit the number of recipients of sensitive information 
for fear of compromising operations and sources. As a result EU level institutions tend to be 
much weaker than its national-level equivalents. Europol is far from a European version of the 
FBI in the US. This is, amongst other reason, linked to the fact that national security and 
intelligence services, and also some national police forces, do not share information with 
Europol and it has no power to oblige national police forces to cooperate.385
 
 
Mathieu Deflem detects at least three ways in which the national persistence to collaborate is 
manifest386
• police institutions will prefer to engage in unilaterally enacted transnational activities, 
most typically through a system of international liaisons stationed in foreign countries.  
: 
• international cooperation among police will typically take place in a bilateral form, 
between the police of two nations, and will be maintained only on a temporary basis 
for a specific inquiry or investigation.  
                                                 
384 Interview with Peter Michel, Data protection secretary, Joint Schengen Supervisory Board, Brussels, 14 
February 2006 
385 Daniel Keohane, One step forward, two steps back, op.cit., p. 37 
386 Mathieu Deflem, Social control and the policing of terrorism: Foundations for a sociology 
of counter-terrorism. The American Sociologist, 2004, 35 (2), 75–92. 
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• national persistence in international police work is revealed in the fact that multilateral 
cooperation among police is of a collaborative nature that does not involve the 
formation of a supranational police force.  
 
He thinks, that the idea of a supranational police force clashes with conceptions of both state 
sovereignty and police autonomy, whereas a collaborative network among police of different 
nations, for instance such as currently exists among the 184 member agencies of Interpol, can 
bring about the advantages of international cooperation. Mathieu Deflem explains the national 
resistance to pool in international police organisations by the preference of police institutions 
to engage in unilaterally enacted transnational activities, most typically through a system of 
international liaisons stationed in foreign countries. Therefore, international cooperation 
among police will typically take place in a bilateral form, between the police of two nations, 
and will be maintained only on a temporary basis for a specific inquiry or investigation. And 
finally, the idea of a supranational police force clashes with conceptions of both state 
sovereignty and police autonomy. 387
 
 
 
4.6.1. Intelligence vs. law enforcement information 
 
Finding a definition of “intelligence” seems to be rather tricky, as most authors describe the 
meaning of the word in a different way. I tried however to find a few definitions in order to 
give an idea of the complexity linked to the term. 
 
The American Joint Chiefs of Staff qualifies as both - employers and consumers - of 
intelligence. Their latest Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms define intelligence as: 
• The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation 
and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas.  
• Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, 
investigation, analysis, or understanding.388
 
 
The American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has used the following description: 
                                                 
387 Mathieu Deflem, 2002,  Policing world society: Historical foundations of international police 
cooperation. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 87–89  
388 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 
1-02, 12 April 2001, p. 208. 
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“Reduced to its simplest terms, intelligence is knowledge and foreknowledge of the world 
around us—the prelude to decision and action by US policymakers.”389
 
 
But as we are talking about a law enforcement agency, and Europol describes itself as “the 
European Union law enforcement organisation that handles criminal intelligence”390, the term 
“criminal intelligence” seems to be even more suitable. Wikipedia describes criminal 
intelligence as information “gathered or collated, analyzed, recorded/reported and 
disseminated by law enforcement agencies concerning types of crime, identified criminals and 
known or suspected criminal groups. It is particularly useful when dealing with organized 
crime. Criminal intelligence is developed by using surveillance, informants, interrogation, 
and research, or may be just picked up on the "street" by individual police officers. Some 
larger law enforcement agencies have a department, division or section specifically designed 
to gather disparate pieces of information and develop criminal intelligence.”391
 
 
Interpol divides “Criminal Intelligence Analysis” into operational (or tactical) and strategic 
analysis: “The basic skills required are similar, and the difference lies in the level of detail 
and the type of client to whom the products are aimed. Operational Analysis aims to achieve 
a specific law enforcement outcome. This might be arrests, seizure or forfeiture of assets or 
money gained from criminal activities, or the disruption of a criminal group. Operational 
Analysis usually has a more immediate benefit. Strategic Analysis is intended to inform higher 
level decision making and the benefits are realised over the longer term. It is usually aimed at 
managers and policy-makers rather than individual investigators. The intention is to provide 
early warning of threats and to support senior decision-makers in setting priorities to prepare 
their organizations to be able to deal with emerging criminal issues. This might mean 
allocating resources to different areas of crime, increased training in a crime fighting 
technique, or taking steps to close a loophole in a process.”392
 
 
Finally Europol talks about criminal intelligence as being “based on raw information which 
can be about a crime, event, perpetrator, suspected person, etc. Intelligence is the 
enhancement of this basic information which provides additional knowledge about the 
activities of criminals. Intelligence provides information that is normally unknown by the 
                                                 
389 Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Public Affairs), A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence, (Washington, 
DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), p. vii 
390 Europol FAQ http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=faq  01. December 2008 
391 Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criminal_intelligence  01. December 2008 
392 Interpol http://www.interpol.int/Public/CIA/Default.asp    01. December 2008 
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investigating authorities and is intended to be used to enhance the efforts of the law 
enforcement investigators, it is information designed for action.”393
 
 
 
4.6.2. Information concerning terrorism 
 
For Europol it is essential that all relevant information, law enforcement and security and 
intelligence service information are send forward by the Member States. The Europol 
Convention already provides a legal framework to share this information, but in its report to 
the Council on the implementation of the EU Action Plan on combating terrorism,394
 
 Europol 
stated that there is no structured provision of data from the security and intelligence service 
domain to Europol’s analysing work files on terrorism. 
Most of the data contributions from Member States to the relevant analysis work file and 
projects of the Counter Terrorism Task Force are from law enforcement rather than from 
security and intelligence services.395 This is rather linked to political will than to technical 
problems, as the “Bureau de Liaison” (BDL) network could easily be used for the exchange of 
encrypted information. Member State law enforcement bodies and security and intelligence 
services and Europol could easily have access to this network.396
 
 
The Council decision on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist 
offences397 provides for the designation of a specialised service within the police services or 
other law enforcement authorities. This service will have access to, and will collect all 
relevant information concerning and resulting from criminal investigations conducted by its 
law enforcement agencies (but not security and intelligence services) with respect to terrorist 
offences, and send it to Europol.398
 
 
                                                 
393 Europol. Intelligence Handling Booklet. The Hague, 2003, quoted in Steven David Brown, The meaning of 
criminal intelligence, International Journal of Police Science & Management Volume 9 Number 4, p. 338 
394 EU Plan of Action on combating terrorism, Council Doc. No. 9156/05, Brussels, 23 May 2005 
395 Evaluation of the Second Counter Terrorism Task Force, Council Doc. No. 12992/05, Brussels, September 
2005 
396 Proposal for a Council Decision on the transmission of information resulting from the activities of security 
and intelligence services with respect to terrorist offences, Commission, COM(2005) 695 final, Brussels, 22 
December 2005,p. 3 
397 Council decision on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences, Council Doc. 
No. 11259/05,, Brussels, 05 September 2005 
398 lbid. Article 2 (1) 
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The information that shall be transmitted to Europol includes399
• data which identify the person, group or entity;  
 
• acts under investigation and their specific circumstances;  
• the offence concerned;  
• links with other relevant cases;  
• the use of communication technologies; and  
• the threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction. 
 
Article 4 emphasises that “each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that 
requests from other Member States for mutual legal assistances and recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in connection with terrorist offences are dealt with as a matter of 
urgency and are given priority.”400
 
 
One of the problems Europol faces with respect to counter-terrorism intelligence is the fact 
that terrorism is in some EU countries dealt with by police agencies, whereas intelligence 
agencies are responsible for counter-terrorism in other EU states. Cooperation on a national 
level across intelligence and police agencies can be difficult, because police institutions tend 
to be interested in specific information about suspects in order to make an arrest, whereas 
intelligence agencies are very broadly interested in general information without prosecutorial 
purposes.401
 
  
 
4.6.3. Exchanging information 
 
As the figures show, the overall activity in message exchange, and the cases initiated upon 
this activity increased significantly since the year 2000. This increase could however also be 
explained by the counting of the messages, as a former Europol official pointed out in an 
interview. Whenever Europol makes a request to the national police authorities, all 27 
Member States authorities reply immediately. Most of them answer with a short message 
                                                 
399 lbid. Article 2 (4) 
400 lbid. Article 4 
401 Mathieu Deflem, Europol and the Policing of International Terrorism:  Counter-Terrorism in a Global 
Perspective,  Justice Quarterly Volume 23 Number 3, p.:336-359, September 2006, p. 351 
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communicating that they do not have any information in the topic. Yet these messages are 
counted as message exchange.402  
Figure 13 Progression of information exchange from 2000 until 2007403
 
 
 
Some Member States still do not give Europol sufficient or consistent support. In 2006, while 
one Member States contributed over 500 pages of criminal intelligence to Europol’s first 
organised crime threat assessment, another Member States offered only a single page. Hugo 
Brady claims that some Member States send police officers to Europol without the necessary 
authority at home to help other colleagues resolve cross-border issues, which poses real 
difficulties for building trust and strengthening co-ordination in international 
investigations.404
 
 Talking to Europol officials usually brings about the same conclusions: the 
level of participation differs immensely between different Member States. This difference is 
not only explained by different policy approaches but also by the level of engagement of 
liaison officers or officers seconded to Europol.  
If an analysis group of the serious crime department is headed by a – let’s say French – Police 
officer, chances are very good, that the flow of information between French competent 
authorities and Europol works perfectly well. If this person is later exchanged by a – let’s say 
                                                 
402 Interview with former Europol official, Vienna 
403 Europol Annual Report 2007, p. 33 
404 Hugo Brady, Europol and the European Criminal Intelligence Model: A Non-state Response to Organised 
Crime, Area: Europe – Security & Defence. ARI 126/2007, 1/12/2007, p. 5 
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Finish police officer – the amount of information provided by the French authorities might 
easily diminish, while the Finish contribution gets bigger. If this eventually proves to be an 
advantage or disadvantage mainly depends on the crime the group is investigating. The Finish 
contribution might prove to be more interesting in a Russian mafia case which involves 
smuggling in human beings, while French information might be more substantial in another 
case.  
 
The Commission’s proposal for a Council Decision on the transmission of information 
resulting from the activities of security and intelligence405 services with respect to terrorist 
offences discussed how to improve things on a legal basis. No additional legislation “would 
lead to the continuation of the current situation that does not fully meet the current security 
challenges”406 while a Council Framework Decision would allow the Member States some 
flexibility in the designation of contact points and the transmission of information. A Council 
Decision was considered as the best option, as “it establishes a mechanism for the 
transmission of such information without requiring the creation of new services or the 
approximation of national laws”.407 Finally the proposal asks the Member States security and 
intelligence services to transmit information to the national contact point408 and make sure 
that the information received by its national contact point is transmitted to Europol.409
                                                 
405 “Intelligence is the collection and analysis of open, publicly available and secret information with the goal of 
reducing policy-makers’ uncertainty about a security policy problem.1 Intelligence takes raw information and 
analyses it, placing it in the proper context and using it to draw conclusions about attributes of other actors or 
about the state of the world that are not directly observable. Intelligence-sharing occurs when one state – the 
sender – communicates intelligence in its possession to another state – the receiver.” James I. Walsh, 
Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union: Institutions Are Not Enough, JCMS 2006 Volume 44., Number 3. 
pp. 626 
 
406 Proposal for a Council Decision on the transmission of information resulting from the activities of security 
and intelligence services with respect to terrorist offences, Commission, COM(2005) 695 final, Brussels, 22 
December 2005,p. 5 
407 lbid. 
408 lbid., Article 3 (1) 
409 lbid., Article 4 
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4.7. Police cooperation outside of the European 
framework 
4.7.1. The Prüm Treaty 
For the Member States who want to walk a faster path in the coordinated fight against crime, 
the major weakness of the EU’s Third Pillar is its unanimity rule. It cuts every programme 
down to the lowest common denominator and reduces the efficiency and overall usefulness of 
the operational settings.410
 
 This might be the major reason for Member States to organise 
themselves outside the EU framework in groups like the G5 or the Treaty of Prüm group. A 
smaller number of members makes it easier to find agreements. But are these agreements 
serving the European cause; do the play a pioneering role in setting up directions for the 
whole Union to follow, or do they intentionally exclude the EU in order to set up an 
autonomous framework?  
The Schengen acquis, now binding on the Member States except the negotiated opt-outs, was 
actually drafted by an ad hoc group of representatives of six of the Member States behind 
closed doors. The process of incorporation was described as one in which Member States had 
signed up to a protocol of which no one knew the content.411
 
 What will happen to the 
agreements of the G5 or the Treaty of Prüm? 
4.7.2. Interpol 
4.7.2.1. Background 
 
Interpol is the world’s largest international police organization, with 186 member countries. 
Created in 1923 in Vienna, it facilitates cross-border police co-operation, and supports and 
assists all organizations, authorities and services whose mission is to prevent or combat 
international crime. Interpol is neither a supranational police agency with investigative 
powers, nor an organization sanctioned by an international governing body such as the United 
Nations.  
 
                                                 
410 Thierry Balzacq and Sergio Carrera, op.cit., p. 4 
411 House of Lords, „Defining the Schengen Acquis“, HL 87 (1997/8) in Carol Harlow, op.cit., p. 46 
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It aims “to ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal 
police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and in the 
spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”412 and “to establish and develop all 
institutions likely to contribute effectively to the prevention and suppression of ordinary law 
crimes.”413
 
 
The General Assembly is the body of supreme authority in the organisation and is composed 
of delegates appointed by the Member states. The Executive Committee is composed by the 
President of Interpol, the three Vice-Presidents and nine delegates. The General Secretariat 
serves as the technical and information centre and ensures the administration of the 
organisation. Each member country maintains a National Central Bureau (NCB) staffed by 
national law enforcement officers. The NCB is the designated contact point for the General 
Secretariat, regional offices and other member countries requiring assistance with overseas 
investigations and the location and apprehension of fugitives. The Advisers are experts in a 
purely advisory capacity, who may be appointed by the Executive Committee and confirmed 
by the General Assembly. 
 
 
Figure 14 
Interpol's structure414
 
 
4.7.2.2. Core Functions 
 
Interpol’s core-functions are: 415
 
 
                                                 
412 Article 2 (1), Interpol Constitution 
413 Article 2 (2), Interpol Constitution 
414 http://www.interpol.int/public/icpo/default.asp, 25. June 2008 
415 http://www.interpol.int/Public/icpo/about.asp 25 June 2008 
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• Secure global police communication services (a global police communications system 
called I-24/7, which provides police around the world with a common platform 
through which they can share crucial information about criminals and criminality.) 
 
• Operational data services and databases for police (databases and services ensure that 
police worldwide have access to the information and services they need to prevent and 
investigate crimes. Databases include data on criminals such as names, fingerprints 
and DNA profiles, and stolen property such as passports, vehicles and works of art.) 
 
• Operational police support services (Interpol supports law enforcement officials in the 
field with emergency support and operational activities, especially in its priority crime 
areas of fugitives, public safety and terrorism, drugs and organized crime, trafficking 
in human beings and financial and high-tech crime. A Command and Co-ordination 
Centre operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week.  
 
• Police training and development (Interpol provides focused police training initiatives 
for national police forces, and also offers on-demand advice, guidance and support in 
building dedicated crime-fighting components. The aim is to enhance the capacity of 
member countries to effectively combat serious trans-national crime and terrorism.) 
 
 
4.7.2.3. Differences between Europol & Interpol 
 
Interpol has a distinct but limited function in maintaining an international information 
network among police which is wholly dependent on the participation of the various member 
agencies. Technologically advanced systems of information exchange were set up and 
participating police agencies linked via the Interpol headquarters, which functions as a central 
clearinghouse. Interpol suffers basically from the same problem as Europol, namely the lack 
of sensitive police information. Taking into account, that some of member countries’ police 
agencies already suffer from a substantial lack of financial means, training or democratic 
accountability in their home countries, one might easily imagine the problems their liaison 
officers face at the international level technically, financially and ideologically. Interpol 
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focuses on cooperation in criminal matters over which concerns are shared internationally 
instead of seeking to accomplish more complex tasks for which it is not equipped.416
 
 
Basically Interpol has a more global approach, while Europol’s activities against international 
crime and terrorism focus on distinctly European problems or the European dimensions of 
more global concerns.417 The technical approach (national units at Europol vs. national central 
bureaus) for the mere exchange of information is pretty similar. Europol is still sometimes 
seen as a kind of “European Interpol” in this regard418
 
. The real added value Europol is able 
to contribute, is the work of its Serious Crime Department.  
But as we have seen above, Europol is actually not as distinct from Interpol as it seems at the 
first glance. If the Member States use Europol for the simple purpose of exchanging 
information bi-laterally, the European agency basically just duplicates Interpol’s function.  
 
4.7.2.4. The cooperation agreement 
 
Europol and Interpol signed a general co-operation agreement, which came into Force on 5th 
November 2001. In 2007 Interpol signed two arrangements by which the organisation became 
an associate member to two Europol Analysis Work Files.  
 
On 27 August 2007, the Director of Europol and the Secretary General of Interpol met in The 
Hague and the Interpol liaison office at Europol headquarters was opened. Additionally an 
amendment to the Joint Initiative 2001 was signed which allows for close cooperation and 
information exchange on euro counterfeiting. On 1 November 2007, the new permanent 
Interpol representative to Europol took up his functions at Europol Headquarters.419
 
 
 
 
                                                 
416 Mathieu Deflem, Interpol, in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern World, edited by Peter N. Stearns. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp.. 198-199 
417 Mathieu Deflem, International Police Cooperation against Terrorism: Interpol and Europol in Comparison,  
in Understanding and Responding to Terrorism, edited by H. Durmaz, B. Sevinc, A.S. Yayla, and S. Ekici. 
Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2007, pp. 17-25 
418 Interview National Liaison Officer at Europol, The Hague, 24 March 2008 
419 Europol Annual Report 2007, p. 86 
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4.8. Conclusion 
 
As discussed above, the specific setup of Europol poses a significant problem. As the Liaison 
Officers Network functions quasi parallel next to Europol, information exchanged via this 
network often does not get into the system of Europol. “The vast majority of information 
exchanges between liaison bureaux occurs outside the formal systems, and thus while 
providing very significant benefit to the participating countries the main loser is Europol, 
which is denied the opportunity to access the information. It is reported that up to 80% of 
bilateral engagement occurs this way”420 A possible solution to cure this problem is provided 
by the Friends of the Presidency “Allowing the usage of Europol's secure ICT infrastructure 
for bilateral exchange of information between the Member States (Europol as service 
provider). Where possible, information exchanged bilaterally should be included in 
appropriate Europol databases.”421
 
 (compare Chapter 3.2.) 
According to Monica the Boer, the way to a coherent internal security agenda may be 
jeopardized by two circumstances:422
 
 
• state security services find themselves placed in a more competitive environment, as 
the decline of the external security threat from communist states has forced them to 
explore new security markets, and 
• the police services in the Member States are also involved in an increased competition 
with their neighbouring services as “police effectiveness is an important catalyst in the 
credibility of state action.” 
 
The information that Europol would need to perform better and more efficient is at the 
disposal of the Member States. Europol’s analytical work is obviously dependent on the 
information they receive from Member States and other partners such as Interpol or the US 
authorities. Or as Max Ratzel, Director of Europol puts it:  
 
                                                 
420 House of Lords – Europol, p. 22 
421 Friends of the Presidency's report to the Future of Europol, recommendation 19 
422 Based upon Monika den Boer, The fight against Terrorism in the Second and Third Pillars of the Maastricht 
Treaty: Complement of Overlap?, op.cit., p. 217 
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“Our philosophy is that intelligence which is not shared is useless and sometimes even 
dangerous, because decisions on police actions might be based on the wrong foundations. 
(…) No country or agency can shoulder the fight against organised crime alone. The 
strengthening of international and inter-agency cooperation is vital and there is no 
alternative.”423
 
 
However, the information Europol seems to receive is growing in quantity and quality while it 
has to be kept in mind that Europol is still a relatively young organisation.424 “It is not extra 
work, but an extra benefit”425 and this needs to be communicated. In 2006, 12 of the 25 
Member States were considered to be “paix contributeur” with being France, Spain, Germany, 
Italy and the UK as main contributors. The fact that these countries cooperated closely in the 
formation of the G5 to push better information exchange could also benefit Europol. The 
Council Decision on the exchange on information and cooperation concerning terrorist 
offences obliges Member States to make available to each other and to Europol and Eurojust 
data relating to pending investigations and prosecutions in the field of terrorism.426 “Wir 
wollen nicht bedingungslos alles, aber eine ernsthafte Diskussion über die Mittel die uns zu 
Verfügung stehen sollen”427 argues Peter Gridling, Head of the Europol Anti-Terrorism 
Unit.428
 
 
When trying to analyse the situation of intelligence sharing at Europol level one has to 
remember that information about the degree of sharing in actual cases is impossible to access 
for outsiders. Security services are extremely reluctant to share such information, even with 
other agencies of the same national government. James Walsh points out that officially 
disseminated information on cases in which sharing has occurred should not readily be 
                                                 
423 Max Ratzel, Director of Europol, Towards a European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice?, EPC Issue 
paper 14, 12-09-2005, 
http://www.epc.eu/en/ce.asp?TYP=CE&LV=177&see=y&t=42&PG=CE/EN/detail&l=3&AI=449  
Retrieved 03. June 2008 
424 Interview with Yves Joannesse, DG Justice Liberté et Sécurité, European Commission, Brussels, 22. March 
2006 
425 Interview with Peter Michel, Data protection secretary, Joint Schengen Supervisory Board, Brussels, 14 
February 2006 
426 Council Decision on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences, Council Doc. 
No. 2005/671/JHA, Brussels, 20 September 2005 OJ L 253, Brussels, 29 September 2005,p. 22 
427 (We do not want unconditionally everything, but at least an honest discussion about the means that 
should be at our disposal.) 
428 Interview with Peter Gridling, op.cit. 
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trusted. Governments may be most likely to release such information only when the sharing 
has resulted in successful operations.429
 
 
This short overview showed how many bodies (Agencies, Committees, Working Groups, etc) 
within the EU framework are actually concerned with the fight against terrorism. Ironically 
one of the major questions is how one is able to coordinate these coordinating bodies in an 
efficient manner. This problem is partly based on the pillar structure of the EU and partly 
based on the geographical (and maybe even ideological) distance between Brussels and the 
capitals.430
 
  
The current situation does not add to the effectiveness of the European approach. Even if 
every single group has its expertise and know-how, the latent danger of conflicts and turf 
fights between these groups is evident. The House of Lords thinks that the proliferation of EU 
Committees could have been prevented if Europol had established itself as the lead institution 
in EU counter-terrorism efforts. But it has not been able to claim such role; partly due to the 
fact that neither the Member States intelligence services share information, or that the EU 
capitals take Europol’s role seriously enough.431
 
 
Daniel Keohane recommends the creation of a cross-institutional body, a “European security 
committee” (ESC)432
 
. Its primary role would be to advise European head of government on 
security matters. The chairmanship would alternate between the EU’s High Representative for 
foreign policy and the chair of the JHA ministerial council which would, according to 
Keohane, guarantee that ESC members addressed the concerns of both internal and external 
security decision-makers. The other permanent members of the ESC should include the 
counter-terrorism co-ordinator, the chief of the EU military Committee, the director of 
Europol, the justice commissioner and the head of the Situation Centre.  
In my opinion the establishment of just another coordinating group would not really cure the 
situation. Keohane’s ESC could help in bringing CFSP and JHA together, but it would only 
be another political round. As the experience show, there have been enough political 
decisions, pamphlets and even legislation on joining forces in the fight against terrorism. 
                                                 
429 James I. Walsh, Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union: Institutions Are Not Enough, JCMS 2006 
Volume 44., Number 3. p. 634 
430 Working structures of the Council in terrorism matters – Options paper, op.cit. 
431 House of Lord, European Union Committee, After Madrid: the EU’s response to terrorism, March 2005 
432 Daniel Keohane, The EU and counter-terrorism,, op.cit., p. 20 
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The problems start when it comes down to practical multilateral cooperation. And here 
it makes more sense to use an already established agency with expertise in the fight against 
terrorism as a focal point. The choice for Europol seems almost logical: It is the European law 
enforcement agency, it had – compared to the recent nature of the Third Pillar – time enough 
to establish itself, and it employs experts in the fight against terrorism.433
 
 
A possible way to bring Europol “into the game” would be to continue the establishment of a 
so called “old boy network”. The employment of Peter Gridling as chief of the Anti Terrorism 
Unit might have had this intention.434 The idea already worked quiet in increasing the role of 
Europol in the Euro counterfeiting protection, where it got its influence increased. “What 
happened was that the old boys’ network was to some extend combined with the formal 
procedures of Europol (…) (they) ran to the Member States and to the other old boys and said 
just get us this information; we need it. They organized the whole thing in quite an informal 
manner and then they used the Europol channels to formalize, to whitewash so they say, the 
information they collected in the member states.”435
 
 
Jürgen Storbeck put hope into the new generation of police officers. Officers towards the end 
of their careers may find it difficult to be open to the necessary changes and they might only 
able to communicate in the language of their homeland and with a vocabulary derived from 
another philosophy of policing. Computers and new technology have only the vaguest 
significance which makes dialogue not always easy. But according to him there is a new 
breed of young officials emerging, who are bright, well trained and highly skilled in modern 
approaches.436
 
 
The big question on Europol is how it is able to provide added value. As Europol is not 
involved in operational matters, it is very often perceived to complicating things. Cyrille 
                                                 
433 See also Mirjam Ditrich, Facing the global terrorist threat: a European response, EPC Working, Paper N 14, 
January 2005,p. 33 
434 „Peter Gridling gilt europaweit als einer der kompetentesten  errorbekämpfungsexperten.“ Gert-René Polli, 
Head of the Austrian Bundesamtes für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung, Öffentliche Sicherheit, 
Nr. 1 -2, January February 2003 
http://www.bmi.gv.at/oeffentlsicherheit/2003/01_02/artikel_8.asp 07 May 2006 
435 Cyrille Fijnaut, On organized crime and police cooperation in the European union – lessons learned, 
Research and Evaluation Community, Contract and Aboriginal policing Services, Royal Canadian Mounted 
police, Ottawa, 2003,p. 7 
436 Jürgen Storbeck, The European Union and Enlargement: Challenge and Opportunity for Europol in the Fight 
Against International Crime, Kluwer Law International, European Foreign Affairs Review 8: 283–288, 2003, p. 
285 
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Fijnaut claims that police officers in the Member States - and especially those in criminal 
intelligence - quite often think that Europol (as it is now) is just one more complicating factor, 
and that they already have to cope with so many obstacles in international operations. For 
them Europol has no added value and it can't easily have added value because it is not 
involved in domestic police operations. Police officers are therefore not always willing to 
share information with Europol because it makes no sense to them. So Europol to some extent 
hopes that the possibility for it to join multi-national task forces will stimulate the flow of 
information between it and the member states.437
 
 
 
 
                                                 
437 Marcel-Eugene LeBeuf, On organized crime and police cooperation in the European Union – lessons learned. 
An Interview with professor Cyrille Fijnaut, Trends in Organized Crime/Vol. 7, No. 4, Summer 2002, p. 58 
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5. Joint Investigation Teams 
 
A tool which should enable Europol officers to get involved in investigative work was created 
with Joint Investigation Teams (JIT). Already the Amsterdam Treaty introduced the principle 
to “enable Europol to facilitate and support the preparation, and to encourage the coordination 
and carrying out, of specific investigative actions by the competent authorities of the Member 
States, including operational actions of joint teams comprising representatives of Europol in a 
support capacity.”438
 
  
This principle was again underlined by the Tampere Conclusions “Maximum benefit should 
be derived from co-operation between Member States' authorities when investigating cross-
border crime in any Member State. The European Council calls for joint investigative teams 
as foreseen in the Treaty to be set up without delay, as a first step, to combat trafficking in 
drugs and human beings as well as terrorism. The rules to be set up in this respect should 
allow representatives of Europol to participate, as appropriate, in such teams in a support 
capacity.”439
 
 
However even Europol admits that the JIT initiative had not been widely accepted in practice 
by the Member States. Reasons for this seem to include: insecurity/uncertainty about national 
implementation of Article 13 of the Mutual Legal Assistance Convention and the Framework 
Decision on JITs, lack of awareness of the JITs as an investigative option; and, a lack of 
funding, as JITs can be expensive to negotiate and operate.440
 
 
 
5.1. The legal background 
 
In accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on the European Union, Article 13 of the 2000 
Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (hereinafter Convention on 
                                                 
438 Amsterdam Treaty, K 2 (2 a) 
439 Tampere Conclusions, Council document SN 200/99, IX. Stepping up co-operation against crime 
440 JIT – Historical Background, Europol website, 
http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=content_jit&item=jit_historical_background 
24. November 2008 
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Mutual Legal Assistance) provided the legal basis for JITs as an instrument to tackle 
transborder crime. 
 
As the ratification of the Convention turned out to be a “rather lengthy” process, some 
Member States took the initiative for the legally binding Framework Decision on Joint 
Investigation Teams which was adopted by the Council in 2002.441 This Framework Decision 
reproduced Articles 13, 15 and 16 of the Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance,442
 
 dealing 
not only with the setting up of teams but also with criminal and civil liability regarding 
officials. It did not oblige Member States to set up JITs but rather aimed at providing the 
Member States with the required legal framework to do so. 
When the Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance finally entered into force on 23 August 
2005, it replaced the Framework Decision on Joint Investigation Teams. 
 
                                                 
441 Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union, 
Brussels, 29 May 2000 OJ C 197/3 
442 Council Framework Decision on Joint Investigation Teams, Council Doc. No. 2002/465/JHA, Brussels, 13 
June 2002, OJ L 162/1 
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5.2. Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance 
 
Article 13 of the Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance focuses on the setting up of JITs 
and provides a legal basis. Until November 2008 the Convention was signed by all Member 
States excluding Greece, Italy, Ireland and Luxembourg. 
 
Article 4 (Para 4) of Article 13 allows requests to be made via Interpol where an urgent reply 
is needed. In addition the reference in the paragraph to anybody competent under provisions 
introduced pursuant to the Treaty on European Union was primarily designed to enable 
requests to be channelled through a body such as Europol or a body yet to be created, such as 
Eurojust, if it were authorised to fulfil that function in the future.443
 
 
One of the obstacles for JITs had been the lack of a specific framework within which such 
teams should be established and operated. To meet that concern it was decided that the 
relevant matters should be dealt with in the Convention. Article 13 Para 1 standardised and 
facilitated the operation of joint teams by defining the role of the team leader and its 
relationship to the team. The team has to act within the scope of the national law of the 
Member States in which the team operates. As a consequence, the team leader has to have the 
nationality of the Member States in which the team is operating, to ensure that national law is 
applied. If the investigation is carried out in more than one Member States, the leadership of 
the team has to change and will be taken over by as many members as the number of Member 
States in which the team operates.444
 
 
Para 5, 6 and 7 concentrate on the competences of the seconded team members, para 8 
regulates possible assistance from a Member States other than those which have set up the 
team, para 9 and 10 concentrate on the exchange of information and para 12 paves the way for 
the Member States to agree that persons who are not representatives of their competent 
authorities can take part in the activities of the team. It should be noted that specific reference 
is made to officials of bodies set up pursuant to the Treaty on European Union., meaning 
Europol or Eurojust. 
 
                                                 
443 Explanatory Report - Official Journal C 379 of 29.12.2000, Explanatory report on the Convention of 29 May 
2000 on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union (Text 
approved by the Council on 30 November 2000) 
444 Claudia Gualtieri, Joint Investigation Teams, ERA Forum 8 2007, p 235 
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In 2003 a Council Recommendation proposed a model agreement to facilitate the setting up of 
JITs as referred to in Article 13 of the Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance.445
 
 By 
providing a template for the setting up of JITs it intended to help facilitating the 
implementation of Article 13 Joint Investigation Teams and reminded the user of possible 
open questions like costs, office accommodation, insurance, allowances, and so on. 
Furthermore it contains provisions on the participating authorities, the purpose of the JIT, the 
duration. Section 7 is dedicated to the participation of officials from Europol, Eurojust, Olaf 
or other bodies set up under the Treaty. It mentions that the exact arrangements of such an 
agreement are subject to a separate agreement, for which a model is provided for in the 
appendix to the model agreement. 
Another Council recommendation concerned the establishment of joint teams for the 
gathering and exchange of information on suspected cases of terrorism in the pre-criminal 
investigative phase and was adopted by the JHA Council in 2002446. The aim was the 
establishment of JIT for “gathering and exchanging information in accordance with national 
law including constitutional provisions in order to combat terrorism”. These teams would be 
made up of officials of national competent authorities from participating Member States and 
could be assisted by Europol officers in accordance with the Europol Convention.447
 
 
                                                 
445 COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION of 8 May 2003 on a model agreement for setting up a joint investigation 
team (JIT) (2003/C 121/01) 
446 Council recommendation for the establishment of multinational ad-hoc teams for gathering and exchanging 
information on terrorists, 25. April 2002 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/polju/EN/EJN278.pdf, 24. November 2008 
447 The Council recommendations basically consisted only of two recommendations, namely  
“The aim is the establishment of such teams for gathering and exchanging information in accordance with 
national law including constitutional provisions in order to combat terrorism as defined in European Union 
instruments. They would be able to work more expeditiously and more effectively, within a framework adequate 
for the purposes of Member States interested in participating, with cooperation subject in all cases to national 
law and the authority and legislation of the Member State in which the activities are carried out.” and 
“Such teams would be made up of officials of national competent authorities from participating Member States 
that are responsible for combating terrorism in the European Union, and could be assisted by Europol officers, 
provided that their participation is requested by the team, in accordance with the Europol Convention.”, Council 
recommendation for the establishment of multinational ad-hoc teams for gathering and exchanging information 
on terrorists, op.cit. 
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5.3. Europol taking part 
 
The legal basis for the participation of Europol in JITs is Article 3a of the Europol 
Convention, which was inserted by the so called JIT Protocol.448
 
 The long span it took before 
it was ratified by all Member States – nearly five years from its adoption by the Council to the 
entry into force on 29 March 2007 – shows one again how cumbersome the process of 
modifying Europol proofs to be in practise. Since then, Europol staff has been allowed to 
participate in JITs in a supporting capacity. This will continue under the Council Decision 
establishing Europol, allowing the teams to take advantage in particular of the analytical 
strengths of Europol staff. 
Para 1 of Article 3a states, that Europol officials may participate in a support capacity in Joint 
Investigation Teams and that Europol official may - within the limits provided for by the law 
of the Member State where the joint investigation team operates - assist in all activities and 
exchange information with all members of the Joint Investigation Team. They shall however 
not take part in any coercive measures. Bart de Buck describes this wording as rather 
unfortunate, ass there is a contradiction between “can assist in all activities” and “shall not 
take part in the taking of any coercive measures”.449
 
 For him it remains unclear, weather 
Europol officials may assist or even be present while operational actions planned by a JIT are 
carried out. An offered solution would be to grant Europol officials an “expert” status, 
allowing them to assist national police officers in the carrying out of coercive measures. 
Para 2 of Article 3a of the Europol Convention regulates the administrative implementation of 
the participation of Europol officials in a JIT, which shall be laid down in an arrangement 
between the Director of Europol and the competent authorities of the Member States 
participating in the joint investigation team, with the involvement of the National Units. 
 
Para 3 declares that Europol officials shall carry out their tasks under the leadership of the 
leader of the team; para 4 indicates that Europol may liaise directly with the members of the 
JIT and provide information from any of the components of the computerised system of 
collected information; para 5 states that information obtained by a Europol official while part 
                                                 
448 Inserted by the Council Act of 28 November 2002, Official Journal 312, 16/12/2002 
449 Bart de Buck, Joint Investigation Teams: The participation of Europol officials, ERA Forum 8 2007, 
Published online 14 June 2008, p. 260 
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of a JIT may be - with the consent and under the responsibility of the Member State which 
provided the information - included in the computerised system.  
 
The Protocol also states in Article 2 that the immunity of Europol’s staff members in respect 
to words spoken or written and/or acts performed by them in the exercise of their official 
functions, does not extend to their activities as participants in the Joint Investigation Teams. 
 
According to Bart de Buck450
 
 the main principle of Europol’s involvement in JITs is that 
Europol is there to provide its support. This support is subject to certain conditions: its 
involvement must be expressly requested by one or more Member States participating in the 
JIT, the JIT must include amongst its participants at least two Member States with which 
Europol has concluded a Cooperation Agreement with, and the offences investigated must fall 
within the scope of Europol’s mandate. 
He sees Europol’s support for a JIT possible in three ways: as “communication channel” in 
which Europol offers the participants a fast and secure telecommunications network, as 
“analytical support” in which Europol disseminates analytical reports containing assembled 
intelligence and as “logistical support” where Europol offers meeting facilities and the 
maintain aces of an operations support centre.451
 
  
                                                 
450 Bart de Buck, Joint Investigation Teams: The participation of Europol officials, ERA Forum 8 2007, 
Published online 14 June 2008, p. 257 
451 lbid. p. 258  
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5.4. Eurojust getting involved 
 
The members of the Eurojust College may participate or even ask to initiate JITs in two 
different ways: either by of individual National Members and or by a request of the College as 
a whole.  
 
• Article 6 of the Eurojust Decision enables individual national members of Eurojust to 
ask the competent authorities to consider setting up a JIT.452
 
 In this case Eurojust has 
the simple right to request the Member States to reflect on the possibility of setting up 
a JIT in a particular case. 
• Under Article 7 the College453 may ask the competent authorities to set up a JIT.454 In 
this case Eurojust must give its reasons for the request, but is also able to execute 
more power. In the case of denial, national authorities must give their reasons for non 
compliance to Eurojust.455
 
 
Apart from that, Eurojust offers – as Europol -  a variety of possibilities to “smoothen” of 
facilitate the work of a JIT, like helping negotiating the JITs agreements, support in legal 
questions (also on national level), provide facilities, or help with the involvement of other non 
participating countries.456
 
 
                                                 
452 Article 6a (IV) “When Eurojust acts through its national members concerned, it (a) may ask the competent 
authorities of the Member States concerned to consider (iv) setting up a joint investigation team in keeping with 
the relevant cooperation instruments”, COUNCIL DECISION of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a 
view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime, (2002/187/JHA), OJ L 63/1, 6.3.2002 
453 Article 10 “The College shall consist of all the national members. Each national member shall have one vote.” 
libid. 
454 Article 7 “When Eurojust acts as a College, it: (a) may in relation to the types of crime and the offences 
referred to in Article 4(1) ask the competent authorities of the Member States concerned, giving its reasons: (iv) 
to set up a joint investigation team in keeping with the relevant cooperation instruments”, lbid. 
455 Article 8 “If the competent authorities of the Member State concerned decide not to comply with a request 
referred to in Article 7(a), they shall inform Eurojust of their decision and of the reasons for it unless, in the 
cases referred to in Article 7(a)(i), (ii) and (v), they are unable to give their reasons because: (i) to do so would 
harm essential national security interests, or (ii) to do so would jeopardise the success of investigations under 
way or the safety of individuals.” lbid. 
456 Monika Helmberg, Eurojust and Joint Investigation Teams: How Eurojust can support JIT’s, ERA Forum 8 
2007, pp. 249 
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5.5. JITs national experts network 
5.5.1. Guiding principles 
 
In order to help implementing the Hague Programme, the Luxembourg Presidency suggested 
in 2005 that a national expert on JITs should be designated by each Member State, to install a 
network of expertise on JITs. This lead to an Article 36 Committee (Cats) agreement that an 
informal JITs Experts Network should be established.457
 
. 
This initiative was mainly due to the limited experience within the Member States regarding 
the use of joint investigation teams. Until summer 2005 only three JITs -one between the UK 
and the Netherlands and two between France and Spain- had been established according to the 
Framework Decision model. These concerned two drug trafficking cases and an investigation 
on terrorism.458
 
 
The following principles were accepted: 
• all Member States agreed on the need to make better use of and share experience 
concerning Joint Investigation Teams; 
• in line with the commitment in the Hague Programme, all Member States should 
designate national experts; 
• national experts may either be a person or a representative of a generic organisation (a 
contact point, perhaps representing a law enforcement and/or a judicial authority e.g. 
Head of International Division, the National Criminal Intelligence Service) depending 
on national law and the circumstances and national arrangements in each Member 
State; 
• national experts will be responsible for liaising with other persons and organisations 
within that MS; 
• national experts do not necessarily need to have operational experience of a Joint 
Investigation Team nor do the need to be directly involved in the establishment or 
running of a Joint Investigation Team; 
                                                 
457 Joint Investigation Teams - Proposal for designation of national experts, Article 36 Committee, Council 
Document 11037/05, Brussels, 7 and 8 July 2005 
458 libd, p. 4 
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• national experts should not form a new formal network or overly bureaucratic 
structure but should be able to meet collectively or in smaller groups if this would 
facilitate the sharing of best practice and experience. These meetings should be 
organised in a flexible way, perhaps in the margins of a working group or at Eurojust 
or Europol, as appropriate. 
 
The main task of national experts is to facilitate the setting up of JITs, be national contact 
points, be able to collect and receive information about best practises as well as on obstacles 
and problems in the setting up and organization of JITs, and be in a position to have close 
contact with Eurojust and Europol when dealing with JITs. 
 
 
5.5.2. The annual meetings of the network 
 
In November 2005, Eurojust and Europol hosted the first meeting of the Network of National 
Experts on JITs which was attended by experts from 22 Member States, Olaf, Eurojust and 
Europol, as well as representatives from the General Secretariat of the Council and from the 
Commission.459 The Experts agreed that a general meeting with all Experts should be 
convened as necessary under the aegis of Europol and Eurojust in order to fulfil their tasks 
and recognized the central role of Europol, Eurojust and Olaf in the international police and 
judicial cooperation.460
 
 
At second meeting of the Network of National Experts on JITs in November 2006 (again 
hosted by Europol and Eurojust in co-operation) experts and practitioners from 22 Member 
States, representatives from Olaf, Eurojust, Europol, the Commission and General Secretariat 
of the Council discussed the model agreement on JITs, how to identify the need for a JIT and 
other practical issues. And even though the national experts welcomed the work carried out by 
Europol and Eurojust it was only recommended that Europol Eurojust and OLAF should be 
informed “where appropriate” about any JIT project. Furthermore it was underlined that the 
“setting up of JITs should be a bottom-up process on the initiative of investigating/ 
                                                 
459 http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/jit_meetings.htm    25. November 2008 
460 Conclusions of the first meeting of the national experts on Joint Investigation Teams, General Secretariat, 
Council Document 15227/05, Brussels, 2 December 2005, p. 2 
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prosecuting authorities.”461
 
 This recommendation indicates the reluctance to let Europol or 
Eurojust take a leading role. 
A different, more optimistic picture was drawn on 29 and 30 November 2007, at the third 
meeting of National Experts on Joint Investigation Teams (again organised by Eurojust in 
collaboration with Europol, the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission). It 
was attended by experts and practitioners from 25 Member States, representatives from 
OLAF, Eurojust, Europol, the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council. 
The general rapporteur concluded that the “overall picture is extremely positive. It is a fact: 
investigations carried out with JITs are successful” and even though the JIT had a difficult 
start, it was reported that in 2006 already to 11 JITs were set up. According to the attending 
experts around 35 JITs were active in 2007, and additionally so-called "light" JITs and 
"permanent" JITs were going on.462
 
  
The perception of Eurojust’s and Europol’s work also seemed to have changed significantly. 
There contribution was appreciated as essential, as they could offer support at many levels. 
Therefore “it is fundamental to inform them about trans-national cases which appear to be 
suitable for the setting up of JITs as soon as possible. The idea launched during the meeting, 
of imposing on national investigative authorities to inform Eurojust and Europol in any 
occasion they envisage setting up a JIT should be taken in serious consideration.”463
 
 
This improvement might be linked to the publication of a guide to the EU Member States’ 
legislation on Joint Investigation Teams. It gives an overview of the legal possibilities in all 
EU Member States to set up Joint Investigation Teams (pursuant to Article 13 of the 
Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance), as well as the means by which Europol and 
Eurojust can support these teams under each legal framework. The finalised guide was 
presented at the second meeting of the national experts on JITs held at Europol on 10 
November 2006. 
It was agreed that a permanent Europol-Eurojust Team should be created which would ensure 
a follow-up to the JITs project. It would tie in with related initiatives aimed at supporting the 
network of the national experts on JITs (managing the webpage and organisation of the 
                                                 
461 Conclusions of the second meeting of the national Experts on Joint Investigation Teams, General Secretariat, 
Council Document 15023/06, Brussels, 21 November 2006, p. 5 
462 Conclusions of the third meeting of National Experts on Joint Investigation Teams, General Secretariat, 
Council Document 5526/08, Brussels, 22 January 2008, p. 3 
463 lbid. p. 4 
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annual JIT experts meetings) and the project of operational guidelines on how to set up 
JITs.464
 
 
Unfortunately the Conclusions of the fourth meeting of National Experts on Joint 
Investigation Teams were not published so far, as it would have been interesting to see how 
things developed further. 
 
                                                 
464 Lisa Horvatits, Bart de Buck, The Europol and Eurojust Project on Joint Investigation Teams, ERA Forum 8 
2007, p. 243 
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5.6. Issues concerning the immunity of JIT 
members 
 
One of the most important problems that needed to be resolved before converting Europol 
into an agency was the status of JITs. As explained above, JITs can also include staff from 
Europol. The concern was what would happen if members of a JIT were suspected of acting 
illegally during its operations and member state authorities wished to question or even 
prosecute them. 
 
The Commission’s initial thinking was that Europol officers would be subject only to ‘ex-
post’ lifting of their immunity. This would have meant that any member state which suspected 
a JIT member of having committed an offence would have had to make a request to the 
director of Europol for the officer’s immunity to be lifted. He would have then been able to 
refuse such requests if they were not considered to be in the European interest. 
 
The immunity issue has been a major cause of concern in a large number of Member States, 
such as the UK and Germany, who insisted that they should be able to question foreign 
officers immediately and prosecute them in accordance with national law.  
 
Siim Kallas, the European commissioner for administrative affairs, initially prevented the 
Commission from backing down on this question, as he argued against ex-ante immunity 
because it went against the principles of the EU staff regulations (which apply to Europol staff 
in its new legal form).465
 
 
Kallas eventually gave in, as the establishment of joint investigation teams was meant be 
encouraged and it was considered important that Europol staff would be able to participate in 
them. To ensure that such participation was possible in every Member State, it was necessary 
to guarantee that Europol staff would not benefit from the application of immunities while 
they are participating in a support capacity in joint investigation teams. Para 6 of Article 3a of 
the Council Decision on Europol regulates the status of immunity of Europol officials. During 
the operations of a JIT Europol officials are - with respect to offences committed against or by 
them - subject to national law of the Member State applicable to persons with comparable 
                                                 
465 European Voice, Commission U-turn over Europol officers’ immunity, by Jim Brunsden, Vol. 14 No. 7 : 21 
February 2008 
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functions. Additionally to the change in the Convention, the Protocol on the privileges and 
immunities of Europol, the members of its organs, the deputy directors and the employees of 
Europol was amended.466
 
 The amendments lay down rules governing the participation of 
Europol in Joint Investigation Teams.  
                                                 
466 Protocol amending the Convention on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention) 
and the Protocol on the privileges and immunities of Europol, the members of its organs, the deputy directors 
and the employees of Europol, OJ C 312/2, 16.12.2002 
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5.7. Conclusion 
 
JITs would basically have the potential to be an innovative tool in the fight against cross-
border organised crime. But so far police has only set up a handful – mostly on drug 
trafficking, fraud and terrorism – and none of those involve more than two countries. Police 
officials argue that this is because JITs are too bureaucratic to start and complicated to operate 
and say they prefer to use the old Council of Europe procedures or informal agreements while 
EU officials counter that JITs will become more common as soon as police and prosecutors 
get used to the new system.467
 
  
The expert group identified a number of potential problems468 like lack of resources; lack of 
added value for each involved country or authority; problems with national legislation and the 
asset-sharing regime; lack of European approach; Cumbersome procedures- especially in 
bilateral cases; easy setting up of traditional police co-operation; lack of knowledge about JIT 
and the language barrier. The group also made recommendations on how to tackle these 
issues, and underlined the importance of working as informal and unbureaucratic as 
possible.469
 
 This recommendation supports the theory, that Police officers in general have a 
pragmatic outlook on the world and that they know that trust is very important and that 
formalizing things can hamper trust and even destroy trust.  
“Within the police culture it is common to hear ‘we are all police officers’. We know who the 
enemy is, we know the problem, we know what we want to achieve. Why should it be 
necessary to write this down in a formal agreement - it just creates a lot of problems. (…) In 
addition, the moment you start to formalize these arrangements, all sorts of other people have 
to become involved -judicial authorities, chief constables and ministries. In the end you are 
organizing the bureaucratization of your own investigations and you spend more time on this 
than with investigating the case. Police have good reasons to dislike this formalization.”470
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Monika Helmberg indicates a number of legal problems with JITs: for example the gathering 
of evidence (where the future location of the prosecution already needs to be taken into 
account in order to ensure compliance with the conditions for evidence to be admissible in 
court), or the setting up of the JIT if more parties are added when new connections to other 
countries are becoming apparent.471
 
 
Nevertheless the concept definitely has a number of advantages: it enables a number of 
Member States to collaborate on specific cases in the fight against transborder crime by 
providing legal basis for multilateral cooperation instead of the – let’s call it old-fashioned - 
“bi-lateral” agreements. Members of the JIT receive information in real-time and are involved 
in decision making processes. If the JIT gets active within one of the Member States, the team 
leader is responsible of ensuring the compliance with national law and ensures the link to the 
national law enforcement agencies. These agencies can then provide investigative or coercive 
measures to be taken. 
 
The changing tone in the annual “Conclusions of National Experts on Joint Investigation 
Teams” showed the growing acceptance of JITs. The Member States – and the respective law 
enforcement agencies – clearly understood the usefulness and opportunities the teams 
provide. The “Future Group” however pointed out that not all types of criminal investigation 
are suitable for JIT:  
 
“For certain aspects of criminal investigation, it will probably be necessary to work towards 
a simplification of the regulations applied when an investigation needs to be carried out on 
the territory of another Member State. There are many ways in which police and legal 
cooperation – which are – closely related – could be improved. (…) Another simplification 
would be a system of written requests for information by public entities or individuals from 
one country to another. Such a system would make today's extremely constraining procedural 
practices more flexible, without affecting the general principles of legal cooperation in 
criminal matters.”472
 
 
  
                                                 
471 Monika Helmberg, Eurojust and Joint Investigation Teams: How Eurojust can support JIT’s, ERA Forum 8 
2007, pp. 247 
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6. Democratic Accountability 
 
“All our countries are committed to pluralist and 
parliamentary democracy, the indivisibility and 
universality of human rights, the rule of law and a 
common cultural heritage enriched by its diversity.”473
 
 
 
Successful police cooperation cannot be measured purely in terms of operational effectiveness 
but also has to be regarded as socially legitimate to be truly effective: “It is vital that any 
strategy initiated is tempered by those overall guiding principles which help to prevent an 
erosion of the standards and traditions which make a democratically liberal way of life 
possible in the first place.”474
 
 
In particularly important is the democratic legitimacy and accountability of the police forces 
which are executing the political will to fight terrorism.475
 
 In example the (very) hypothetical 
scenario in which police interrogates a terrorist who knows where a time-bomb is hidden 
raises the question of how far a democratic state can go in order to obtain information.  
The emerging role of a pan European police force poses the question how it fits into our 
concept of “European democracy”. The European integration brought a shift of sovereignty 
from the Member States to the Union level. But e.g. the action plan on terrorism was not even 
communicated to the European Parliament before it was adopted by the European Council. 
The only subjects of consultation with the European Parliament are legislative initiatives.476
 
 
Only within the context of intergovernmental and supranational development one is able to 
understand the discussion about the accountability of Europol. 
                                                 
473 Vienna Declaration, 9 October 1993 
474 Peter Chalk, op.cit., p. 186 
475 “Even if accountability does not play a big role in the practical cooperation”, Interview with Peter Gridling, 
op.cit. 
476 Article 24 TEU Amsterdam Treaty 
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6.1. Definitions of Accountability 
 
I will briefly discuss the definition of accountability. A very helpful definition is provided by 
Christopher Lord who argues that “political leaders and power relations be authorised by the 
people; that the continuous flow of decisions should be made in a manner that is 
representative of public needs and values; and that rulers should be accountable to the people, 
who should be the ultimate judges of their performance”477 For him, effective democratic 
accountability is provided by four elements: electoral accountability which legitimates and 
provides authorization; continuous parliamentary accountability of political leaders to a 
representative assembly; administrative accountability understood as ministerial 
responsibility; and judicial or legal accountability.478
 
  
The Commission issued a White Paper on European Governance479 where it identifies 
accountability as one of several values essential to good governance, saying that “roles in 
legislative and executive processes need to be clearer. Each of the EU institutions must 
explain and take responsibility for what it does in Europe.” This idea focuses on the policy-
making process and pays minimal attention to the more traditional obligation of government 
to render an account of its doings. The White Paper downplays the role of parliaments, 
reducing them to the level of pressure groups and other organisations of civil society to which 
the Commission wishes to entrust the task of collecting and collating public opinion and 
neglects the classical definitions of responsibility and accountability as recognised within the 
democratic systems of government of the MS.480
 
 
The growing amount of Framework Decisions and other EU legislation in the third pillar 
raises the question of its accountability. The Schengen acquis, now binding the Schengen 
Member States (except for the negotiated opt-outs), was actually drafted by an ad hoc group 
of representatives of six of the Member States behind closed doors. The process of 
incorporation was described by the House of Lords as one in which Member States had 
signed up to a protocol of which no one knew the content.481
                                                 
477 Christopher Lord, Democracy in the European Union, Sheffield, Academic Press, 1998, p. 15 
 
478 lbid. 
479 European Commission, White Paper on European Governance (COM(2001) 428 final), July 2001, p. 32 
480 Critic based on Carol Harlow, Problems of Accountability in the European Union, National Europe Centre 
Paper No. 53, The Australian National University, 27 November 2002, p. 5 
481 House of Lords, „Defining the Schengen Acquis“, HL 87 (1997/8) in Carol Harlow, Accountability in the 
European Union, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002, p. 46 
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6.2. Civil Society in the EU 
 
 
Another problem with regard to accountability is the diverging perception of the rights of 
citizens. The Swedish Journalist Union (SJU) 482
 The ECJ stated that "the objective of Decision 93/731 is to give effect to the principle of the 
largest possible access for citizens to information with a view to strengthening the democratic 
character of the institutions."
 applied under Swedish law for documents 
used by the Justice Council and obtained around 80 per cent. Applying for the same 
documents under EC law, the Council secretariat was prepared to release just 20 per cent. 
483 Something similar happened in the case of Kuijer484
 
 where a 
researcher in asylum issues was refused to receive documents on the ground of potential 
damage on international relations even though information supplied by Denmark showed that 
much of the material in the refused reports was not particularly sensitive.  
The European Ombudsman (EO) followed a complaint by the NGO “Statewatch” and asked 
the Council to provide at least a list of “instruments adopted” after it denied information to the 
“Statewatch”.485 In a second complaint from the same NGO that the Council had refused 
access to Minutes of the Article 36 Committee the EO made a “critical remark” which 
indicates that the EO will not make a finding of maladministration but is nonetheless not 
entirely satisfied with the administrators’ conduct of an affair. 486
 
 
On the 29th of January 2009, the European Ombudsman, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, urged 
the European Commission to set up a comprehensive register of the documents it produces or 
receives. This followed a complaint from Statewatch about the Commission's failure to 
register the vast majority of its documents. According to the Commission, the establishment 
of a comprehensive register is impossible at this point in time, mainly because of the use of 
incompatible registers in its different departments. The Ombudsman was unconvinced. He 
                                                 
482 Judgment of 17.06.1998, in case T-174/95, Svenska Journalistforbundet v Council, [1998] 
483 lbid.  
484 Judgment of 06.04.2000, in case T-188/98, Aldo Kuijer v Council, [2000] 
485 Complaint of 25.11.1996, 1055/25, Statewatch against the Council, [1996] 
Statewatch Annual Report for 1998, 256-9, Annual Report of 1999, 232-3 
486 Harlow, op.cit., p. 43 
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considered the Commission's failure to comply with the legal obligation to establish such a 
register to constitute maladministration.487
 
 
On 14 January 2009 the European Parliament adopted a strong Resolution, urging the 
Commission to follow the recommendation of the European Ombudsman (Complaint 
3208/2006/GG) on the Commission register as regards its obligation to "include references to 
all documents within the meaning of Article 3(a)488 that are in its possession in the register 
foreseen by Article 11489 to the extent that this has not yet been done.490
 
 
                                                 
487 THE EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN, Ombudsman criticises Commission for inadequate register of 
documents, PRESS RELEASE NO. 2/2009, Brussels, 29 January 2009 
488 "‘document’ shall mean any content whatever its medium (written on paper or stored in electronic form or as 
a sound, visual or audiovisual recording) concerning a matter relating to the policies, activities and decisions 
falling within the institution's sphere of responsibility", Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 
489 lbid. 
490 Resolution on public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (implementation of 
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001): Rapporteur: Marco Cappato 
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6.3. Accountability and police forces 
 
With regards to police forces, Bill and Alison Tupman distinguish between legitimacy and 
accountability. Legitimacy is the acceptance of the police by the public. If legitimacy was not 
given it would be followed by civil unrest and disorder. And if the police are used 
incautiously and aggressively to counter this civil unrest there is a good chance that the 
political order will be challenged as well.491 Accountability needs to be provided by a 
mechanism by which comment can be made on general policy. In most democratic systems 
such a comment is best made by elected representatives of the public. Police actions are also 
subject to the rule of law which can only be represented by magistrates, judges and 
prosecutors. This relationship between the police and local or national governments and 
judicial authorities is named accountability.492
 
 
The first part of this chapter will show the recent developments within the Third Pillar. How 
does the Council work, where did the Commission get in, how is the European Parliament 
trying to enlarge its influence and how is the role of the European Court of Justice perceived. 
The second part will in particular focus on the current discussion about the accountability of 
Europol. It is mainly concerned with the shrinking influence of national parliaments which 
leads to a lack of accountability. My analysis will concentrate on the role of the European 
Parliament which usually advocates itself as a remedy for this problem. 
 
                                                 
491 Bill Tupman, Policing in Europe – Uniform in Diversity, Intellect Books, Exeter, 1999,p. 66 
492 lbid,p. 73 
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6.4. Developments within the Third Pillar 
6.4.1. Scrutiny by national parliaments 
 
Liberal-intergovernmentalists argue that the Member State always intends and controls 
actions on the Union level. Therefore ministers, who meet decisions within the third pillar, are 
to be held responsible by their national parliaments. In theory this is a plausible concept. But 
the powers of national parliaments to scrutinise their governments in EU decisions vary.  
 
The degree of control exercised depends on two variables:493
• the balance of power inside the national system between the parliament and the 
government;  
  
• and the degree of parliamentary control over the conduct of foreign affairs.  
 
The most stringent instrument of control that can be issued by a parliament is through 
mandate, but this is rather exceptional. Beside the Danish Parliament no other national 
parliament has taken political accountability to such limits and it is doubtful if the EU could 
function if mandate were to be tried more widely. Protocol 1 on the Role of National 
Parliaments in the European Union of the Constitutional Treaty would have required  the 
Commission to forward all consultation and Green and White papers “promptly” 494 to 
national parliaments. It expresses the desire of the institutions to “encourage greater 
involvement of national parliaments in the activities of the European Union and to enhance 
their ability to express their views on matters which may be of particular interest to them.”495
 
  
But as this is rather speculative, we need to concentrate on the current methods of decision 
making. It is common for Member States to enter scrutiny reserves where their national 
parliaments needs more time to form a position but this power is more used strategically to 
achieve the bargaining preferences of governments rather than to protect the purview of the 
parliaments. The difference is that some parliaments, like the Danish, Austrian, Finish and 
Swedish can issue instructions to their governments which are more or less, but never 
                                                 
493 Harlow, op.cit., p. 16 
494 1 Protocol, Constitutional Treaty, On the role of national Parliaments in the European Union, OJ 2004/C 
310/01 
495 lbid.  
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completely, binding. In all of the six496 countries, the Ministers have the power to put through 
at least deviations from their mandates.497
 
  
This can, however, also be seen as problematical: Having the negotiator in the Council 
Working Group his hands tied also makes the decision making process extremely difficult. 
The negotiations take place with not only the representatives of the Member States but also 
with the national parliaments. As they are not present in the Working Group it is not 
infrequent that a negotiator says that he cannot change the position of his parliament.498
 
 These 
problems are twofold: On one hand the parliaments do not really have the means to bind the 
Minister for decisions, and on the other hand they are still influential enough to make the 
negotiations more difficult.  
Carol Harlow thinks that the format of informal, intergovernmental cooperation conducted 
though ad hoc groups, working groups and committees was designed to exclude the 
Community institutions under the pretext of lack of formal EC competence in the field. This 
did not only avoid a transfer of scrutiny powers to the European Parliament but also had a 
seriously detrimental effect on control by national parliaments.499
 
   
 
6.4.2. Possible roles for the EP 
 
The European Parliament takes accountability seriously and likes to present itself as “the” 
democratic European institution. It holds various powers which it wrested rather painfully 
from institutions and Member States during the process of Treaty amendment and sees 
success in holding “the government” to account as a vital component of the power struggle in 
which it is engaged against Council and Commission.500
 
 
The European Parliament has always been critical of the secretive nature of intergovernmental 
cooperation on migration and secrecy issues since the establishment of the Trevi and 
                                                 
496 According to Christopher Lord, 2004, p. 160: Denmark, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Dutch and Germany 
497 Christopher Lord, A Democratic Audit of the European Union, Palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire and New 
York, 2004, p. 169 
498 Hans Nilsson, Decision-Making in EU Justice and Home Affairs: Current Shortcomings and Reform 
Possibilities, SEI Working Paper NO 57, Sussex, 2002, p. 5 
499 Carol Harlow, op.cit., p. 13 
500 Carol Harlow, op.cit., p. 10 
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Schengen groups. It argued that the decision procedures removed the accountability of policy-
making from national parliaments without replacing it with powers of scrutiny for itself. The 
European Parliament’s demanded more democratic accountability and greater transparency 
and the right to issue an opinion on policy proposals, which was also supported by domestic 
politicians and finally lead to the consultation procedure for the European Parliament with the 
Amsterdam Treaty. According to Christopher Lord501
 
  there would be different roles for the 
European Parliament to play today.  
One is that the European Parliament should scrutinise the Council while the national 
parliaments should concentrate on holding their governments to account for their individual 
contributions. In another one, the national parliaments would concentrate on the 2nd and 3rd 
pillar where decisions are met by unanimity and the European Parliament should play a 
relatively weak role. A third opinion suggests that the national parliaments should guard their 
powers carefully against the European Parliament. It is well known as enthusiast for 
supranational solutions which would take away power from the national parliaments. The 
European Parliament considers itself as the Parliament of the European Union and thinks 
therefore that it has the responsibility to scrutinise all three pillars as decisions in one pillar 
may include external effects on the other two. It is important to remember that the means of 
the European Parliament to influence legislation are very limited under the Consultation 
Procedure. 
 
The national Parliaments of the EU Member States and the European Parliament have a 
mission and a mandate to monitor and evaluate the activities that take place in the framework 
of Title VI TEU (Police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters), notably those of 
Europol and the Member States supposed to actively participate in Europol's activities.  
 
Parlopol (a joint committee of members of the European Parliament and national Parliaments 
to oversee Europol) the Commission and the European Parliament called on the Council to 
strengthen the European Parliament's democratic power of control over Europol and, to that 
end, to adopt a number of provisions, the most important being502
• a provision amending art. 34 of the Europol convention laying down that one single 
annual activity report (including data protection aspects).  
 
                                                 
501 Christopher Lord, A Democratic Audit of the European Union, op.cit., p. 166 
502 What Future for Europol? Increasing Europol's Accountability and Improving Europol's Operational 
Capacity, European Parliament, Brussels, 7 September 2006 
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• a regular, formal exchange of information between Europol, the national parliaments 
and the European Parliament and a formally established Parlopol; 
• a provision amending art. 34 of the Europol Convention and conferring on the 
European Parliament the formal right to invite the Director of Europol to appear 
before the competent committee and make the Director of Europol accountable to the 
competent Parliamentary committee; 
• the establishment in art. 22(2) of the Constitutional Treaty of a legal base for the 
adoption of measures which will enable the scrutiny of Europol's activities by the 
European Parliament and national parliaments; 
• a provision amending art. 28 of the Europol Convention on altering the composition of 
the Europol Management Board to include two representatives of the Commission and 
two representatives of the European Parliament, in addition to one representative from 
each Member State; 
• a provision amending art. 29 of the Europol Convention and laying down that the 
European 
• Parliament shall be equally involved in the procedure for the appointment and 
dismissal of the Director of Europol, jointly with the Council; 
 
 
6.4.3. The increasing influence of the Commission 
 
The influence of the Commission increased when the Member States delegated tasks of the 
intergovernmental procedure to supranational mechanisms in order to improve the credibility 
and accountability of policy-making. Even though it was originally excluded from influencing 
the policy-making in the JHA field under the Maastricht Treaty it set up a policy portfolio and 
sought to develop credible policy ideas. The effort obviously paid off as the Member States 
decided in the Amsterdam Treaty to share the right of initiative with the Commission.503 Even 
though the DG LJS (Liberté, Sécurité et Justice) is one of the smallest DGs of the 
Commission it has a very high output. It is launched proposals are often made in consultation 
with the Member States.504
                                                 
503 Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union, Second Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2005, 
p. 370 
  
504 Interview with Yves Joannesse, DG Justice Liberté et Sécurité, European Commission, Brussels, 22. March 
2006 
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But they take a long time to be tabled and are not always in line with the necessity of a rapid 
reaction to new events. The European Arrest Warrant had been prepared for two years within 
the Commission after the Tampere European Council. This is the main reason why the 
Commission was able to present the initiative for a Framework Decision on terrorism and the 
EAW at the 19 September 2001 right after 9/11.505 The fact that the staff of the DG “Freedom, 
Security and Justice” will soon be almost doubled shows the increasing role it intends to 
play.506
 
 
 
6.4.4. The ECJ and its jurisdiction 
 
Christopher Lord sees “judicial or legal accountability”507 as the fourth part of effective 
democratic accountability.  Oliver considers “a framework for the exercise of state power in a 
liberal-democratic system, within which public bodies are forced to seek to promote the 
public interest and compelled to justify their actions in those terms or in other constitutionally 
acceptable terms (justice, humanity, equity); to modify policies if they should turn out to have 
been ill conceived; and to make amends if mistakes and errors of judgement have been made” 
as necessary to create accountability.508 Carol Harrow thinks that the ECJ has recognised its 
potential509
 
 and stresses this by his standard formula justifying the reasoning of decisions with 
the control function of judicial review.  
By ensuring that “in the interpretation and application of this Treaty, the law is observed”510 
the ECJ posses - if this power was initially intended to be granted is another question - the 
final word in interpreting the Treaties. It decides on validity of EU legislation and preserves 
the “institutional valance” of the Treaties, maintaining the balance of power between the EU 
institutions.511
                                                 
505 Hans Nilsson, op.cit., p. 4 
 But it is important to keep in mind, that the ECJ is also criticised on the bases 
506 Lecture by Hans Nilsson, College of Europe, Brugge, 25. March 2006 
507 see Introduction 
508 Dawn Oliver, Government in the United Kingdom: The Search for Accountability, Effectiveness and 
Citizenship, Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 1991, p. 28. 
509 Based on TEC Article 253 which contains an obligation for the institutions to „ state the reasons on which 
they are based and shall refer to any proposals or opinions which were required to be obtained pursuant to this 
Treaty.” 
510 TEC Article 220 
511 Carol Harlow, op.cit., p. 26 
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of democratic principle. In the view of some,512
 
 the ECJ has itself subverted the rule of law 
principle that all Union actions and institutions should comply with the terms by which they 
were democratically authorised, others think that it is acting contrary to division of powers 
principles on the ground that some of its rulings encroach on decisions that should be left to 
legislators, and some even doubt the neutrality of the judges as the ECJ is often perceived as a 
partisan for a particular cause, that of integration itself.  
The ECJ was successful in slowly enlarging his room of manoeuvre in the third pillar. It has 
always been arguing that there was a clear clash of jurisdictions in the Maastricht design and 
suggested that the intergovernmental conference should determine the limits of EU action in 
the JHA field. It criticised the lack of proper instruments and mechanisms for legal oversight 
of Council decisions. NGOs condemn the shortage of judicial and parliamentary control, and 
the subordination of migration issues to crime policies which lead to an extension of the 
ECJ’s jurisdiction to all migration and security issues.513 Within the third pillar, the ECJ 
cannot review the validity of acts conducted by national police and administrative agencies 
when carrying out their objectives meaning that the ECJ is largely excluded where it is, 
arguably, most needed:514 “The role of the judiciary is of utmost importance if we want to 
protect our democratic values and the individual.515” But it has judicial review over decisions 
and framework decisions and can rule on a dispute between Member States over the 
interpretation of acts under the third pillar. Member States can voluntary accept the 
jurisdiction of the ECJ to make preliminary rulings which are then binding on all courts in all 
Member States. Simon Hix thinks that “it is unlikely that most of the governments were aware 
of this implication when signing the Amsterdam Treaty.”516
 
 
The ECJ has no direct jurisdiction over agencies such as Europol - except in matters where a 
conflict of interpretation arises over the Convention between the agency and a Member State, 
or between two Member States. The Court of Human Rights would be the appropriate court 
when it concerns complaints from individuals about the way they have been treated by law-
                                                 
512 Critic based on Christopher Lord, A Democratic Audit of the European Union, op.cit., p. 211 
513 Simon Hix, op.cit,, pp. 371 
514 Christopher Lord, A Democratic Audit of the European Union, op.cit., p. 213 
515 Thierry Balzacq and Sergio Carrera, The EU’s fight against International Terrorism, CEPS Policy Brief, No. 
80, Brussels, July 2005 
516 Simon Hix, op.cit., p. 358 
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enforcement agencies. However, a as Monica den Boer points out, a complaint first has to be 
submitted to a national court in one of the Member States.517
 
 
                                                 
517 Monica den Boer, Claudia Hillebrand, Andreas Nölke, Legitimacy under Pressure: The European Web of 
Counter-Terrorism Networks, JCMS 2008 Volume 46. Number 1. p. 107 
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6.5. Accountability of Europol 
 
Whenever we discuss Europol’s operational accountability, we need to remind that according 
to the Europol convention the agencies tasks are limited to crime analysis, information 
exchange and co-ordination. Europol has only a relatively limited function compared with the 
wide range of functions entrusted to “normal” police forces in the Member States; it yields no 
executive powers. This has been confirmed by Europol’s management board518
 
, and is also 
made clear in the declaration on the police in the annex to the convention, which only talks 
about databases, support of national investigations, the development of preventive strategies, 
and so on.  
Therefore the discussion about operational accountability of Europol staff is difficult to lead 
as it is quiet unclear if Europol officers actually work operationally.519 Article 41 of the 
Europol convention states that “Europol, the members of its organs and the Deputy Directors 
and employees of Europol shall enjoy the privileges and immunities necessary for the 
performance of their tasks”520 Seconded liaison officers from the other Member States and 
their families enjoy the “privileges and immunities necessary for the proper performance of 
the tasks of the liaison officers at Europol.”521 However, one should keep in mind that it is not 
unusual to grant immunity to international police cooperation, as France did in the case of 
Interpol212. And finally, “If you want the best people in different law systems, you need to 
protect them.”522
 
 
As mentioned above, the Council Decision establishing Europol brought an extension of 
Europol’s mandate so that it may support Member State investigations into serious crimes that 
are not necessarily thought to be carried out by organised gangs. However this extension is 
limited by the requirement that any such investigation must at least two Member States and 
thus be cross border in nature. This broadening of the mandate went along with enhancing the 
role of the European Parliament. By establishing Europol as an entity of the Union, funded 
                                                 
518 when discussing the Rhodes vision document in 2003, Europol, 3000-19r1, 11 april 2003, quoted in 
Bruggeman, op.cit “what are the options for improving democratic control of Europol and for providing it with 
adequate operational capabilities? 
519 Peter Gridling doubts that Europol officers work operationally, Interview with Peter Gridling, op.cit. 
520 Europol Convention, Article 41 (1) 
521 lbid. Article 41 (2) 
522 Interview with Peter Michel, Data protection secretary, Joint Schengen Supervisory Board, Brussels, 
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from the general budget of the European Union, the role of the European Parliament in the 
control of 
Europol will be enhanced through the involvement of the European Parliament in the adoption 
of that budget, including the establishment plan, and the discharge procedure. With the entry 
into force of the Council Decision in 2010, the European Parliament may also call the 
Director and Management Board Chair to account for their actions.  
 
 
6.5.1. National Parliaments “left outside” 
 
The creation of agencies at EU level as the centre of a “policy network” of national agencies 
and other policy actors is likely to diminish the input of national parliaments as policy-makers 
as well as scrutiny stages.523 The Member States simply use informal methods of 
collaboration if they wish to avoid the legal and institutional controls of the EU Treaties. The 
chose ad hoc groups, Working Groups and Committees designed to exclude the Community 
institutions under the pretext of lack of formal EC competence in the field. This has a 
seriously detrimental effect on control by national parliaments and avoids a transfer of 
scrutiny powers to the European Parliament. The JHA agenda has a tendency to grow 
invisibly and create agencies such as Europol over which there is little control from any 
parliament in the EU.524
 
 If the question of parliamentarian scrutiny of Europol is discussed 
within the European framework, it is almost always linked or raised by the European 
Parliament and its LIBE Committee (Committee on Civil liberties and Justice and Home 
affairs). Basically Europol has no executive powers; no power to conduct wire tapping, house 
searches or arrests and other police measures which regularly intrude on the fundamental 
rights of citizens and have to be under the control of public prosecutors or other 
democratically accountable authority.  
Hence one could follow António Vitorino’s conclusions and argue that “it is no surprise 
therefore that for the moment there does not exist any judicial control of Europol at EU level. 
It has simply not been necessary, (but) things could change in the future and sincerely things 
should change.” 525
                                                 
523 Carol Harlow, op.cit., p. 13 
 The national parliaments, on the other hand, do not have any rights to 
524 lbid. 
525 António Vitorino, Democratic Control of Europol, Europol Conference, The Hague, 8 June 2001 
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control the decision-making of the Council or the Management Board as regards 
implementing measures. They do not even have the right to be informed of implementing 
measures or reports produced pursuant to the Convention.526 And their ability to scrutinize 
operational accountability depends on each Member States national decision whether or not to 
give information, consultation or control powers to its parliament.527
 
 
Europol Director, Mr. Storbeck, mentioned during a hearing of the Working Group X 
“Freedom, security and justice” of the Convention on the reforms of EU Treaties, that the 
parliamentary control of Europol is currently unclear and that there are also difficulties in 
being accountable to too many national parliaments. He proposed the perspective of control 
by the European Parliament as a possible solution and the final report of the WG raises the 
question if “Europol activities will need in the future to be subject to democratic 
accountability to the European Parliament and to the Council as well as to judicial control by 
the ECJ in accordance with the normal Treaty rules.”528
 
 
 
6.5.2. Europol in the Centre of the EP’s attention 
 
As explained above, police cooperation is a politically sensitive subject for the Member States 
which shows why decisions can only be taken by unanimity; why in addition to the 
Commission each Member States has a right of initiative for legislative proposals. The 
legislative accountability of Europol was focused on national parliaments who approved the 
initial Convention and had the right to control any changes to the Convention that are made 
by Protocols. The European Parliament was not consulted on the initial Europol Convention 
or its Protocols before their adoption. Its role was enhanced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
which gave the European Parliament the right to be consulted on Conventions and all 
measures implementing Conventions.529
                                                 
526 Steve Peers, op.cit,,p. 257 
 This means that the European Parliament has to be 
consulted if the Convention is amended or when the Council adopts one of the measures 
mentioned in the Europol convention. So far the European Parliament has been consulted on 
twelve of the seventeen measures implementing the Europol Convention and on all three 
527 lbid.p. 259 
528 Minutes of the WG X “Freedom, Security and justice” of the Convention of the reform of EU 
Treaties, cited in European Parliament, 26 March 1993, Rapporteur, M. Turco A5-0107/2003, 26 March 1993 
529 Article 39 EU 
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Protocols on the Europol Convention adopted since the Treaty of Amsterdam came into 
force.530
 
 
National parliaments are often provided with strong powers to commit democratic control on 
police and intelligence services, while the European Parliament has only limited control, such 
as the weak right to be informed and consulted.531 National parliaments have at least the 
power to block amendments to the Convention or planned implementing measures, while the 
European Parliament only receives a “sanitized version”532 of the annual report of Europol. In 
2001, the European Parliament adopted a resolution demanding the Commission to submit a 
proposal for a comprehensive reform of instruments of police and judicial co-operation. This 
proposal was meant to include a revision of the Europol Convention to bring the whole area 
into line “with highest standards and methods of democratic control of police forces of the 
Member States.”533
 
 
The European Parliament issued a number of reports, most notably the Nassauer, Karamanou, 
Turco and Deprez reports534
 
, asking for 
• budgetary powers: European Parliament involvement in the Europol budget procedure 
and Europol funding through the Community budget 
• appointment powers: European Parliament involvement in the appointment and 
dismissal of Europol’s Director and Deputy Directors and two European Parliament 
elected representatives to take part in the Management Board meetings 
• information and consultation rights: an extension of the documents on which the 
European Parliament shall be consulted 
• the strengthening of judicial control by the ECJ, and 
• ultimately the communitarisation of Europol 
 
The European Parliament emphasised, that “in order for the European Parliament to exercise 
democratic control, Europol must, as with the other European Institutions (e.g. the European 
Central Bank and the European Ombudsman) report on its activities in an annual exchange of 
view. In addition, the Director of Europol should appear before Parliament’s competent 
                                                 
530 Steve Peers, op.cit., p. 258 
531 Rapporteur M. Turco, European Parliament A5-0107/2003, 26 March 1993, op.cit 
532 Steve Peers, op.cit., p. 259 
533 Rapporteur, M. Turco, European Parliament A5-0370/2001, 13 Nov. 2001 
534 Quoted in European Parliament, Rapporteur, M. Turco A5-0107/2003, 26 March 1993, op.cit 
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Committees when circumstances so require. Finally, the European Parliament should have a 
say in the choice of the Director of Europol.”535
 
 
The Commission published a Communication to the European Parliament and the Council 
under the title of “Democratic Control over Europol” in 2002.536 This Communications put 
the need for an adequate level of control over Europol beyond doubt but it also points out that 
Europol is working in the highly sensitive area of fight against organised crime and that the 
challenge is therefore to find the right balance between an appropriate level of  parliamentary 
control on the one hand and the need for confidentiality and discretion of a police organisation 
to fight crime effectively. The existing controls could not be regarded as legally insufficient, 
in particular regarding the limited powers of Europol by comparison with those of national 
police forces, but the mechanisms are exercised in an indirect, fragmented and not easily 
understood manner.537
 
 
Hence the Commission proposed an institutionalised and regular information exchange 
between those responsible in national parliaments and the European Parliament. It follows the 
argumentation of Antonio Vitorino,538 that the intensified use of already existing provisions 
and procedures of parliamentary control at national or EU level would improve the situation 
already considerably. Furthermore the Commission proposes to establish a formal mechanism 
for information exchange between national Parliaments and the European Parliament and the 
installation of a joint Committee responsible for police matters which meets twice a year to 
exchange information and experience relating to Europol.539
 
 
                                                 
535 European Parliament, 2000b, in Christopher Lord, A Democratic Audit of the European Union, 
op.cit,p. 191 
536 Democratic Control over Europol, COM(2002)95 final, Brussels, 26 February 2002 
537 lbid.,p. 11 
538 António Vitorino, Democratic Control of Europol, Europol Conference, The Hague, 8 June 2001 
539 Democratic Control over Europol, op.cit. 
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6.6. Ways out of the accountability dilemma 
 
The last chapter showed how national parliaments lost their influence of the Justice and Home 
Affairs area which is dealt with by the Council. They parliaments lack not only the means to 
bind their Ministers, but also the information and knowledge to keep up with the topic. One 
possibility would be to include the parliaments more in the decision making process. Protocol 
1 on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union of the Constitutional Treaty 
would have required the Commission to forward all consultation and Green and White papers 
“promptly”540 to national parliaments. It expresses the desire of the institutions to “encourage 
greater involvement of national parliaments in the activities of the European Union and to 
enhance their ability to express their views on matters which may be of particular interest to 
them.”541
 
  
The wish of the European Parliament to have influence in the appointment of the Director of 
Europol or to receive the same report as the Council, and not a “sanitised” version is as 
plausible as the call for a communitarisation of Europol. A Europol with more powers most 
certainly needs clear structures of accountability and democratic legitimacy. 
 
Article 37 of the Council Decision establishing Europol now states, that the European 
Parliament shall receive the same documents, the Management Board adopts, and the Council 
endorsed before, namely:  
• the draft estimate of revenue and expenditure, including the draft establishment plan; 
the preliminary draft budget to be submitted to the Commission; and the final budget; 
• a work programme for Europol's future activities taking into account Member States' 
operational requirements and budgetary and staffing implications for Europol, after the 
Commission has delivered an opinion; 
• a general report on Europol's activities during the previous year including the results 
achieved on the priorities set by the Council. 
 
Furthermore the Management Board shall commission an independent external evaluation of 
the implementation of this Decision and of the activities carried out by Europol within four 
                                                 
540 1 Protocol, On the role of national Parliaments in the European Union, Constitutional Treaty, OJ 
2004/C 310/01 
541 ilbid. 
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years of the date of application of this Decision and every four years thereafter. The report of 
the evaluation should be forwarded to the Council and the Commission, and again as well to 
the European Parliament. 
 
The Council Decision marks an improvement from the point of view of budgetary control. It 
makes the control of Europol more democratic, more transparent. Article 42 states that the 
“revenues of Europol shall consist, without prejudice to other types of income, of a subsidy 
from the Community entered in the general budget of the European Union (Commission 
section) as from the date of application of this Decision. The financing of Europol shall be 
subject to an agreement by the European Parliament and the Council.“ This transposes more 
responsibility to the European Parliament, which I regard as a significant step forward. 
 
Article 48 rules that the Presidency of the Council, the Chairperson of the Management Board 
and the Director shall appear before the European Parliament at its request to discuss matters 
relating to Europol taking into account the obligations of discretion and confidentiality. 
Finally having Europol officials appointed as Community officials and will subject them to 
the same selection and integrity regime as their fellow officials in the Community.542
 
 So even 
if the changes introduced by the Council Decision in other matters might be considered 
modest, it definitely brought an improvement in terms of involvement of the European 
Parliament. This marks a development which has been necessary for quite a while, and 
became even more pressing with the new, wider mandate of the agency. 
 
 
                                                 
542 Compare with Monika den Boer, Select Committee on European Union Minutes of Evidence,   
Examination of Witnesses (Questions 146 - 159), TUESDAY 24 JUNE 2008  
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7. Conclusion 
 
Let me remind you of the underlying assumption of my thesis. The transnational cooperation 
between law enforcement agencies is shaped by a historical process of bureaucratization in 
which police institutions have a relative independence from the dictates of their governments; 
the police institutions share the same conception of crime and crime control and create 
transnational “expert systems” to exchange their knowledge; and a remarkable persistence of 
nationality can be observed in international police work.  
 
My chapter on the historical evolution of “Police and Judicial Cooperation” (chapter 2.) 
showed how police cooperation slowly emerged as policy area within the European Union. It 
started with informal meetings, and became more and more structured. Trevi was shaped 
under the impression of terrorist attacks across Europe; the idea of fighting illicit drug 
trafficking across borders gave birth to Europol. Even though there were set-backs when 
Member States had political issues about terrorism, the bureaucratization of transnational 
police cooperation developed further. The institutional progress in the third pillar followed the 
advancement of the “acquis communautaire” as a whole. When the Treaty of Maastricht 
introduced Police and Judicial Cooperation in 1993 and the Schengen Agreement was signed 
between five of the ten Member States in 1985, the conclusion that cooperation between 
internal security forces and judicial authorities should be the answer to a Single European 
Market, followed suit. It was liberal, western Democracies who shared a common 
understanding of human rights and civil liberties and refrained from instrumentalizing and 
abusing their police institutions who decided to let their police forces collaborate on an 
institutionalized basis within an “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”. 
 
In 1999, Europol became fully operational. It represents an “expert system” which aims at 
improving the effectiveness and cooperation of the competent authorities in the Member 
States in preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious 
forms of international organised crime. Its mandate has ever since been continuously 
enlarged, and will cover “organised crime, terrorism and other forms of serious crime (…) 
affecting two or more Member States in such a way as to require a common approach by the 
Member States owing to the scale, significance and consequences of the offences” from 1st of 
January 2010 onwards (when the Council Decision establishing Europol will enter into force 
 176 
and replace the old Europol Convention.) For this purpose, Europol is making use of a highly 
sophisticated IT system, which underlies – next to very strict data security standards – a 
comprehensive data protection regime. And the agency is able to hire international staffs who 
work as crime fighting experts in one of the serious crime departments. One of their duties is 
to condense their findings on pan-European trends in annual publications like the “European 
Organised Crime Threat Assessment” (OCTA) or the “EU Terrorism Situation and Trend 
Report” (TE-SAT). 
 
But Europol also serves another function. Beside the international staffers, or the “European 
part” as I call it, the Member States are represented by Liaison Offices and National Units. 
They are supposed to serve as an interface between Europol and national police authorities, 
somehow like in international permanent representations to other International Organisations 
like the United Nations. But instead of feeding their data into Europol’s system, they prefer to 
exchange their information bi-laterally, e.g. directly between Germany and France and 
exclude the agency and its experts. Informal estimations assume that up to 80 % of the 
information is exchanged outside the formal system by bilateral engagement. In this respect 
Europol pretty much resembles or even duplicates the work of Interpol. This very fact alone 
supports my third hypothesis, namely that a remarkable persistence of nationality can be 
observed in international police work. Lack of trust, turf fights and the overwhelming 
complexity of coordinating police intelligence work make it difficult for Europol to benefit 
from comprehensive data. The exhaustive legislation produced so far has not really been 
improving the situation successfully.  
 
Even if Europol is improving its cooperation with other European agencies and bodies, like 
Eurojust, Frontex, the Joint Situation Center or the Police Chiefs Task Force, the pre-
dominance of intergovernmental cooperation is evident. 
 
One might argue that the new Council Decision establishing Europol changed that situation. It 
establishes Europol as an entity of the European Union, funded from the general EU, and will 
enhance the role of the European Parliament in the control of Europol. And it enables the 
Council to appoint a Director by qualified majority instead of unanimity, which will hopefully 
prevent just another deadlock in finding a politically suitable candidate. Even the most 
influential organ of Europol – the Management Board which is composed by one 
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representative per Member State – will decide by a majority of two thirds of its members in 
most of the cases. 
 
But still Europol has only a relatively limited function compared with the wide range of 
functions entrusted to “normal” police forces in the Member States; it yields no executive 
powers. Its tasks are limited to crime analysis, information exchange and co-ordination. Even 
if Europol officers are finally able to assist in Joint Investigation Teams, they shall however 
not take part in any coercive measures. Nevertheless, it could be precisely those Joint 
Investigation Teams which might enable Europol to “get a foot into the door”.  
 
And instead of redesigning the whole set-up of Europol in order to impede national police 
authorities from bypassing it bilaterally, e.g. after the blueprint of Eurojust, the Member 
States strengthened the National Units and brought even more bureaucracy to the 
Management Board. From now on the Chairperson and the Deputy Chairperson will be 
selected by and from the three Member States of the EU Troika. This excludes a number of 
possible Chairpersons just because they do not belong to the “right” country, and it links the 
term of the Chairpersons to the – for Europol rather irrelevant – Troika period. 
 
From the perspective of democratic accountability, things improved satisfactory. Even if the 
agency is relatively weak compared to national police forces, and control by the national 
governments is guaranteed through the Management Board, granting the European Parliament 
control over the budget was a correct and overdue decision. I trust the Members of European 
Parliament to make the most out of this new situation, and hence compensate the lack of 
influence of national parliaments.  
 
During my research appeared some interesting questions to be asked: which impact will the 
Prüm Treaty eventually have on Europol? National police authorities opening up their 
databases for each other might on one hand make the European agency in The Hague 
obsolete; on the other hand it could mark a new era of mutual trust which might finally enable 
the European crime fighters to draw upon the information they need.  
Or how much sense would it make to merge Europol and Eurojust? Within European Member 
States the powers Police Officers yield vary considerably. In some countries they exercise 
powers which are considered to be the work of a public prosecutor in other countries. 
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Merging the two European agencies might help to overcome differences in national tradition 
and legislation. But would this eventually lead to the dissolution of the separation of powers?  
And finally the “old-boys network”: If Europol manages to hire senior law enforcement 
personal, with a vast personal network across Europe which is build upon mutual trust and 
respect; will those “old boys” be able to increase the amount of information fed into the 
system? Or is the structure really as rigid as my interview partners tried to make me believe. 
 
Finally one thing seems rather sure: Europol will not be given coercive powers, to create a 
kind of European Union FBI in the near future. The huge differences in criminal law and 
procedural law ask for much more harmonization or approximation in this area, before such a 
step could be done. And most of all, granting Europol such powers would heavily interfere 
with national sovereignty; even if – for example during the EURO championship in 2008 – 
there are already bilateral agreements, which allow police officers to work almost equal to 
their host police forces. Such a radical change of role on multilateral bases seems very 
unlikely. Therefore Europol fictional appearance, like in the 2004 movie “Oceans’s Twelve” 
in which Catherine Zeta-Jones plays the proactive Europol agent Isabel Lahiri, will stay – as 
the word indicates – purely fictional.  
 
 
 i 
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Abstract 
 
In 1999, the European Union established the European Police Agency (Europol) which aims 
at improving the effectiveness and cooperation of competent authorities in Member States in 
preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of 
international organized crime. My thesis aspires at understanding how Europol fits into the 
European architecture for internal security, and if its legal basis and the inter-institutional 
framework allows the agency to achieve its goals. 
 
I will start by analyzing how the evolution of the Police and Judicial Cooperation triggered 
and supported the installation of Europol and slowly advanced its role over the years. 
Based on the analyses of Europol’s mandate, I will argue that its setup – with factual two 
different entities – favors the by-passing of its “European Core”. I will then look into the 
agencies relation with the Member States and its interconnection with other European 
agencies and bodies concerned with a similar agenda. I will argue that even though there is a 
thorough legal basis for police cooperation with Europol, national police forces are quiet 
reluctant to make use of the agency. Lack of trust, turf fights and the overwhelming 
complexity of coordinating police intelligence work across borders severely hinder Europol 
from unfolding. A situation mirrored by the fate of other agencies like Eurojust or Frontex.  
 
Developments like the shift from the old Europol Convention to the new Council Decision 
establishing Europol, or the intensified use of “Joint Investigation Teams” might however 
effectively lead to a relaunch of the agency. Only if national police forces can be convinced 
that Europol does not only produce “added work” but also “added value”, they will be 
prepared to cooperate fully. 
 
An examination of a new policy agency can only be comprehensive, if the question after 
democratic legitimacy and operational accountability is asked. My argument is that the 
current regulations are fully sufficient for Europol’s mandate. A deepening or widening of its 
authority – e.g. towards executive powers – might however make changes necessary. 
 
 xviii 
My thesis will mainly draw on documents published by the European institutions, and 
secondary literature like scientific books or articles concerned with the topic. Expert 
interviews will provide a valuable insight on the agencies work, while news coverage will 
provide supplementing information. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
1991 begann die Europäische Polizeiagentur (Europol) ihre Arbeit in Den Haag mit dem Ziel, 
die Zusammenarbeit der Polizeibehörden in den europäischen Mitgliedsstaaten im Bereich der 
Terrorbekämpfung, des Drogenhandels und anderen Formen internationaler Kriminalität zu 
verbessern. Meine Dissertation widmet sich der Frage, wie sich die Rolle Europol’s in der 
europäischen Sicherheitsarchitektur für Inneres definiert, und welche 
Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten der Agentur durch ihre rechtlichen Grundlagen und die inter-
institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen zu Verfügung stehen. 
 
Zum Einstieg werde ich die Entwicklung der Polizeilichen und Justiziellen Zusammenarbeit 
untersuchen, und zeigen wie sie zur Entstehung der Agentur geführt, und ihren langsam 
wachsenden Einflussbereich begünstigt hat. Ich argumentieren, dass der Aufbau der Agentur 
zu einer faktischen Zweiteilung– in die zwischenstaatlichen Verbindungsbüros und einen 
„Europäischen Kern“ – geführt hat, die Umgehung des Letzteren sehr stark begünstigt. 
Danach werde ich die Beziehung der Agentur mit den Mitgliedsstaaten und zu anderen 
europäischen Agenturen mit einer ähnlichen Agenda untersuchen. Ich werde argumentieren, 
dass – obwohl eine ausreichende rechtliche Grundlage vorherrscht – die nationalen 
Polizeibehörden nur sehr zurückhaltenden Gebrauch von Europol’s Möglichkeiten machen. 
Mangelndes Vertrauen, Grabenkämpfe und die hohe Komplexität internationaler Polizeiarbeit 
erlauben es Europol nicht, das zu Verfügung stehende Potential in vollem Umfang 
einzusetzen. Darin ähnelt Europol auch anderen europäischen Agenturen wie Eurojust oder 
Frontex. 
 
Neue Entwicklungen, wie etwa der Beschluss des Rates zur Errichtung Europol‘s der die alten 
Europolkonvention ersetzen wird, oder die zunehmende Nutzung der „Joint Investigation 
Teams“ könnte den Wirkungsgrad der Agentur wesentlich verbessern. Nur wenn nationale 
Polizeibehörden davon überzeugt werden können, dass Europol nicht nur „Mehr-Arbeit“ 
sondern auch einen „Mehr-Wert“ liefert, werden sie bereit sein voll zu kooperieren.  
 
Eine Untersuchung der Polizeiagentur kann nur dann umfassend sein, wenn sie auch die Frage 
nach der demokratischen Legitimation und der operationalen Verantwortlichkeit stellt. Ich 
 xx 
werde argumentieren, dass die derzeitigen Bestimmungen völlig ausreichend gestaltet sind. 
Falls allerdings das Mandat Europol’s in Zukunft erweitert oder vertieft werden sollte – etwa 
in Richtung behördlicher Zwangsgewalt – wird es notwendig werden, Legitimation und 
Verantwortung neu zu definieren. 
 
Dokumente der europäischen Institutionen und Sekundärliteratur wie wissenschaftliche 
Bücher oder Artikel zum Thema bilden die Grundlage meiner Arbeit. Weiters boten 
Experteninterviews wertvolle Einblicke in die Arbeitsweise der Agentur, während 
Presseberichte zusätzliche Informationen lieferten. 
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